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Abstract 
Beginning in 2005, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed changes to the 
disclosure of risk information in the annual 10-K reports. Based on these changes, large firms in 
the US are required to disclose risk factors in Item 1A of their 10-K. This study contains three 
essays that review the current literature on Risk Factor Disclosures (RFDs) and employ empirical 
methods to test the usefulness of this disclosure.  
 The first essay reviews the existing literature on RFDs and provides direction for future 
research. This review discusses the strengths and limitations of current research in the field and 
suggests further research relating to the call for comment by the SEC, the contents and topics in 
RFDs, the usefulness of RFDs to investors, in contractual settings, and the market in general.  
In the second essay, I develop a new measure of RFDs that captures managerial discretion in risk 
factor reporting to examine the usefulness of RFDs in the private and public debt markets. In both 
debt markets, I find that RFDs are informative and that the risk profile of firms is reflected in their 
cost of debt. In the private debt market, I find that firms with RFDs above expectation have lower 
cost of debt as possible reward for transparency. Similarly, firms with RFDs below expectation 
also have lower cost of debt, suggesting banks already know that the firms are less risky. In the 
public debt market, I find that firms with RFDs above expectation have higher cost of debt while 
firms with lower risk disclosure than expected have lower cost of debt. The results suggest public 
lenders take RFDs as representative of firm risk. 
The third essay examines the effect of corporate governance on managerial discretion in 
reporting RFDs and the subsequent impact on cost of debt. To examine this effect, I focus on firms 
that pay a penalty for perceived higher risk in the public debt market. I find evidence that corporate 
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governance promotes transparency in reporting RFDs. I also find that risky firms with either strong 
or weak corporate governance have higher cost of debt, suggesting corporate governance may not 
be important to public lenders.   
The findings in this dissertation suggest that RFDs are both informative and useful to 
borrowers and lenders. The findings are useful to regulators in setting mandatory disclosure 
requirements, debt providers in evaluating firm risk, and management in implementing 
organizational corporate governance structures. 
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
Beginning in 2005, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) made it mandatory for 
large companies to disclose the most significant risks relating to the company or its securities in 
Item 1A-Risk factors of the annual 10-K report. This disclosure aims to provide investors with a 
clear and concise summary of the material risks faced by the issuer. Risk Factor Disclosures 
(RFDs) have, however, been criticised as boilerplate (Business Wire, 2016). The SEC has 
responded to this criticism by encouraging companies to improve on the quality of the disclosure 
(Johnson, 2010), while also issuing a call for comments on how to improve the disclosure (SEC, 
2016).  
Although recent research provides evidence that RFDs are useful, predominantly in the 
equity market, there are unanswered questions on the usefulness of RFDs in other settings. For 
example, questions remain as to how RFDs and managerial discretion in reporting RFDs affect 
the cost of debt including the impact of strong corporate governance on discretions in reporting 
RFDs. To contribute to the literature on RFDs, in chapter 2, I conduct a review of the current 
RFD literature and suggest directions for future research. In chapter 3, I develop a new measure 
to capture managerial discretion in reporting RFDs and then examine the effect of RFDs and 
managerial discretion in reporting RFDs on cost of debt in the private and public debt market. In 
chapter 4, I extend the findings from chapter 3 and investigate the effect of strong corporate 
governance on managerial discretion in reporting RFDs and the effect on cost of debt for firms 
that are perceived as risky in the public debt market. 
I find that RFDs are indeed informative and useful in the private and public debt markets. 
In the private debt market, firms with RFDs above expectation have lower cost of debt, which may 
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be a reward for transparency. Firms with RFDs below expectation also have lower cost of debt, 
suggesting banks know these firms are less risky and do not penalize them. In the public debt 
market, disclosing higher risk than the expectation is associated with higher cost of debt. On the 
other hand, firms disclosing less risk than that expected have lower cost of debt. The results 
suggest public lenders take RFDs as representative of firm risk. In addition, I find evidence that 
strong corporate governance promotes transparency in reporting RFDs in the public debt market. I 
also find that risky firms with weak corporate governance have higher cost of debt. There is 
however no cost of debt mitigating effect for risky firms with strong corporate governance.  
This dissertation is the first study to provide a comprehensive review of the literature on 
RFDs, thereby providing a platform for future research in the field. It is also the first study to 
introduce a measure to capture discretionary reporting in RFDs and examine the effect of this 
measure on cost of debt in the private and public debt markets. Furthermore, it is the first study 
to examine the role of strong corporate governance on discretions in reporting RFDs and the 
subsequent impact on cost of debt in the public debt market.  
The findings discussed herein are useful to regulators in setting mandatory disclosure 
requirements, debt providers in evaluating firm risk, and management in implementing corporate 
governance structures in their organization. 
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Abstract 
To a large extent, prior research has examined the disclosure of corporate risk information 
in firms’ annual reports. Beginning in 2005, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
proposed changes to the disclosure of risk information in annual 10-K reports. These changes 
mandated large firms in the US to disclose risk factors in a specific section of their 10-Ks, referred 
to as Item1A. While research on the impact of this change is still in its infancy, some studies has 
suggested that RFDs are vague, repetitive, and boilerplate.1 As a result, the SEC has called on 
managers to ensure that the risks disclosed reflect the risks faced by their firms. Furthermore, the 
SEC is reviewing RFDs and has requested comments on how to improve the disclosure.  
In light of the importance of risk information disclosure and the interest of the SEC in 
improving this disclosure, this chapter reviews the existing literature on RFDs to determine how 
informative this disclosure is. My findings suggest that RFDs are not boilerplate. Rather, they 
contain information that is useful to both investors and regulators. Following from this review, I 
identify directions for future research that can be informative for academic scholars, regulators, 
and other stakeholders that rely on RFDs in decision making.  
 
 
  
                                                 
1http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160121005251/en/Corporate-Risk-Disclosures-Dominated-Non-
Specific-%E2%80%9CBoilerplate%E2%80%9D-Fail 
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2.1. Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to provide an exhaustive review and synopsis of the current state 
of the literature on RFDs which will serve as a springboard for future research on the content and 
usefulness of this disclosure. Disclosure of risk factors in Item 1A of the annual 10-K became 
mandatory for large public firms in the United States beginning in 2005. Based on SEC regulations, 
firms are required to identify the most significant factors that make their stock offering speculative 
or risky. This disclosure aims to provide investors with a clear and concise summary of the material 
risks faced by the issuer. Management disclosure of RFDs has, however, been criticised as 
boilerplate after it was made mandatory by the SEC (Business Wire, 2016). This criticism has 
resulted in the SEC encouraging companies to improve on the quality of the disclosure (Johnson, 
2010). To ensure that the risk disclosures are informative, the commission further emphasizes that 
companies are expected to disclose risks that are specific to their operations and not risks that could 
apply to any issuer.  
 Recent studies assessing the information content of risk disclosures found evidence of some 
information content in the disclosure. Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, and Steele (2014), Filzen 
(2015), Campbell, Cesshini, Cianci, Ehinger, and Werner (2016) found that RFDs are informative 
to investors, while Brown, Tian, and Tucker (2014) found the information useful to regulators. To 
enhance our understanding of this disclosure and to identify opportunities for future research, this 
chapter presents the existing literature on RFDs and proposes directions for further research. The 
papers reviewed in this chapter are categorized into the following themes: RFD words and topics, 
investor and contracting usefulness, and market-wide usefulness. 
Papers on RFD words or topics identify and group common themes that address specific 
risks. The risk categories identified include financial, regulatory, tax, macroeconomic, systematic, 
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legal, and idiosyncratic risks. Among other findings, these papers showed that the number of risk 
factor topics included in RFDs has increased over time and that specific firm characteristics, such 
as research and development (R&D) intensity, are associated with the type of risk disclosed. 
Identifying relevant topics and words included in RFDs provides an opportunity to examine the 
risk category that is most informative for users of the report as well as a platform to examine how 
the contents of RFDs have changed over time. 
Studies on the usefulness of risk disclosures to investors have examined various topics 
including the relationship between risk disclosure and information asymmetry, future cash flow, 
future stock returns, volatility of stock returns, stock market reaction, analyst risk assessment, and 
changes between voluntary and mandatory regimes (Campbell et al., 2014; Campbell et al.,2016; 
Hope, Danqi, & Hai, 2016; Nelson & Pritchard, 2016). The main finding from these studies was 
that RFDs are informative and not boilerplate as speculated. There is still potential for further 
research in this field especially in relation to value relevance of risk disclosure and cost of equity. 
On the other hand, research on contracting usefulness of risk disclosure is still in its infancy and 
to date there is only one identified study on both debt contracting (Chiu, Guan, & Kim, 2017) and 
compensation contracting (Israelsen & Yonker, 2017). Chiu et al., (2017) find that RFDs improve 
information transparency and are useful to credit investors while Israelsen & Yonker (2017) find 
that RFDs relating to key man life insurance are associated with negative market reactions. Future 
studies could investigate the impact of RFDs on cost of debt or other debt market features, such as 
debt default risk and yield to maturity. Studies could also examine the relationship between RFDs 
and various measures of managerial risk-taking incentives, such as the sensitivity of managerial 
wealth to stock return volatility and stock price.  
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 Studies relating to the general market have also examined various RFD topics, including 
how risk disclosures change after SEC comment letters are received and the impact of RFDs on 
industry and product market competition (Brown et al., 2014; Yen, Li, & Chen, 2016). In general, 
these studies found that firms change their RFDs after receiving comment letters from the SEC 
and that receiving a comment letter has a spillover effect across the industry. However, questions 
remain as to the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on RFDs and the relationship between 
firm level characteristics and the extent of risk disclosure.  
A summary of the papers reviewed, including the topic of the paper, methods used, time 
period covered in the study, sample, and findings is presented in Table 1. The methods used to 
collect data on RFDs are mainly through content analysis employing both manual and automated 
methods to extract key words or key topics discussed. The studies vary from examining only RFD 
topics (Bao &Datta, 2012; Huang & Li, 2011) to examining both the topics and testing the 
usefulness of the disclosure (Campbell et al., 2014; Mirakur, 2011). The period of research mainly 
covers the post-mandatory disclosure period after 2005 to as recent as 2017, and the sample 
selection is mostly based on firms that have reported risk factor disclosure in the annual 10-K and 
fall within the definition of large firms as required by SEC.2 
 To identify papers on RFD, I first conducted a search using Google Scholar with the key 
phrase (in quotation marks) ‘risk factor disclosure’ to identify both published and working papers 
in the field.3 I focused only on articles that examine Item1A risk factor disclosures and exclude 
papers on general risk disclosure. Then, I did another search to identify Item 1A risk factor 
disclosure anywhere in the article from 2005 to date; this search returned over 17,000 articles. 
                                                 
2SEC defines small companies as those with less than $75m market capitalization. Thus, we can infer that large 
accelerated filers have market capitalization greater than $75m: https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/265-
23/adavernslides081005.pdf 
3This search included reviewing the citations of papers generated by Google Scholar. 
9 
 
Upon further examination, only 300 of these articles appeared to be relevant.4 The final search was 
conducted through Social Science Research Network (SSRN), which did not identify any new 
article,5 thus providing reasonable assurance that all relevant studies on RFD had been identified. 
The papers were read and the findings analyzed and categorized into various groups based on the 
key research questions of each study. As a result of this analysis, gaps in the literature were 
identified to provide opportunities for future studies that can contribute to our understanding of 
RFDs. 
This analysis is, to date, the only study to provide a comprehensive review of the literature 
on RFDs and it provides a platform for future research in this field. The findings discussed herein 
inform both users of the annual report as well as regulators on the usefulness of the disclosure and 
how the disclosure can be improved to enhance its informativeness. 
 The remaining sections of this chapter are structured as follows: in the second section, I 
examine Item1A-RFDs and review papers that examine either the topics or the content of this type 
of disclosure. In the third section, I review studies on investor relevance of risk disclosure relating 
to value relevance, risk relevance, future cash flow, and information asymmetry. The fourth section 
reviews studies on contracting relevance of risk factor disclosure. In the fifth section, I review 
studies on market-wide usefulness of RFDs which are not directly related to investing or 
contracting usefulness. The sixth section concludes this study. Sections three to five conclude with 
suggestions for further research.  
                                                 
4By the 200th article the search was returning irrelevant articles. 
5Google Scholar returned a search of both published and working papers. 
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2.2. Item 1A Risk Factor Disclosure 
2.2.1 Risk factor disclosure regulation 
Beginning in 2005, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) made it mandatory for large 
firms to report risk factors as Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K. This requirement became effective 
for fiscal years ending on or after December 1, 2005. In addition, the SEC required firms to include 
qualitative disclosures of risk factors in Item 1A of the annual 10-K filing. This disclosure is 
described by the SEC as a “discussion of the most significant factors that make the offering 
speculative or risky” and is aimed at providing investors with a clear and concise summary of the 
material risks in the issuer’s securities. Furthermore, the SEC provided guidelines for reporting 
this information, including examples of relevant risk factors. Specifically, the SEC required that 
the section be written in “plain English”, updated in quarterly reports, and avoid the unnecessary 
restatement and repetition of risk factors. The following guidance was provided by the SEC for 
Item 1A:  
Where appropriate, provide under the caption “Risk Factors” a discussion of the most 
significant factors that make the offering speculative or risky. This discussion must be 
concise and organized logically. Do not present risks that could apply to any issuer or any 
offering. Explain how the risk affects the issuer or the securities being offered. Set forth 
each risk factor under a sub caption that adequately describes the risk. (SEC, 2005) 
The SEC also provided guidelines on the content to be included in risk disclosures, suggesting that 
risk factors could include: (1) lack of an operating history; (2) lack of profitable operations in 
recent periods; (3) financial position; (4) the business or proposed business; or (5) lack of a market 
for common equity securities or securities convertible into or exercisable for common equity 
11 
 
securities. An example of Item 1A disclosure is presented in Appendix A.6 This sample disclosure 
discusses risks related to the business in terms of profitability, cash reserves, dependence on the 
chief executive officer, exposure to currency fluctuations, market and industry risks, and risks 
related to stock ownership. 
 One of the goals of including risk factor disclosures in forms 10-Q and 10-K, as outlined 
by the SEC, is to further enhance the value of forward looking statements in informing investors 
and markets. RFDs are not required to be audited externally. Criticism of this disclosure 
requirement has been based mainly on the fact that firms do not have to quantify this risk and 
managers are not held liable for the quality of the disclosure. Despite guidance from the SEC, the 
quality of the disclosure has been criticized as lacking information content. To address this 
criticism, in 2016 the SEC issued a request for comment on issues relating to the disclosure (SEC, 
2016). The main concern of the SEC is that the risk factor disclosures are generic in nature and not 
tailored to reflect the registrant’s particular risk profile. This request for comment, numbered 145 
to 156, addresses twelve main topics on RFDs including how to improve risk factor disclosure and 
whether registrants should be asked to discuss how the risks disclosed will be addressed, as well 
as if said risks can be quantified. Other issues addressed in the request for comment include 
whether registrants should be encouraged to provide more detail in their description of risks and 
whether generic risks should be included in the RFD. Table 2 presents a summary of the request 
for comments by the SEC and potential avenues for future research, discussed further in section 
2.2.2. 
                                                 
6 The disclosure is for Dynacq [Ticker: DYII] for the 2012 fiscal year and includes only a section of the full 
disclosure. 
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2.2.2 Proposed future research questions on risk factor disclosure regulation 
The following research questions can provide insight to the SEC on improving RFDs based on 
the call for comment summarized in Table 2. 
1. Is there a relationship between the level of specificity or detail of risk factor disclosure and 
its usefulness? Hope et al. (2016) provided initial evidence of an association between the 
level of detail in RFDs and both market reaction to 10-K filling and analyst assessment of 
fundamental risk. Other investor usefulness research areas, such as future cash flows and 
firm value, can also be examined to provide more evidence on the specificity of RFDs. 
2. Is there an association between the length of Item 1A disclosure and understandability of 
the disclosure? Dyer et al. (2016) showed that Item 1Arisk factor disclosure is mostly 
responsible for the increase in length of annual 10-K fillings, thereby suggesting that the 
length of this disclosure has significantly increased in recent years. Future studies can 
address the association between the length of 10-K filling and other measures of 
understandability such as the Fog index.7 
3. Are generic risk disclosures useful? Are there incremental benefits to providing more 
specific risk factor disclosures? It would be interesting to develop a measure of generic risk 
disclosure and examine the information content in comparison to specific risk disclosure; 
this will guide the SEC in determining whether more specific disclosure is necessary. 
4. What are the costs versus benefits of requiring additional disclosure? How will increasing 
the length of RFDs affect its usefulness? Additional disclosure comes at a cost and also 
increases the length of the disclosure. It is important to capture the negative implications 
of asking registrants to provide more information and how this request can affect firms. 
                                                 
7 The Gunning Fog index is a weighted average of the number of words per sentence and the number of long words 
per sentence: http://gunning-fog-index.com/index.html. A higher Fog index implies the text is less readable. 
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5. How are risk disclosures useful in debt and compensation contracts? Is the risk profile of 
firms reflected in these contracts? Most of the studies on RFDs focus on investors. As seen 
in comment 155 in Table 2, the SEC is interested in whether there are other audiences that 
value this disclosure. Examining the debt market provides an interesting opportunity to 
examine the usefulness of this information for other audiences. 
Research on RFDs is still at an early stage and most of the studies to date have focused on the 
content and informativeness of the disclosure, particularly in relation to the stock market. The need 
to further examine RFDs is significant considering that this disclosure has greatly increased in 
content over the years and it is one of the three topics responsible for practically all of the increase 
in the length of the annual 10-K8 (Dyer et al., 2016). In the sections that follow, I discuss research 
that examines various aspects of RFDs and how these studies can provoke future research that will 
enhance the usefulness of the disclosure for both market participants and regulators.  
2.2.3 Risk factor disclosure content or topics 
Based on my review, only two papers focus solely on the content or topics discussed in Item 1A 
risk factor disclosures: Huang and Li (2011) and Bao and Datta (2012). Huang and Li developed 
a new approach by applying a computational method to quantify textual information. Their 
multilabel text classification algorithm, called ML-CKNN, can identify 25 types of risk factors in 
Item 1A of the 10-K report. According to Huang and Li, this new method generates information 
similar to that of Natural Language Processing (NLP), but the approach is more advanced in the 
quantification of textual information.9 The method involved reading through hundreds of annual 
reports to identify 25 types of risk factors (Table 1). Four student researchers were recruited to 
                                                 
8 Out of the 150 topics examined, fair value, internal controls, and risk factor account for virtually all the increase in 
10-K length between 1996 and 2013. 
9Other methods include: content analysis using packaged software, counting keywords, and text classification. 
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label 10,000 risk factors into the 25 risk factor types. This process resulted in 3,153 risk factors 
from 4,267 companies’ RFDs in 2007.The ML-CKNN algorithm works by computing a similarity 
score for each label category and ensuring that the risk factors are properly classified. The 
algorithm also enhances transparency of the parameters and can be adjusted to recognise 
homogenous and heterogeneous risk factor disclosures. To test the algorithm, 21,077 10-K files 
from January 2006 to May 2010 were collected from the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and 
Retrieval (EDGAR) system. The algorithm was able to classify roughly 75% of risk factors and 
99% of labels. To validate the results, the performance of the algorithm was compared to other 
similar multi-label algorithms, and ML-CKNN outperformed the others in terms of accuracy based 
on five performance metrics.  
The risk factor categories (Table 3) identified by Huang and Li can be useful in textual 
analysis research in accounting and finance. This study indirectly contributes to the accounting 
literature on RFD by shedding light on the types of information disclosed in RFDs. The main 
weaknesses of the study, as noted by the authors, are that ML-CKNN ignores the 
interdependencies between different labels and that the algorithm requires a long time to run. 
Bao and Datta (2012) addressed the two limitations found in Huang and Li (2011). These 
limitations relate to the manual process of pre-defining the risk types before categorization and the 
substantial effort required to label the training data in the algorithm. The authors claimed that their 
paper is the first study on automatic discovery of risk and mapping of risk factors to a risk type. 
Bao and Datta utilized all disclosed risk factors as inputs to derive a set of risk types which were 
then matched to the most probable risk types. In extracting the set of risk types, a modified form 
of Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) – a natural language processing tool used to analyse data –
extracted the risk types. According to Bao and Datta, this algorithm, called sent-LDA, is 50 times 
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faster and can generate more meaningful topics compared to normal LDA models. Using 14,799 
RFDs from Item 1A of the 10-K forms, the authors generated 30 risk topics that were successfully 
matched to the 25 risk topics found in Huang and Li (2011), thus ensuring that all risk types 
identified in Huang and Li were included. These topics were grouped by the most probabilistic 
words,10 which are not descriptive but rather groups of words that address similar risks. For 
example, cost, regulation, environmental, law, operation, and production risk types were all 
grouped together as one category, topic 4, while cost, contract, operation, plan, increase, pension, 
and delay were grouped together as another category, topic 9. One problem with Bao and Datta’s 
classification, which the authors do not acknowledge in the study, is the classification of the same 
word under multiple topics. For example, the word ‘price’ appears under topics 2, 3, and 15, and 
the word ‘financial’ is classified under topics 1, 5, 6, 15, 17, 25, 26, and 28. It remains to be seen 
how this multiple classification can be managed in future research studies. 
Bao and Datta also examined trends in the use of these words or topics between 2006 and 
2010. The authors showed an increase in the discussion of some topics over the study period. For 
example, the use of the term ‘macroeconomic risks’ increased significantly between 2008 and 
2010 probably due to the financial crisis. The findings from Bao and Datta’s study can be used by 
researchers, financial analysts, business managers, and those who need to interpret large amounts 
of textual data. 
Mirakur (2011) also explored the content of RFDs in Item 1A with the purpose of 
examining whether this disclosure is associated with firm performance. The study was conducted 
in three stages. The first stage involved categorizing risk factors and identifying key risk words for 
a random sample of 122 firms selected from Compustat in the year 2009. The next stage involved 
                                                 
10The topics are presented in Table 3. 
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running descriptive statistics for the 122 firms to identify the risk disclosure that can be considered 
repetitive or boilerplate and then identifying the disclosures that will likely provide relevant 
information. Finally, Mirakur examined the relationship between various accounting measures of 
firm performance and risk factor categories including the influence of industry on risk disclosure. 
Initially, 116 general or high-level categories were identified, this was further compressed into 29 
risk topics: accounting, acquisitions, calamities, capital expenditures, capital structure, cash, 
competition, contracts, credit risks, customer concentration, distribution, government, industry, 
intellectual property, international, inventory, investments, key personnel, labor, legal, macro, 
marketing, operations, regional, solvency, stock price, suppliers, and takeover. This descriptive 
analysis also included comparisons across industries to determine the influence of industry on risk 
disclosure. The results of this descriptive analysis showed that the most common risk categories 
mentioned by companies are: capital structure, leverage, inability to pay interest, competition, 
government, key personnel, and macro risks such as recession, inflation, and financial crisis. 
However, Mirakur did not find any industry influence, suggesting that RFDs are firm-specific and 
do not capture industry-wide risk. Further, the study examined the relationship between four 
accounting measures (leverage, capital expenditure scaled by Property, Plant, and Equipment 
(PPE), operating risk (cash scaled by total assets), and cash acquisitions scaled by PPE) and found 
evidence of an association between RFD and both capital expenditure and operating risk. 
The paper concludes by proposing several avenues for future research, including using 
automated methods to process data, investigating whether risk factor can be used to replace stock 
volatility or earnings volatility, studying the relationship between risk and firm financial 
performance, efficient capital allocation, and market-based risk measures, and examining the 
association between firm risk and key person life insurance. Interestingly, the proposed research 
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on key life insurance was subsequently examined by Israelsen and Yonker (2017), which will be 
discussed in section 2.5 in relation to market-wide usefulness of RFDs. There are two major 
limitations in Mirakur (2011) including the small sample size and lack of control variables in the 
regressions. These limitations affect the ability to generalize the findings reported in the paper.  
Both Israelsen (2014) and Campbell et al. (2014) examined whether RFDs are informative, albeit 
from different perspectives. While Israelsen assessed stock return, beta, and stock volatility, 
Campbell et al. examined risk factor disclosure and pre-disclosure proxies of firm risk, post-
disclosure measures of firm risk, information asymmetry, and abnormal return around the 10-K 
filing. Similar to Bao and Datta (2012), Israelsen (2014) employed LDA to extract the risk factor 
disclosures from the SEC filings. The author used computer scripts to search through 10-K filings 
from 2006 to 2011 and then extracted section 1A from these filings. In cases where the software 
was not successful, a manual search was also conducted to extract the section. Together, the 
automated and manual search yielded 27,339 risk factor sections which were then divided into 
paragraphs to more easily identify the risk words. Thirty topics were eventually extracted by the 
LDA and each topic was classified based on how closely the risk factors are associated. The 30 
identified words are presented along with associated risk words in Table 3.Campbell et al. (2014), 
on the other hand, developed bespoke software for the purpose of their study. After downloading 
annual 10-K filings from the EDGAR database, the software was used to extract counts of 
identified risk words based on the key words identified by Nelson and Pritchard (2007). To verify 
the accuracy of their data, 300 firms were randomly selected and manually checked to confirm that 
the correct subsection was extracted. The results showed over 98% accuracy to extract the correct 
sections. Thirty percent of the key risk words identified were further classified as financial, 
litigation, or tax risks. The remaining risk words were classified as either other-systematic or other-
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idiosyncratic depending on whether the risk factors are firm-specific or economy-wide. The risk 
words identified by Campbell et al. (2014) are also presented in Table 3. 
Israelsen (2014) examined the specific firm characteristics that are most closely associated 
with the 30 identified factors. These firm characteristics are: size, Book-to-Market (BTM), firm 
age, R&D intensity, sales, general & administrative expenses, earnings to price ratio, advertising 
expenses, capital expenditure, productivity, profitability, leverage, capital-to-labor ratio, and 
industry classification. The results for this test showed that firm characteristics vary with the type 
of risk disclosure topic. For example, small value firms with low R&D intensity, low advertising 
expenses, high investment-to-capital, low leverage, and greater labor-intensity are more likely to 
disclose risks relating to the ‘accounting’ factor, while more seasoned firms with high BTM ratios 
and little R&D are more likely to disclose risks relating to ‘credit’. This result is similar to the 
result obtained by Campbell et al. (2014) in examining the relationship between RFDs and pre-
disclosure firm risk measures. Using a final sample of 9,076 firm-year observations from 2005 to 
2008, Campbell et al. (2014) found that RFDs are associated with nine of the 13 different proxies 
of pre-disclosure firm risk (expected returns, size, BTM, leverage, stock return volatility, turnover, 
big N auditor, analysts following, Beta, skewness, net income, and institutional ownership) 
suggesting that firms with more risks disclose more risk factors and that the type of risk the firm 
faces determines how much of the disclosure addresses that risk. 
Israelsen (2014) further examined the relationship between RFD and stock return volatility 
to confirm if the risks are reflected in equity market returns. Using daily volatility and idiosyncratic 
volatility as volatility measures, the results show significant association between 15 of the 30 risk 
factors and daily volatility. Some of the risk factor topics, such as those relating to Credit, 
Dividends, International, and Legal, are associated with higher volatility while other topics, 
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including Demand, EnviroReg, and FinMarket, are associated with lower volatility. The results for 
idiosyncratic risks were similar to that of volatility except that the word contractual risk is no 
longer significant while Demand becomes significant. The other tests conducted involved 
examining the association between the disclosed risks and systematic risks, which was estimated 
using factor loading for each Fama-French 4-Factor model, and examining the relationship 
between asset pricing risk factors and the risk factors disclosed by the firms. The results of the test 
for systematic risk show that more risk disclosures relating to customer demand, cost of input, 
supply chain, international markets, ability to access credit markets, and ability to develop new 
products are associated with higher market betas. However, firms with risk disclosure associated 
with health care, insurance, litigation, information technology, systems failure, real estate, new 
product and service development, and more general disclaimers have lower market betas, 
suggesting that these firms are risk-averse. The results for the asset pricing risk factors show that 
for market returns, most of the risk factors have either positive significant coefficient or are not 
statistically significant, while for the Small minus Big (SMB) portfolio, many of the factors have 
negative coefficients, and explain about half of the variation in the SMB portfolio. For High minus 
Low (HML), the disclosure portfolio explains about 69% of the HML variation, while it explains 
about 50% of the variation for the momentum strategy returns (UMD). In sum, the style analysis 
results show that, on average, returns in small value firms and SMB and HML factors are related 
to disclosed risk about access to credit and aggregate financial markets. 
To explore whether the disclosures are informative and whether investors incorporate the 
information into their risk assessment, Campbell et al. (2014) examined the association between 
post-disclosure measures of firm risk and the unexpected portion of risk factor disclosure which 
was obtained by controlling for the pre-disclosure measures of firm risk. The results show that the 
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unexpected portion of risk factor disclosure is positively associated with post-disclosure, market-
based measures of firm risk (beta and stock return volatility), thereby suggesting that investors 
incorporate risk factor disclosures into these market-based measures. Other tests examined the 
association between the unexpected portion of RFDs and post-disclosure, market-based measures 
of information asymmetry, the timeliness in which investors incorporate information from RFDs, 
which was done by examining the association between short-window, abnormal stock returns 
around the 10-K release and RFDs, and the association between the unexpected portion of RFDs 
and abnormal returns surrounding the 10-K release. The results of these tests reveal that the 
unexpected portion of risk factor disclosure is negatively associated with information asymmetry, 
suggesting that RFDs decrease information asymmetry. The results also show that RFDs are 
negatively associated with abnormal stock returns. Thus, investors incorporate risk factor 
disclosures into firm stock price.  
Overall, the results in both studies provide support that RFDs are neither generic nor 
boilerplate and are informative to investors. Although, the main focus of Israelsen (2014) was asset 
pricing, the paper contributes extensively to the literature on qualitative disclosures in accounting 
and the information content of disclosures in the annual 10-K. The analysis by Campbell et al. 
(2014) offers insight into the effect of disclosure on costs of capital by providing evidence that the 
type of risk a firm is exposed to affects the type of risks that are disclosed.  
In Table 3, I present a comparison of the topics extracted from Item 1A risk factor disclosure, with 
the exclusion of Mirakur (2011) because of the noted sample size limitation, and map these topics 
by identifying common themes of risk topics. I start by outlining the topics identified in Bao and 
Datta (2012), adjust for Huang and Li’s (2011) list, and then include Israelsen (2014) and Campbell 
et al.’s (2014) risk topics or key words. Through this mapping process, I further compressed the 
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topics into six main categories of RFD: financial, regulatory (legal), macroeconomic, 
idiosyncratic, legal, systematic, and tax. I propose that these compressed categories of risk topics 
can be further explored to study the determinants of RFDs among other interesting research 
opportunities relating to RFD topics discussed below. 
2.2.4 Proposal for future research on risk factor disclosure content/topics 
In this section, I offer some unexplored areas that can guide future researchers as they examine 
the risk words that are used in RFDs and how this research can influence regulation. 
1. Which of the determinants of risk factor disclosure has the most influence on the quality of 
the disclosure? Identifying the most common or most influential category of RFDs will 
help researchers better understand RFDs. 
2. Are these determinants of equal usefulness to investors? Should users of annual reports be 
more concerned about certain categories of disclosure than others? This information will 
be useful to the SEC in proposing changes to RFDs. 
3. Can RFDs be decomposed into a normal component that reflects firm risk and an abnormal 
component that reflects managerial discretion in reporting? If so, what are the likely 
implications of managerial discretion to inform or misinform capital market participants? 
Are firms punished for misinforming the market? Due to the negative nature of RFDs, 
managers are biased against disclosing too much information. Therefore, identifying the 
managerial discretion component of RFD will provide insight into how managers negotiate 
the conflict between protecting their self-interest and complying with regulations.  
2.3. Investor Usefulness of Risk Factor Disclosure 
More effort has gone into examining the investor usefulness of risk factor disclosures compared to 
other accounting research areas. The focus on investors is not surprising however, as the SEC states 
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that risk factor disclosure is aimed at providing investors with a clear and concise summary of 
firms’ material risks. Studies on investor usefulness of RFDs have focused on risk and value 
relevance of the disclosure, the impact of RFDs on future cash flow, how disclosure of risks affects 
information asymmetry, the effect of disclosure on analyst risk assessment, and how changes in 
RFDs have affected investors risk assessment. I discuss the details of these papers below. 
2.3.1 Value relevance, future cash flow, information asymmetry, and risk assessment 
Broadly speaking, value relevance can be explained as the ability of accounting information to 
capture firm value. In some accounting literature, value relevance is measured as the ability of 
earnings to explain variation in returns; the greater the explanatory power, the more decision useful 
the financial information (Francis, Lafond, Olsson, & Schipper, 2004). The effect of information 
on firm value can be captured through stock market reaction, stock returns, or other measures of 
firm value. Studies on investor usefulness have examined market based measures of risk and the 
relationship between risk disclosure and value relevance of the disclosure (Campbell et al., 2014; 
Israelsen, 2014; Riley &Taylor, 2014; Filzen, 2015; Campbell et al., 2016; Filzen, McBrayer, & 
Shannon, 2016; Hope et al., 2016; Gaulin, 2017; Hu, Johnson, & Liu, 2017), association between 
tax RFD and future cash flow (Campbell et al., 2016), RFD and information asymmetry (Campbell 
et al., 2014), RFD and analysts’ assessment of firm risk (Hope et al., 2016), and RFDs and investors 
risk assessment (Nelson & Pritchard,2016). Two of the papers, Campbell et al. (2014) and Israelsen 
(2014) were discussed in detail above. This section will focus on the remaining studies on investor 
usefulness. 
Filzen (2015), Filzen et al. (2016), Campbell et al (2016), and Hope et al. (2016) examined 
different measures of RFDs and both stock return and stock market reaction. Filzen (2015) 
investigated the informativeness of risk factor disclosure in the 10-Q filing by examining whether 
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updates to risk factor disclosures are negatively associated with short-window stock returns and 
negative earnings shock. This study was extended by Filzen et al. (2016) who assessed the 
association between future returns and quarterly risk factor updates to provide insights into whether 
the market fully incorporates updates to risk factor disclosure. Campbell et al. (2016), on the other 
hand, continued the research in Campbell et al. (2014) by examining the relationship between RFD 
and both future cash flows and firm value. Hope et al. (2016) examined the relationship between 
the level of detail in risk factor disclosure and both stock market reaction to 10-K reporting and 
reliability of analysts’ fundamental risk assessment.  
Filzen (2015) and Filzen et al. (2016) focused on updates to RFDs. The requirements for 
quarterly RFDs differ from those of the annual 10-K report; for example, while the annual report 
requires firms to report all risks they are exposed to, quarterly reports are only necessary when 
there is an update to the risk disclosed in the annual report. Based on disclosure theory’s prediction 
that managers tend to withhold bad news and disclose good news, and the potential legal penalties 
that can arise if a material risk emerges, Filzen (2015) speculated that managers weigh the 
perceived costs of disclosing against the expected cost of non-disclosure when deciding whether 
or not to disclose bad news. Therefore, if updates to RFDs provide investors with information 
about potential negative outcomes they should have adverse outcomes in future periods and a 
negative effect on future cash flows and stock returns. Similarly, Filzen et al. (2016) expected 
quarterly risk factor updates to create uncertainties regarding future cash flow to the firm in both 
magnitude and likelihood if the risk materializes, making it difficult to predict the future state of 
the firm. Campbell et al. (2016) conducted their study in a tax setting because future cash flows 
associated with taxes can be directly captured in tax measures, such as effective tax rate and cash 
taxes paid, unlike future cash flow implications of other risk factors that are dispersed throughout 
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the financial statement. According to the authors, high levels of tax risk disclosures can have two 
implications; it can indicate that firms have engaged in some risk-taking activities that will lower 
future tax payments and increase future cash flow, or it can imply that the firm has taken tax 
positions that will expose the firm to taxes and penalties which will lower future cash flow and 
increase tax payment. Building on the assumptions that the market possesses some degree of 
efficiency and that analysts make use of public information, Hope et al. (2016) examined whether 
and how investors and analysts benefit from more specific disclosures. Specificity was 
operationalized as words or phrases that convey specific information about the firm.  
Filzen (2015) predicted lower abnormal returns around the 10-Q filing for firms with risk 
factor updates relative to firms without risk factor updates. If the risk disclosures provide investors 
with information about future negative earnings, firms with risk factor updates should have more 
adverse outcomes in the future. Filzen also predicted that firms with risk factor updates are more 
to likely experience adverse effects on future earnings relative to firms without risk factor updates. 
This expectation is continued in Filzen et al. (2016). Based on the same rationale, Filzen et al. 
(2016) predicted that quarterly risk factor updates will be negatively associated with future stock 
market returns and extends the prediction to the effect of the language of disclosure. The authors 
expected that the negative stock market reaction will be stronger for weak updaters, firms that 
avoid the use of strong language to describe the risk, compared to strong updaters. In the study, 
strong updaters were defined as firms who use many words related to firm fundamentals. Campbell 
et al. (2016) expected current tax risk factor disclosure to be associated with future stock return if 
investors fully incorporate the implications of the disclosure. If investors find the disclosure 
complex and difficult to comprehend, then there should be no relationship between tax risk 
disclosures and future stock returns. However, if the high tax disclosure is regarded as tax 
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aggressiveness that will lower future tax payments, then investors will react to that information 
resulting in positive stock returns. Considering the usefulness of RFDs for investors, and relying 
on the assumption that more precise disclosures imply greater information content that should 
elicit more market reaction, Hope et al. (2016) expected investors to put more weight on risk 
disclosures with greater specificity, which should facilitate the incorporation of risk information 
into stock price. This is because research has shown that uncertainty about the variance of a firm’s 
cash flow is priced and that more precise signals receive greater weight (Heinle & Smith, 2017). 
Hope et al. (2016) predicted a positive association between stock market reaction to the 10-K 
report and the level of specificity of risk factors. They also expected that more specific RFDs will 
provide further information that analysts can use to assess a firm’s fundamental risk. In summary, 
updates to RFDs should be associated with stock returns, earnings shock, and future stock market 
returns, while tax RFDs should be associated with future firm value and future stock returns, and 
the level of specificity of RFDs should be associated with stock market reaction and reliability of 
analyst risk assessment. 
In both Filzen (2015) and Filzen et al. (2016), the authors used the same python 
programming language to extract Item1A from SEC filings. In Filzen (2015), the study period was 
from 2006 to 2010 and the final sample was 13,165 firm-quarters, excluding firms with market 
value of less than $100 million.11 For Filzen et al. (2016), the study period was from 2006 to2014, 
with a sample of 52,955 10-Q fillings for 4,343 unique firms. The variable of interest in both 
papers, UPDATER, was equal to 1 for firms with risk factor updates in the 10-Q filing, otherwise 
the value is zero. For a firm to be considered as an UPDATER, a risk factor section must be 
extracted from the 10-Q, the extracted section must be more than 200 words, and the section must 
                                                 
11The regulation excludes small firms, which are firms with market capitalization of less than $75m. The author uses 
an exclusion level of$100m to be more conservative.  
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be at least 100 words longer than the previous quarter for the second and third quarters. In addition, 
Filzen et al. (2016) classified firms in the top quartile as strong updaters and those in the bottom 
third quartile as weak updaters based on a defined word list.12 The method in Campbell et al. 
(2016) was based on the same procedure as Campbell et al. (2014) with updated tax keywords that 
capture tax related risks, such as “foreign tax, haven, tax provision, taxable income, and tax law”. 
The sample period was from 2005 to 2010, although the actual period extends into 2013 to meet 
the requirement of three-year forward data for some of the variables. The sample sizes were 7,234, 
6,735, and 6,312 for the one one-year forward, two-year forward, and three-year forward sample, 
respectively. Hope et al. (2016) used a technique called Named Entity Recognition (NER) to 
identify and extract specific measures under different categories, including identified names of 
persons, locations, organizations, and quantitative values in percentages, money values in dollars, 
time, and dates. To test stock market reaction, the final sample was 14,865 firm-year observations 
from 2006 to 2010 and to examine analyst risk assessment 627 firms were classified into the top 
and bottom quintile.  
Filzen (2015) tested the stock market reaction as the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
three days around the day of 10-Qfiling. In addition, quarterly earnings surprise was calculated as 
the change in earnings, scaled by total assets and then multiplied by 100. Similar to Filzen (2015), 
Hope et al. (2016) measured stock market reaction as the absolute value of three-day abnormal 
returns around the 10-K filing date. They also examined analyst fundamental risk assessment 
                                                 
12 The complete word stem list used was: bankrupt, busi, cash, charg, competit, condit, cost, custom, cyclic, demand, 
divis, earn, economi, environ, expens, financi, incom, lawsuit, legal, liquid, litig, market, oper, product, profit, 
revenu, sale, season, servic, settlement, solvenc, spend, sue. The complete word list is as follows: bankrupt, business, 
cash, charge, competition, competitive, competitor, conditions, cost, customer, cyclical, demand, division, earnings, 
economy, environment, expense, financial, income, lawsuit, legal, liquidity, litigation, market, operations, product, 
profit, revenue, sales, seasonal, services, settlement, solvency, spending, and sue.   
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measured as the absolute value of the difference between the one-year ahead realized raw return 
and one-year ahead stock price forecast in the first analyst report. Filzen et al. (2016) measured 
market return as three-month buy-and-hold annual return, while Campbell et al. (2016) used the 
annual buy-and-hold return for each firm. Future cash taxes were measured as one-year, two-year, 
or three-year cash taxes paid in Campbell et al. (2016), while effective tax rate was used as an 
alternate measure. 
Overall results confirm the informativeness of RFDs and stock market reaction to 
information in the 10-K. Specifically, Filzen (2015) confirmed significant negative association 
between UPDATER and both cumulative abnormal returns and earnings surprise, suggesting that 
firms that release quarterly updates of their risk factors have lower CAR around the 10-Q filing 
and a downward shift in the distribution of unexpected earnings in all three quarters following the 
update. However, in terms of earnings surprise, the result becomes less statistically significant as 
the period increases. The results discussed by Filzen et al. (2016) reveal a negative association 
between quarterly RFD and future stock returns and also show that the reaction is more negative 
for weak updaters compared to strong updaters. These results suggest that completeness of reaction 
to an update is affected by the content of the update. Alternate tests using a trading strategy further 
confirm these findings. Campbell et al. (2016) showed a negative association between future cash 
taxes (for all three subsequent years) and tax-related risk words, implying that tax risk disclosure 
signals an increase in cash flow through a decrease in future cash taxes paid. This result also holds 
when effective tax rate is used as an alternate test. Other results show a positive association 
between returns and tax risk disclosure over one-year and two-year horizons, but the results 
become more positive as the horizon increases suggesting that investors do not immediately price 
the information in tax risk disclosure. The results in Hope et al. (2016) show that specificity is 
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negatively related to proprietary cost and accruals and positively related to many other variables 
including specificity of 10-K, length of 10-K, return volatility, and analyst forecast error. The 
results to test market reaction provide evidence that a higher level of specificity leads to stronger 
market reaction to the 10-K report. Further tests showed that specificity of the quantitative 
disclosures (money, percentage, date, and time) are more significant, but when the disclosure 
categories are considered individually, money and date are the most significant. Alternate tests, 
such as using abnormal trading volume to test stock market reaction, examining the period before 
SEC requirement of RFD, and splitting the sample by proprietary cost, confirmed the study 
findings. The results also show that greater specificity helps analysts make better estimations.  
These papers provide evidence of the informativeness of RFDs for future cash flows, firm 
value, stock returns, earnings surprises, and analyst risk assessment. The methods used enable 
researchers to examine different aspects of qualitative disclosures in evaluating the completeness 
and accuracy of such disclosures. Specifically, Hope et al. (2016) provided empirical evidence that 
supports the SEC’s call for more specific risk disclosures by showing the benefit of improved risk 
disclosures to investors. These studies clearly demonstrate that RFDs are not boilerplate. 
There are four other research papers relating to usefulness of RFDs for investors: Riley and 
Taylor (2014), Nelson and Pritchard (2016), Gaulin (2017), and Hu et al. (2017). Riley and Taylor 
(2014) examined the effects of readability of RFDs, varying the degrees of familiarity of the RFDs 
from familiar, moderately familiar, to unfamiliar in an experimental setting. Nelson and Pritchard 
(2016) studied how the change from voluntary to mandatory reporting affects the disclosure of risk 
factors by examining the association between securities fraud litigation and RFDs. They also 
assessed firms’ responses to SEC’s 2005 disclosure mandate and the relevance of risk factor 
disclosure to investors. Gaulin (2017) examined whether managers disclose risk factors that warn 
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of future adverse outcomes by testing whether managers disclose risk factors in a timely manner 
and whether the demands for risk factors from the various stakeholders affect managerial 
disclosure decision. In a theoretical setting, Hu et al. (2017) examined the effect of parameter 
uncertainty in the pricing of risk by providing evidence that differences in priors13 result in 
differential pricing of risk for the same set of assets. The authors used RFDs as a novel instrument 
to proxy investors’ priors on a firm exposure to risk factors.  
Because RFDs must be written in plain English with no legal jargon, and based on the 
management obfuscation hypothesis, Riley and Taylor (2017) expected that managers have an 
incentive to make annual reports difficult to read so investors are unable to incorporate adverse 
information into stock prices. Nelson and Pritchard (2016) explained that the provision of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) provided as an incentive for firms to voluntarily 
disclose risk factors in order to enjoy the safe harbour provision, thereby shielding firms from 
liability for forward-looking statements which could reduce likely litigation costs. Similar to Riley 
and Taylor (2014), Nelson and Pritchard (2016) examined the SEC’s requirement of plain 
language, meaning that disclosures must go beyond boilerplate discussion of risks and should be 
thorough, updated year to year, and readable. The expectation is that under the PSLRA, firms with 
greater probability of litigation have greater expected benefits from disclosing risk factors 
compared to firms with less likelihood of being sued. Therefore, it is expected that firms with 
greater risk of litigation will provide more RFDs that are more specific and readable than firms 
with lower risk of litigation. Also, an increase in litigation risk will trigger more meaningful, 
readable, and less boilerplate risk factor disclosure for these firms. Furthermore, under a voluntary 
disclosure regime, firms at greater risk of litigation will provide more RFDs that are less generic 
                                                 
13 Priors refer to uncertain quantity in the probability distribution under Bayesian statistics. 
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and more readable while under a mandatory disclosure regime, risk factor disclosures will be 
similar across firms with both low and high litigation risk. Nelson and Pritchard (2016) also 
expected meaningful RFDs to improve investors’ assessment of expected future cash flow as seen 
through the positive association between RFDs and market assessment of firm risk. Gaulin (2017) 
expected managers to be motivated to provide risk information not only because it is a SEC 
requirement but because investors demand this information as an early warning of negative 
outcomes, which can subsequently reduce the expected cost of class-action securities litigation 
under the litigation shield. This shield, however, can only be invoked if the disclosure complies 
with SEC’s regulation on specificity and level of detail. These three studies emphasize the 
importance of clarity and understandability of RFDs.  
The method in Riley and Taylor (2014) involved a survey sent out to 44,000 people. The 
final study participants were 365 non-professional investors. Using a 1 X 3 mixed research design, 
participants were randomly assigned to the treatment conditions of more or less readable for a 
fictional company. The risk words were developed using similar risk factors from a random sample 
of 100 of the Fortune 500 companies and cover the areas of sales, data security, and control over 
financial reporting. The familiar risk scenario described risks from a competitive environment and 
potentially negative effects of changing customer preferences. The second risk factor scenario 
discussed the moderately familiar risk of holding sensitive client data, while the third risk scenario 
addressed the unfamiliar risk that an internal control weakness may compromise the reliability of 
the financial reports. Participants were then asked to provide their initial perception of each risk 
factor for probability of economic loss, size of economic loss, worry, and overall risk and then 
provide information on their expected stock price, buy/sell recommendation, and perceptions of 
managements’ reporting credibility. In Nelson and Pritchard (2016), the study examined the period 
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of voluntary disclosure from 1996 to 2004 and the mandatory regime from 2005 to 2010. Firms 
were classified as high or low litigation risk based on an estimate of firm-specific ex-ante litigation 
risk. Five percent of the firms were selected for the high risk sample for a total of 181 firms. 
Similarly, 5% of the firms in the low risk sample were randomly selected for a total of 112 firms. 
The three proxies used for RFD characteristics are the risk factor disclosure word count, the 
resemblance score for non-boilerplate disclosure, and the Fog index for readability. Gaulin (2017) 
followed the procedure described in Campbell et al. (2014) to extract RFDs, and the final sample 
in the study included 31,549 firm-years from 2005 to 2015. Three proxies are used to track risk 
factor evolution over time: total number of risk factors, number of new risk factors, and number 
of dropped risk factors from the previous filing. To identify new and dropped risks, for each risk 
factor across the years, a search for an exact match was performed allowing for a minimum of 50% 
character-level match. If no match was found, the risk factor was considered “new”. Where a match 
was found in year t, the matched risks were dropped in year t-1.Therefore, the remaining risks in 
year t-1 represented risks that no longer featured in year t and were counted as dropped risks. 
Definitiveness of the risk factors was measured based on the language in the disclosure (i.e., 
whether it used general language or named a specific entity or location; similar to Hope et al. 
2016), the percentage of words that were numeric such as numbers, percentages, currencies, or 
dates, and the average words per risk factor. Adverse outcomes were considered as negative net 
income, negative operating income, sales declines, and business or non-securities litigation. 
Hu et al. (2017) first developed a model to show that differences in perceived risk exposure 
can arise due to different priors for the same asset which can then result in different required 
returns. The dummy variable to proxy for the dichotomous prior distribution of the beta on a risk 
factor takes the value of one if a risk factor appears in item 1A of the 10-K report and zero 
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otherwise. Investors priors on the firm’s exposure to the risk was classified as low beta prior if 
specific risk words or phrases (interest rate, currency and exchange rate, commodity, and economic 
downturn and recession) do not appear in Item 1A or high beta prior if a word or phrase appear at 
least once. Interest rate risk factor was measured as the difference between the return on 10-year 
government bond and the three-month Treasury bill rate. Exchange rate risk was considered as the 
monthly return of the U.S. dollar against a range of major world currencies. Commodity risk was 
the monthly return of the All Commodity Price Index and downturn/recession risk was the spread 
between the five-year bond yield and the yield of the three-month Treasury bill. The sample period 
was from January 2006 to December 2014 and the authors used Fama-MacBeth regressions to 
examine the difference between the slopes of the return-factor beta for the two groups (i.e., the 
high beta and low beta group). For each of the four categories of risk, the sample was divided into 
whether a firm discloses the risk or not, and the risk exposure to the risk category was calculated 
using monthly returns data for the previous five years. The firms were then sorted into quintile or 
tercile portfolios, which are held for one year and rebalanced in January. The average excess return 
per annum, average exposure to each risk category, average return for long-short portfolios, and 
the 3-factor model were presented. The difference between return-factor beta slopes for reporting 
and non-reporting firms was tested by cross section regression of portfolio returns on the cross 
section of beta.  
Riley and Taylor (2014) confirmed that readability affects non-professional investors’ 
assessments of risk and that this effect was different for familiar versus unfamiliar risk. Their 
results also showed that there is no effect on investment decisions between participants that receive 
disclosures in readable versus less readable language. Similarly, presentation style had no effect 
on non-professional investors’ assessments of management credibility, and readability had no 
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effect on whether non-professional investors read and rely on management-provided risk 
disclosures. Nelson and Pritchard (2016) offered evidence that the amount of disclosure increases 
with firm risk and high risk firms provide less boilerplate RFD; however, this result is less 
significant when reporting is mandatory. The study also shows that during the mandatory regime 
high risk and low risk firms are similar in their use of boilerplate disclosures. The test for 
readability confirms that firms with more readable Management Discussion & Analysis (MD&A) 
provide more meaningful RFDs. Furthermore, firms disclose more risk factors if litigation risk 
increases but do not substantially change their risk factors in response to a decrease in litigation 
risk, i.e., risk factor disclosure is sticky. This is contrary to the results reported in other studies on 
updated RFDs (Filzen, 2015; Filzen et al., 2016; Gaulin, 2017). Additionally, Nelson and Pritchard 
(2017) provided evidence that RFD is positively associated with investor risk assessment for high 
risk firms only under a voluntary regime and for both high risk and low risk firms when reporting 
is mandatory. Gaulin (2017) showed a positive association between new risk factors and dropped 
risk factors for all the measures of future economic outcomes confirming that managers are 
updating risk factors in an informative and timely manner. The results also suggest that managers 
disclose more specific risk factors in advance of adverse outcomes and managers respond to private 
law enforcement by increasing the new risk factors they identify, thereby increasing the total 
number of risk factors discussed. This increase persists for multiple years for private security 
litigation but not for SEC comment letters. Also, the results provide evidence that managers react 
to public enforcement by increasing the definitiveness of their RFDs. The results from Hu et al. 
(2017) showed that the return-factor beta slope for non-reporting firms is higher than that of 
reporting firms for all the four risk categories. Furthermore, investors form priors about risk 
exposure by combining information provided directly by firms with other data, and the relation 
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between required return and risk factor betas is steeper under low beta prior than high beta prior. 
These results confirm that the return-factor beta slope is steeper for firms that do not disclose a 
given risk factor.  
The results discussed in Riley and Taylor (2014) provided information about another type 
of investor, non-professional investors, and the study used an experimental setting which is unique 
from the other studies discussed herein. The major limitation of the paper was the low response 
rate of around 1% which threatens the validity of the results. Nelson and Pritchard (2016) 
highlighted the significance of RFDs to managers and legal counsel for formulating a disclosure 
strategy and to regulators and courts in evaluating disclosure quality for assessing the risks posed 
by firms. Gaulin (2017) showed that managers update their disclosure in a timely manner and do 
not merely copy and paste, while Hu et al. (2017) demonstrated the importance of RFDs as a source 
of information about firms’ risk exposures. Overall, these four studies highlight the importance of 
clear and precise RFDs and the subsequent impact on firms’ risks. 
2.3.2 Proposal for future research on investor usefulness 
Although there is extensive work already done on investor usefulness of risk factor disclosure, 
there is still opportunity for further research in this area. The following research questions are 
proposed for future studies on investor usefulness: 
1. What is the effect of risk factor disclosure on the cost of equity capital? Campbell et al. 
(2014) reported a reduction in information asymmetry effect; examining the effect of this 
reduction on capital costs will be interesting. 
2.  How are firms’ risk disclosures considered by market participants? Are the firms 
considered as riskier or more transparent? Risk disclosure is negative by nature and 
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different from most disclosures in the annual report. Whether more RFD is considered more 
risk or better quality remains to be investigated.  
3.  Are firms with better risk disclosures able to raise capital more easily? 
4.  How do stock markets react to the release and update of risk factor disclosure?14Is it 
possible to isolate the effect of RFD from other information in the 10-K? 
5.  How are risk disclosures related to the firms’ information environment such as investors’ 
and analysts’ trading behaviour? Hope et al. (2016) report some benefits of more specific 
RFD for analysts. Other analyst characteristics can also be examined to better understand 
these benefits. 
2.4. Contracting Usefulness 
Studies on contracting usefulness tend to focus on compensation and debt contracting. There is 
currently only one paper on the usefulness of RFDs in the debt market. There is vast potential for 
research on the impact of RFDs in the debt market. Apart from the SEC’s interest in the benefit of 
RFDs for other users of the annual 10-K report, examining the debt market is important as debt 
financing is the predominant source of external financing in the US. The securities issue report for 
US corporations published by the Federal Reserve Bank shows that over $1.6 trillion bonds were 
issued in 2016.15 Section 2.4.3 includes recommendations on research opportunities relating to 
RFDs and debt contracting.  
                                                 
14 Since Item 1A is released along with other information, it may be difficult to examine the direct impact. 
15This data is available from the Federal Reserve Bank current releases: 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/corpsecure/current.htm. 
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2.4.1 Debt Contracting 
Chiu et al. (2017) examined the relationship between RFDs and the pricing of credit default swap. 
The study builds on the expectation that more transparent or precise accounting disclosures will 
help reduce credit stakeholder’s uncertainty about the underlying firm risk. The authors examined 
the effect of RFDs on credit default swap spread and whether this effect is greater for firms with 
high information uncertainty. The sample period extends from 2003 to 2007 and the final sample 
size is 7,504 firm quarter observations for 535 unique firms. The authors use both level and change 
research models to examine the research objectives. RFD is measured as a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one for firms that comply with Item 1A disclosure and zero otherwise. Credit 
default swap pricing is measured as the natural log of the spread on the first day of trading after 
SEC filing. Information uncertainty is operationalized as analyst forecast dispersion, number of 
business segments, and number of credit default swap quote contributors. 
The authors find that credit default swap spread reduces from pre-RFDs period to post-
RFDs period, suggesting that credit investors incorporate RFDs in their pricing of credit default 
swap. The authors also use content analysis to examine the association between credit default swap 
and the length of RFDs. Similar to Campbell et al. (2014), the authors find a positive association 
between credit default swap spread and RFDs further confirming RFD is priced in credit default 
swap spreads. The results also show that the effect of RFDs on credit default swap is more 
pronounced when there is greater information uncertainty. Overall results confirm the usefulness 
of RFDs in the debt market and opens up further research on the usefulness of RFDs to other 
audiences other than equity investors. Next, I discuss the only paper on compensation contracting 
by Israelsen and Yonker (2017). 
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2.4.2 Compensation contracting 
Israelsen and Yonker (2017) examined the human capital risks posed by key employees, defined 
as an employee who possesses a large fraction of the firm’s human capital. In their study, 
disclosure relating to “key man life insurance” was used as a measure of human capital risk. The 
human capital possessed by key employees is difficult if not impossible to replace, for example 
scientists who develop high-tech products and some Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). Thus, 
companies exposed to key human capital risk may obtain key man life insurance policies due to 
dependence on such employees or in accordance with loan covenant requirements.  
To develop the data, Israelsen and Yonker conducted a search of filings from every firm 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), NASDAR, and the American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX) to identify disclosure of key man insurance. A computer script was written to search for 
phrases such as “key person life insurance”, “key woman life insurance” and similar derivatives. 
Identified firms were further classified as to whether key life employees are disclosed and insured 
(Disclosure/Yes) or disclosed but not insured (Disclosure/No). Key human capital was set as an 
indicator variable equal to one for the Disclose/Yes firms and zero for the Disclose/No firms. The 
sample in the study was 51,316 firm-year observations for 8,013 unique firms from 1996 to 2009. 
Of the firms that disclose and have insurance, those that state the policy amount were further 
classified. 
To investigate the characteristics of firms that are exposed to key human capital risk, the 
authors examined differences between firms that insure key employees and those that do not. The 
results showed that smaller, younger firms with better growth opportunities, lower asset tangibility, 
and greater propensity to make disclosures are more likely to be key human capital intensive. Also, 
there is some evidence that these firms have weak governance and most are run by the CEO. 
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Furthermore, insuring firms tend to be smaller, have poorer growth opportunities, and fewer 
tangible assets compared to firms with human capital that is not insured. To test whether key 
human capital firms were riskier, the volatility and abnormal returns for firms with higher key 
human capital were examined where stock volatility was measured as the daily standard deviation 
of stock returns and stock idiosyncratic volatility was the standard deviation of the residual from 
a regression of daily stock returns on the 3 Fama-French factors. The results of this test showed 
that volatility is higher for firms that make key man insurance disclosures, but there is no difference 
in the level of risk between firms that choose to insure and those that do not. To test market reaction 
to the announcement of key employees, firms with key human capital (KHC) intensity were further 
split into high KHC and low KHC based on the median score in the sample. The results showed 
that when key executives leave high KHC firms, there is a more negative market reaction but 
hardly any reaction when key executives depart from low KHC firms. The authors then examined 
whether firms with key human capital are more innovative than those without, where innovation 
was measured as the natural log of number of patents filed during the calendar year and the number 
of citations the patents received. The results showed that firms with key human capital produce 
more patents than similar sized industry peers. Also, firms with key employees holding MD and 
PhD degrees produce more patents than firms whose key employees are not doctors. The final test 
to examine whether key human capital represents a systematic source of risk to an investor did not 
show any statistical difference between the high and low KHC portfolios; however, when tercile 
portfolios were created, the results show a difference between the two groups suggesting that 
investors require compensation for holding firms with key human capital risk. 
This study contributes to the literature by identifying and investigating a new type of 
human capital – key human capital – and providing evidence of the risks associated with key 
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human capital. Furthermore, focusing only on key employees and not all executives highlights the 
importance of identifying the type of human capital that is important to firms.  
2.4.3 Future research on contracting usefulness 
Compared to research on investor usefulness of risk disclosure, the literature on contracting 
usefulness is very limited. A possible reason is the regulation’s focus on investors to the detriment 
of other financial statement users. In light of the SEC’s recent interest in understanding how other 
users can benefit from this disclosure, we can expect research to increase on contracting usefulness 
of RFDs. To advance this line of research, I propose the following questions for researchers to 
consider in examining the topics relating to contracting usefulness of RFDs. 
1.  Is the risk profile of firms reflected in their risk factor disclosure? Campbell et al. (2014) 
found that the RFD of firms reflects the type of risks they are exposed to; can RFDs be 
used as a proxy of risk? 
2.  How are risk disclosures used by the debt market? The focus of RFD research has been on 
the equity market. However, understanding its usefulness in the debt market is also 
relevant. 
3.  Are risk factor disclosures related to managerial risk-taking incentives and managerial risk 
aversions? Since managers have the discretion to report more or less risk, understanding 
how managerial qualities or characteristics are reflected in RFD is important. 
4.  What is the effect of director’s equity-based pay on the quality of risk disclosure? Li (2006) 
explained that managers have career concerns regarding disclosure of negative information. 
Examining the association between the quality of RFD and managerial pay incentives will 
be interesting. 
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2.5. Market-wide Usefulness 
In this section, I discuss other papers on RFDs that do not directly relate to investor or 
contracting usefulness but benefit the market at large. These papers relate to the effect of SEC 
comment letters and product market competition. The findings from these papers also enrich our 
knowledge of RFDs and their application in other management fields outside accounting and 
finance.  
2.5.1 Risk factor disclosures and SEC comment letters 
Brown, Tian, and Tucker (2014) and Beatty, Cheng, and Zhang (2015) examined the effect of SEC 
comment letters related to RFDs. Brown et al. (2014) investigated whether a firm changes its risk 
factor disclosure after observing SEC comments on its peers’ disclosures, while Beatty et al. 
(2015) assessed the relationship between increased financial constraints risk disclosure and 
changes in underlying financial risk outcomes for the period before and after the financial crisis 
and the period before and after a firm receives SEC RFD comment letters. These two periods are 
significant because the former is associated with changes in underlying financial constraint risk 
while the latter puts regulatory pressure on the firm which may or may not reflect underlying 
economic risk. As explained by Brown et al. (2014), the SEC can issue a comment letter after a 
full review of a firm’s filings, a financial statement review, or a targeted review examining only 
specific issues in the filing. Firms can respond to the comment letter by providing additional 
information, amending the filing, or disclosing additional information in future filings. Firms avoid 
receiving SEC comment letters related to RFDs because of the negative consequences of this 
disclosure, for example the significant amount of time and resources needed to resolve the issues 
identified, which can lead to uncertainties and distractions for management. In addition, the 
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comment letter can negatively affect investors’ perceptions about the firm which may affect the 
firm’s market return. 
Brown et al. (2014) examined how a no-letter firm (a firm that did not receive a SEC 
comment letter) reacts to comment letters received by the leaders in their industry (at least 20% 
share), a close industry rival, a large number of industry peers, and an industry peer with the same 
auditor. The data was obtained from 10-K filings in the EDGAR and Audit Analytics databases 
for the period between January 2005 and December 2010. The final sample was made up of 13,254 
Item 1A filings. The sample firms were grouped into four categories: (1) risk letter firms are firms 
that receive comments on the risk factor disclosure; (2) 10-K non-risk-letter firms receive 
comments on 10-K issues other than risk factor disclosure; (3) other-letter firms receive comments 
on filings other than 10-K; and (4) no-letter firms do not receive any SEC comment letter. RFD 
modification was measured based on a similarity score and the absolute change in the number of 
words in the RFD. Beatty et al. (2015) tested the association between the extent of disclosure of 
financial constraints risk and measures of expected financial constraints and litigation risks. They 
also tested the association between realized financial constraints and the extent of financial 
constraints RFDs over the financial crisis period and the association between realized financial 
constraints and the extent of financial constraints RFDs after receiving an SEC comment letter. 
The sample for the study was drawn from all 10-K filings from 2006 to 2013 on EDGAR and 
consisted of 22,434 firm-year observations from 4,658 unique firms. Financial constraint 
disclosure relates to external capital, leverage, and cash flows.  
The results in Brown et al. (2014) confirmed a spillover effect based on industry leader, 
close rival, or a large number of industry peers receiving SEC comment letters, i.e., a no-letter firm 
will significantly modify the following year’s risk disclosure in response to the comment letter 
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received by other companies in these situations. The result, however, was not significant when an 
industry peer with the same auditor receives a comment letter. Beatty et al. (2015) confirmed that 
risk factor disclosures reflect expected financial constraint but this did not change for the pre-, 
during, and post-crisis period for the financial constraint measure. It did, however, change for the 
litigation risk measure, suggesting that RFDs are more sensitive to litigation risk. The results also 
showed that the quality of RFDs reduce from the pre- to the post-crisis period and that firms 
increase their disclosures after receiving a SEC comment letter; however, this effect diminishes 
one-year after receiving the SEC comment letter. 
These studies contribute to the RFD and public enforcement literature by showing that 
there is some reaction to SEC comment letters on risks that have market-wide implications. 
2.5.2 Product market competition 
Yen, Li, and Chen (2016) examined whether and how firms in more concentrated industries 
(higher proprietary costs) avoid divulging information to competitors through risk factor 
disclosures. The study builds on proprietary cost theory and the willingness of managers to provide 
more or less information when faced with competition. Firms can choose to disclose less to avoid 
the proprietary cost of disclosure or more when the benefit of sharing cost is higher than the cost. 
Also, the threat of entrants and litigation risks can influence the level of risk disclosure due to the 
negative nature of this disclosure. The authors examined the association and similarity between 
industry concentration and both overall risk disclosure and idiosyncratic RFD. 
The sample was drawn from all non-financial firms in Compustat from 2006 to 2009, with 
a final sample consisting of 8,509 firm-year observations and 1,155 industry years. The risk 
measures were based on the five RFD categories identified in Campbell et al. (2014). The 
similarity score followed comparable literature that uses cosine similarity scores, while industry 
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concentration was measured using the U.S. census-based four-firm concentration ratio. The results 
showed that firms in more concentrated industries actually increase the number of RFDs in 
Item1A; they do not decrease the disclosure to avoid divulging information. Furthermore, firms in 
more concentrated industries may reduce the informativeness of their disclosures by making them 
similar to their competitors rather than reduce the amount of risk disclosure.  
The finding that firms avoid divulging information by making their disclosure content 
similar to those of their competitors highlights a strategy that firms can use to reduce the 
informativeness of their disclosure. Future studies can explore the effect of RFDs in other 
management fields such as organizational behaviour and marketing. 
2.5.3 Future research on other topics 
Below are some suggested research topics on risk factor disclosures that are not related to investor 
or contracting usefulness of the disclosure but have some market-wide implications. 
1.  How do a firm’s characteristics determine the type of risk disclosure? Studies can examine 
the relationship between firm characteristics such as firm size, auditor type, industry, and 
RFD. 
2.  Are risk disclosures reflected in firms’ performance? Studies can examine accounting and 
market-based measures of performance to understand the relationship between firm 
performance and RFD. 
3.  What is the influence of corporate governance on risk factor disclosures? How do 
governance attributes, such as board characteristics, influence risk factor disclosures? 
Several internal and external governance characteristics can be examined and corporate 
governance indexes can be developed to research the topic. 
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4.  What is the implication of risk disclosure for litigations? Are ‘riskier’ firms exposed to 
higher litigation risk? 
5.  What is the relationship between risk factor disclosure and firms’ risk of bankruptcy or 
fraud? 
2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter reviews and proposes directions for future research on RFDs. This review focuses on 
the history and background of the regulation, contents or topics disclosed, studies on investor and 
contracting usefulness, and research on market-wide usefulness of RFDs, such as effect of SEC 
comment letters and product market competition. Beginning in 2005, SEC made it mandatory for 
large firms in the US to disclose risks that significantly affect their businesses or securities in Item 
1A of the 10-K report. Following criticisms on the generic nature of this disclosure, the SEC has 
called for more specific disclosures and also asked the public to provide comments on how to 
improve risk factor disclosures. 
The review of recent research findings shows that this disclosure offers some information 
that is useful to investors, analysts, and other annual report users, confirming that the RFDs are 
not boilerplate as speculated earlier. This review maps out the current state of the literature and 
suggests areas for future research relating to the content of RFDs, investor and contracting 
usefulness of RFDs, and market-wide usefulness of the disclosure. Directions for future research 
include analysing the cost versus benefit of improving the disclosure, assessing the usefulness of 
RFDs for potential users in the debt market, and understanding the association between RFDs and 
corporate governance attributes. 
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To date, this review is the only identified study to provide a comprehensive review of the 
RFD literature. The findings and suggestions provide a platform for future research in this field 
and are informative to users of the annual report and regulators.  
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Appendix 
Item 1A. Risk Factors. 
The value of an investment in Dynacq Healthcare, Inc. is subject to significant risks, certain 
of which are specific to our Company, others are inherent in our business and the industry in 
which we operate, and still others are market related. If any of the matters described in the risk 
factors listed below were to occur, our business and financial results could be materially adversely 
affected. The Risk Factors described below apply to the current operations and market for the 
common stock of the Company, and do not address risks that may arise in the future.  
Risks Related to our Business  
We continue to incur substantial losses, and we have no current prospect of generating 
operating profits.  
For the fiscal years ended August 31, 2012 and 2011, our business generated a net loss of 
approximately $12.2 million and $21.0 million, respectively. In recent years, our net patient 
revenues have declined, relative to historical levels, due to declines in patient referrals. While we 
continue to seek out additional sources of patient referrals, we have not been able to realize the 
substantial increase in patient referrals we require in order to generate the revenues needed to offset 
our operating losses. Our industry is highly competitive, and we have not been able to identify and 
execute any business plan that might result in an operating profit or even in decreased losses. We 
are currently evaluating strategic alternatives in an attempt to reverse our historical trend of 
operating losses, although there can be no assurance that we will be able to reverse this trend. If 
we are unable to generate positive net income on a consistent basis going forward, we may not be 
able to continue our operations.  
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Our cash reserves cannot continue to support the level of losses we have incurred in recent 
years.  
As of August 31, 2012, we had approximately $30.8 million in net assets, including 
approximately $10.6 million in cash and cash equivalents, available for continuing operations. 
These reserves are being steadily depleted by our losses, which totalled approximately $33.2 
million in our last two fiscal years. If we are unsuccessful in implementing an alternative business 
plan to increase revenues and improve performance, or are otherwise required to continue to use a 
substantial portion of our current assets in order to continue our day to day operations, then our 
continued operations will not be sustainable.  
 A significant percentage of our revenues are generated through relatively few physicians.  
For the fiscal year ended August 31, 2012, approximately 90% of our gross revenues of our 
Pasadena facility were generated from 7 surgeons. For the fiscal year ended August 31, 2011, 
approximately 91% of our gross revenues of our Pasadena facility were generated from 11 
surgeons. A physician from our medical staff, who accounted for 19% and 7% of gross revenues 
for the fiscal year ended August 31, 2012 and 2011, respectively, passed away in August 2012. 
The loss of this physician led to a reduction in our revenues and adversely affected our results of 
operations. The loss of other physicians who provide significant net patient revenues for the 
Company may adversely affect our results of operations.  
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Tables 
Table 1: Summary of Literature 
Article Topics   Method Time 
Period 
Sample Findings 
Bao & Datta 
2012 
Topic Modelling Modified version of 
LDA to identify 
topics 
2006-
2010 
14,799 10-K 
filings 
Identified 30 risk topics covered in risk 
factor disclosure.  
Beatty, 
Cheng, 
&Zhang, 
2015 
Financial crisis 
period and response 
to SEC comment 
letters 
Content analysis to 
identify sentences 
on financial 
constraint risk 
2006-
2013 
22,438 firm-
year 
observations 
Financial constraints risk disclosures 
are positively associated with financial 
constraints risk outcomes pre-financial 
crisis period, but the association 
disappears during the crisis and post-
crisis after the firm receives SEC 
comment letters, i.e., increased 
regulation. 
Brown, Tian, 
& Tucker, 
2014 
Spillover effect of 
SEC comment letters 
Change in 
disclosure using 
Vector Space 
Model and change 
in length of 
disclosure 
2005-
2010 
13,254 firm-
year 
observations 
Firms that did not receive any 
comment letter from SEC tend to 
modify a subsequent year’s risk 
disclosure if the SEC commented on 
the risk disclosure of its industry 
leader, a close rival, or numerous 
industry peers; 
After the release of an industry leaders’ 
comment, firms that did not receive 
any letter make their subsequent risk 
disclosure more firm-specific. 
 Campbell, 
Chen, 
Information content Word 
Categorization 
2000-
2008 
9,076 firm-
year 
observations 
Firms facing greater risk disclose more 
risk factors and the type of risk faced 
by a firm determines how much of the 
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Article Topics   Method Time 
Period 
Sample Findings 
Dhaliwal, Lu, 
& Steel, 2014 
section is dedicated to describing that 
risk; 
Information in risk factor disclosure is 
reflected in idiosyncratic risk, 
information asymmetry, systematic 
risk and firm value. 
Campbell, 
Cecchini, 
Cianci, 
Ehinger, & 
Werner, 2016 
Future cash flow and 
stock returns 
Content analysis 
based on key words 
2005-
2010 
7,234 for one-
year forward 
6,735 for two-
year forward 
6,312 for 
three-year 
forward 
6,944 for value 
relevance test 
Significant positive association 
between tax risk disclosure and future 
cash flow; 
Tax risks are positively associated with 
future stock returns.  
Chiu, Guan, 
& Kim, 2017 
The Effect of Risk 
Factor Disclosures on 
the Pricing of Credit 
Default Swaps. 
Content analysis. 2003-
2007 
7,504 firm-
quarter 
observations. 
Credit Default Spread (CDS) decreased 
after disclosure of risk factors. CDS 
increases with the length of RFDs and 
the number of risk words. Also, CDS is 
more pronounced for firms with greater 
information asymmetry. CDS volatility 
also decreases from the pre- to the 
post-disclosure period. 
Filzen, 2015 Informativeness of 
risk factor disclosure 
in 10-Q 
Automated Python 
programming 
language  
2006-
2010 
13,165 firm-
quarters 
Firms with quarterly updates to their 
risk factor have lower cumulative 
abnormal returns around the 10-Q 
filing; 
Quarterly update is associated with 
downward shift in the distribution of 
unexpected earnings three quarters 
following the update. 
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Article Topics   Method Time 
Period 
Sample Findings 
Filzen, 
McBrayer, & 
Shannon, 
2016 
Future stock returns 
and stock market 
efficiency around 
quarterly update 
language 
Automated Python 
programming 
language 
2006-
2014 
52,955 firm-
quarters 
Evidence of stock market under 
reaction for firms that do not use words 
that describe the impact of their risk on 
firm fundamentals. 
Gaulin, 2007 Whether mangers 
disclose risks to warn 
of future outcomes 
Regression analysis 2005-
2015 
31,549 firm-
years 
Managers update their disclosure in an 
informative manner. 
Huang & Li 
2011 
Topic Labelling Multi-label text 
classifier 
2006-
2010 
21,077 10-K 
filings 
Identified 25 risk types. 
Hope, Danqi, 
& Hai, 2016 
Level of detail Automated analysis 
based on Campbell 
et al. (2014) 
2006-
2011 
14,865 Absolute value of market reaction to 
10-K filing is significantly positively 
associated with the level of detail; 
Analysts are better able to assess a 
firms’ fundamental risk when risk 
factor disclosures are more detailed. 
Hu, Johnson, 
& Liu, 2017 
Effect of uncertainty 
on pricing of risk 
Theoretical research  2006-
2014 
108 monthly 
returns 
Investors form priors about risk 
exposure. Truthful disclosure of risks 
can reduce cost of capital. 
Israelsen, 
2014 
Topics of disclosure 
and firm and industry 
characteristics 
associated with 
disclosure type 
Topic modelling 
using Latent 
Dirichlet 
Application (LDA) 
2006-
2011 
21,077 firm-
year 
observations 
Average returns in small value firms 
and in SMB and HML factors are 
related to the disclosed risks about 
access to capital and aggregate 
financial markets. 
Israelsen and 
Yonker, 2017 
Key Human Capital Content analysis; 
Key word search 
1996-
2009 
51,316 firm-
year 
observations 
Firms with key human capital and 
firms with greater exposure to key 
human capital are riskier; 
Stock returns decline at 4% on average 
following the departure announcement 
of key employee; 
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Article Topics   Method Time 
Period 
Sample Findings 
Investors require a premium for 
exposure to firms with key human 
capital risk and firms with key human 
capital are generally more innovative. 
Mirakur 2011 Disclosure content 
and firm performance 
Manual content 
analysis to identify 
topics 
2009 
filings 
122 random 
firm-year 
observations 
The 5 most common risk disclosure 
categories are: capital structure, 
competition, governance, key 
personnel, and macro; 
The risk classifications are not driven 
by firms’ industry and only some risk 
categories are predictive of capital 
leverage and cash, but not for leverage 
and acquisitions. 
Nelson & 
Pritchard, 
2016 
Voluntary vs. 
Mandatory risk 
disclosure regime 
Manual extraction 
of risk factor 
section. 
1996-
2010 
181 firms 
(High risk) 
 
112 firms 
(Low risk) 
During voluntary disclosure regime, 
firms with high litigation risk disclosed 
a greater number of risk factors that are 
less boilerplate and easier to read than 
firms with low litigation risk. This 
difference disappeared during the 
mandatory regime. Therefore, firms 
with high litigation risk use disclosure 
to mitigate expected cost of litigation. 
Riley 
&Taylor, 
2014 
Effect of readability 
on risk factor 
disclosure 
Experimental 
survey 
Not 
applicable 
365 non-
professional 
investors 
Readability affects non-professional 
investors’ assessment of risk but has no 
effect on presentation style or reliance 
on risks. 
Yen, Li, & 
Chen, 2016 
Product market 
competition 
Automated content 
analysis 
2006-
2009 
8,509 firm-
year 
observations 
Firms in more concentrated industries 
do not reduce the amount of risk factor 
disclosures but rather provide more 
similar disclosure to their competitors. 
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Table 2: SEC Request for Comment Summary 
 Request for Comment Suggestions for Future Research 
1145 How could we improve risk factor disclosure? For example, should 
we revise our rules to require that each risk factor be accompanied 
by a specific discussion of how the registrant is addressing the risk?  
 
1146 Should we require registrants to discuss the probability of 
occurrence and the effect on performance for each risk factor? If so, 
how could we modify our disclosure requirements to best provide 
this information to investors? For example, should we require 
registrants to describe their assessment of risks?  
 
1147 How could we modify our rules to require or encourage registrants 
to describe risks with greater specificity and context? For example, 
should we require registrants to disclose the specific facts and 
circumstances that make a given risk material to the registrant? 
How should we balance investors’ need for detailed disclosure with 
the requirement to provide risk factor disclosure that is “clear and 
concise”? Should we revise our rules to require registrants to 
present their risk factors in order of management’s perception of 
the magnitude of the risk or by order of importance to 
management? Are there other ways we could improve the 
organization of registrants’ risk factors disclosure? How would this 
help investors navigate the disclosure?  
Research can build on the work done by Hope et al. 
(2016) to examine whether the level of specificity or 
detail is associated with usefulness of risk factor 
disclosure. 
1148 What, if anything, detracts from an investor’s ability to gain 
important information from a registrant’s risk factor disclosure? Do 
lengthy risk factor disclosures hinder an investor’s ability to 
understand the most significant risks?  
Studies can examine the relationship between the 
length of Item 1A disclosure and understandability of 
the disclosure. Different proxies of understandability 
such as the Fog index or other lexical quality proxies 
can be examined. Other factors apart from length can 
also be examined. 
1149 How could we revise our rules to discourage registrants from 
providing risk factor disclosure that is not specific to the registrant 
but instead describes risks that are common to an industry or to 
Studies have shown some spill-over effect from 
disclosures. It is possible that generic risks also 
provide some information to investors. Investigating 
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 Request for Comment Suggestions for Future Research 
registrants in general? Alternatively, are generic risk factors 
important to investors?  
the informativeness of generic risks can provide more 
evidence in this field of research. 
1150 Should we specify generic risks that registrants are not required to 
disclose, and if so, how should we identify those risks? Are there 
other ways that we could help registrants focus their disclosure on 
material risks?  
 
1151 Should we retain or eliminate the examples provided in Item 
503(c)? Should we revise our requirements to include additional or 
different examples? Would deleting these examples encourage 
registrants to focus on their own risk identification process?  
 
1152 Should we require registrants to identify and disclose in order their 
ten most significant risk factors without limiting the total number of 
risk factors disclosed?  
If so, should other risk factors be included in a separate section of 
the filing or in an exhibit to distinguish them from the most 
significant risks? Alternatively, should we require registrants to 
provide a risk factors summary in addition to the complete 
disclosure? Would a summary help investors better understand a 
registrant’s risks by highlighting certain information? Are there 
challenges associated with requiring a summary of the most 
significant risks?  
Studies can examine the cost versus benefit of 
requiring additional disclosure in terms of a summary 
which will also contribute to increasing the length of 
the 10-K report. 
1153 Are there ways, in addition to those we have used in Item 503, our 
Plain English 153.Rules and guidance on MD&A, to ensure that 
registrants include meaningful, rather than boilerplate, risk factor 
disclosure?  
 
1154 Risk profiles of registrants are constantly changing and evolving. 
For example, registrants today face risks, such as those associated 
with cyber security, climate change, and arctic drilling, 494 that 
may not have existed when the 1964 Guides and 1968 Guides were 
published. Is Item 503(c) effective for capturing emerging risks? If 
not, how should we revise Item 503(c) to make it more effective in 
this regard?  
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 Request for Comment Suggestions for Future Research 
1155 What types of investors or audiences are most likely to value the 
Item 503(c) disclosures?  
Studies can examine whether other audiences benefit 
from risk disclosures. A potential area of future 
research is examining debt and compensation 
contracts in line with the risk profile of firms. 
1156 What is the cost of providing the disclosure required by Item 
503(c), including the administrative and compliance costs of 
preparing and disseminating this disclosure? How would these 
costs change if we made any of the changes contemplated here? 
Please provide quantified estimates where possible and include 
only those costs associated with providing disclosure under Item 
503(c).  
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Table 3: Summary of RFD topics 
  Huang & Li 
(2011) 
Bao & Datta 
(2012) 
Campbell et al. 
(2014) 
Israelsen 
(2014) 
Risk 
represented 
1 Shareholder's 
interest risk 
Topic 0: 
Investment, 
property, 
distribution, 
interest, 
agreement 
Financial: Investment 
in plant, investment in 
equipment, leases, 
improvements, sale of 
productive assets, 
locked-in, 
construction 
Dividends 
Stakeholder 
Financial 
2 Regulation 
changes 
Topic 1: 
Regulation, 
change, law, 
financial, 
operation, 
tax, 
accounting 
Legal & Regulatory: 
Deregulation, 
regulatory, regulatory 
approval, regulatory 
change, regulatory 
compliance, 
regulatory 
environment, new 
standard, new method, 
possibility of 
restatements, 
uncertainties in 
estimates 
Regulation Regulatory/Leg
al 
3 Input prices 
risks 
Topic 2: Gas, 
price, oil, 
natural, 
operation, 
production 
Other systematic: gas, 
fuel, gasoline, 
petroleum, metal(s), 
mineral(s), mining, 
natural gas, oil, ore, 
silver, steel, housing, 
capacity, gold, 
housing starts, coal, 
obsolescence, 
overstocked, price 
pressure, prices, 
pricing power, raw 
material, unsalable 
inventory 
Oil Macroeconomic 
4 Shareholder's 
interest risk 
Topic 3: 
Stock, price, 
share, market, 
future, 
dividend, 
security, 
stakeholder 
Financial: stock 
market listing, stock 
price drop, stock price 
volatility, decline in 
stock price, dividends, 
illiquid market, 
underwriting, limited 
trading, penny stock 
Stock Price 
Disclosure 
Financial 
62 
 
  Huang & Li 
(2011) 
Bao & Datta 
(2012) 
Campbell et al. 
(2014) 
Israelsen 
(2014) 
Risk 
represented 
5 Regulation 
changes 
Topic 4: 
Cost, 
regulation, 
environment, 
law, 
operation, 
liability 
Legal and regulatory: 
casualty, charged, 
defendant, adverse 
judgment, anti-trust, 
environmental, 
hazardous, product 
liability, regulation, 
Superfund 
 
Environment
al Regulation 
Regulatory/ 
legal 
6 Financial 
condition risks 
Topic 5: 
control, 
financial, 
internal, loss, 
reporting, 
history 
Financial: financial 
condition, anti-
takeover, dilution, 
Other idiosyncratic:  
asset impairment, 
asset securitization, 
cost control, 
downsizing, 
economies of scale, 
underlying 
Accounting 
Costs 
Financial 
Idiosyncratic 
7 Potential/ongoi
ng lawsuits 
Topic 6: 
financial, 
litigation, 
operation, 
action, legal, 
liability, 
regulatory, 
claim, lawsuit 
Legal & Regulatory: 
class action, 
compliance, comply, 
contamination, injury, 
litigation, pay 
damages, penalty, 
enforcement (of 
judgment),fines, 
pending lawsuit, 
plaintiff, potential 
lawsuit, safety, 
remediation 
Legal Legal 
8 Competition 
risks 
Topic 7: 
competitive, 
industry, 
competition, 
highly, 
market 
  Competition Systematic 
9 Human 
resource risks 
Topic 8: cost, 
operation, 
labor, 
operating, 
employee, 
increase, 
acquisition 
Other idiosyncratic: 
key personnel, labor, 
labor relations, labor 
unions, keep & retain 
top mgt, mgt 
retention, strike, 
personnel, redundancy 
Human 
Capital 
Idiosyncratic 
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  Huang & Li 
(2011) 
Bao & Datta 
(2012) 
Campbell et al. 
(2014) 
Israelsen 
(2014) 
Risk 
represented 
10 New product 
introduction 
risks 
Topic 9: 
product, 
candidate, 
development, 
approval, 
clinical, 
regulatory 
Other idiosyncratic: 
clinical, new product 
acceptance, new 
product dev, product, 
product dev, product 
performance, product 
mix, production, 
preclinical, patent, 
advertising, 
certification, backlog, 
commercialize, 
concentration, 
copyright, licence, 
market acceptance, 
marketing innovation, 
new construction, 
publicity, research and 
development 
Product 
Approval 
Product 
Development
1 and 2 
Idiosyncratic 
11 Restructuring 
risk 
Merger and 
acquisition risk 
Topic 10: tax, 
income, asset, 
net, goodwill, 
loss, 
distribution, 
impairment, 
intangible 
Other idiosyncratic: 
brand recognition, 
brand, consolidation, 
intangible, integrate, 
intellectual, internal, 
investment in 
subsidiaries, 
restructuring, 
restructuring 
implementation,  
Accounting Tax  
12 Human 
resource risks 
Topic 11: 
interest, 
director, trust, 
combination, 
share, conflict 
Other idiosyncratic: 
corporate culture, 
material weaknesses, 
reporting controls, 
Sarbanes-Oxley 
Human 
Capital 
Idiosyncratic 
13 Potential 
defects in 
products 
Topic 12: 
product, 
liability, 
claim, 
market, 
insurance, 
sale, revenue 
Financial: insider 
sales 
Demand Idiosyncratic 
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  Huang & Li 
(2011) 
Bao & Datta 
(2012) 
Campbell et al. 
(2014) 
Israelsen 
(2014) 
Risk 
represented 
14   Topic 13: 
loan, real 
estate, 
investment, 
property, 
market, loss, 
portfolio 
Other idiosyncratic: 
maintenance, 
insurance coverage, 
secret, limited 
operating history, 
MBS, M.B.S, 
Mortgage backed 
securities, mortgage 
servicing rights, MSR, 
M.S.R 
Other systematic: 
Mortgage, real, real 
estate investment 
trust, REIT, R.E.I.T 
Real Estate Financial 
15 Human 
resource risks 
Topic 14: 
personnel, 
key, retain, 
attract, 
management, 
employee 
Financial: defined 
benefit, family, 
reorganization, 
postretirement, OPEB, 
O.P.E.B, funded 
status, unfunded 
pension, mandatory 
contribution, adequate 
staffing, training, 
union election 
Human 
Capital 
Idiosyncratic 
16 Volatile stock 
prices risk 
Topic 15: 
stock, price, 
operating, 
stockholder, 
fluctuate, 
interest, 
volatile 
Financial: volatility of 
revenue, operating 
results, sales 
Stock Price Financial 
17 Funding Risks 
Merger and 
Acquisition 
Risks 
Topic 16: 
acquisition, 
growth, 
future, 
operation, 
additional, 
capital, 
strategy 
Other idiosyncratic: 
acquisition, goodwill, 
goodwill impairment, 
impairment, joint 
venture, merger, SPE, 
S.P.E, Special purpose 
vehicle, synergy, 
trademark, variable 
interest entity, VIE, 
V.I.E, Proprietary 
Growth Idiosyncratic 
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  Huang & Li 
(2011) 
Bao & Datta 
(2012) 
Campbell et al. 
(2014) 
Israelsen 
(2014) 
Risk 
represented 
18 Macroeconomi
c risks 
Industry is 
cyclical 
Topic 17: 
condition, 
economic, 
financial, 
market, 
industry, 
change, 
affected, 
downturn, 
demand 
Other systematic: 
economy, EU, Euro, 
E.U, European union, 
fiscal policy, foreign 
currency, aggregate 
demand, foreign 
exchange, general 
business risks, general 
conditions, seasonal, 
GDP, G.D.P, GNP, 
G.N.P, general 
economic condition, 
industry, industry 
environment, 
inflation, currency 
collapse, currency, 
cyclical, demand, 
economic (condition, 
downturn, growth), 
political climate, 
political instability, 
pound, middle east, 
monetary policy, peso, 
recession, RMB, 
Rubble, Rupee, 
terrorism, U.S. dollar, 
war, Yen, Yuan, 
Enron, economic 
uncertainties, 
electricity, energy, 
complement, 
concentration, 
consumer confidence, 
consumer spending, 
consumption, market 
(demand, supply, 
place), materials 
operating environment 
International Macroeconomic 
19 Infrastructure 
risk 
Disruption of 
operations 
Topic 18: 
system, 
service, 
information, 
failure, 
product, 
Other idiosyncratic: 
internet, IT, I.T., 
information 
technology, security, 
software, systems, 
technological 
Systems 
Internet 
Idiosyncratic 
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  Huang & Li 
(2011) 
Bao & Datta 
(2012) 
Campbell et al. 
(2014) 
Israelsen 
(2014) 
Risk 
represented 
operation, 
software, 
network, 
breach, 
interruption 
obsolescence, 
technologies, 
technology, web 
security, website(s), 
embargo, expand, 
expanding, export, 
facilities, 
franchise(ee),expansio
n, online 
Other systematic: 
saving, substitute 
20 Suppliers risk Topic 19: 
cost, contract, 
operation, 
plan, 
increase, 
pension, 
delay 
Other idiosyncratic: 
delivery, distribution, 
distributor, single 
supplier, reliance on 
key supplier, contract, 
sole supplier, 
suppliers, supply 
chain, shortages, 
vendor 
Supply Chain 
Contractual 
Systematic 
21 Rely on few 
large 
customers 
Suppliers risks 
Downstream 
risk 
Topic 20: 
customer, 
product, 
revenue, sale, 
supplier, 
relationship, 
key, portion, 
contract, 
manufacturin
g, rely 
Other idiosyncratic: 
customer 
concentration, 
customer control, 
single customer, 
reliance on key 
customer 
Supply Chain Idiosyncratic 
22 Intellectual 
property risk 
Licensing 
related risks 
Topic 21: 
property, 
intellectual, 
protect, 
proprietary, 
technology, 
patent, 
protection, 
harm, licence 
Legal and regulatory: 
infringe, intellectual 
property 
Intellectual 
Property 
Regulatory/Leg
al 
23 Volatile 
demand and 
results 
competition 
risks 
Topic 22: 
product, 
market, 
service, 
change, sale, 
Other systematic: 
commodity, 
competition, 
competitor, tariff, 
Demand 
Competition 
Systematic 
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  Huang & Li 
(2011) 
Bao & Datta 
(2012) 
Campbell et al. 
(2014) 
Israelsen 
(2014) 
Risk 
represented 
demand, 
successfully, 
technology, 
competition 
trade, no current 
operations, 
24 Potential/ongoi
ng lawsuits 
Topic 23: 
provision, 
law, control, 
change, 
stock, 
prevent, 
stockholder, 
Delaware, 
charter, 
delay, bylaw 
Legal and regulatory: 
conflict of interest, 
related party 
Contractual 
Legal 
Regulatory/Leg
al 
25 Regulation 
changes 
Topic 24: 
regulation, 
government, 
change, 
revenue, 
contract, law, 
service 
Legal and regulatory: 
IFRS, I.F.R.S, 
inquiry(ies), 
investigation, 
legislation, 
government 
investigation, 
government policy, 
government approval, 
government 
investigation, FDA 
approval, Federal, 
Fraud 
Regulation Regulatory/Leg
al 
26 Financial 
condition risks 
Topic 25: 
capital, 
credit, 
financial, 
market, cost, 
operation, 
rating, access, 
liquidity, 
downgrade 
Financial: capital, 
credit rating, 
downgrade, liquidity, 
rating, working 
capital, Maturity, 
negative operating CF 
Financing 
Credit 
Financial 
27 Funding risks Topic 26: 
debt, 
indebtedness, 
cash, 
obligation, 
financial, 
credit, 
covenant 
Financial: credit, 
covenant, credit risk, 
bank debt, obligations, 
loan, debt burden, 
default, indebtedness, 
collateral, chapter 11, 
chapter 7, chapter 9, 
leverage(d), financing 
Financial 
Market 
Financial 
68 
 
  Huang & Li 
(2011) 
Bao & Datta 
(2012) 
Campbell et al. 
(2014) 
Israelsen 
(2014) 
Risk 
represented 
costs, refinance(ing), 
renegotiation, new 
financing 
28 International 
risks 
Topic 27: 
operation, 
international, 
foreign, 
currency, 
rate, 
fluctuation 
Other systematic: 
exchange rate, 
financial crisis, 
foreign currency, 
Asian crisis, business 
conditions, forward, 
growth rates, hedging, 
Iraq, call, Hedge, 
Option, Peso, 
Derivative, 
discounting, 
Renminbi, swap, 
short,  
International Macroeconomic 
29 Financial 
condition risks 
Topic 28: 
loss, 
insurance, 
financial, 
loan, reserve, 
operation, 
cover 
Financial: operating 
losses, reinsurance, 
reserves, revolver 
Insurance Financial 
30 Catastrophes Topic 29: 
operation, 
natural, 
facility, 
disaster, 
event, 
terrorist, 
weather 
Other idiosyncratic: 
Natural disasters, 
weather, SARS, 
September (11th) 
  Macroeconomic 
31     Tax: uncertain tax, 
VAT, Value added 
tax, aggressive tax, 
back taxes, deferred 
tax, excise, FIN 48, 
IRS, I.R.S, Internal 
Revenue Service, IRS 
audit, IRS judgment, 
Loss (carry forward, 
carry backs), property 
tax(es), provision for 
International 
Revenue 
Tax  
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  Huang & Li 
(2011) 
Bao & Datta 
(2012) 
Campbell et al. 
(2014) 
Israelsen 
(2014) 
Risk 
represented 
income tax(es), state 
tax(es), tax(es), tax 
audit, tax 
authority(ies), tax 
liability(ies), tax 
penalty(ies), taxable 
32       Health Care Idiosyncratic 
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Abstract 
This chapter examines the relationship between Risk Factor Disclosures (RFDs) in the annual 10-
K report and the cost of debt in both the private and public debt markets. I examine this 
relationship from two perspectives: the direct effect of RFDs on cost of debt, and the indirect 
effect on cost of debt through Abnormal Risk Factor Disclosure (ARFD). ARFD is a new measure 
proposed to capture managerial discretion in risk factor reporting and it is estimated as the residual 
from the regression of RFD on its determinants. To measure RFDs, I use the total number of words 
in Item 1A-RFD and the aggregate and categorical risk words developed by Campbell, Chen, 
Dhaliwal, Lu, and Steele (2014). To extract RFDs from company filings in the Electronic Data 
Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval Systems (EDGAR) database, I employ an automated content 
analysis method. I find that firms with greater numbers of RFD words have higher cost of debt in 
both the private and public debt markets. This finding supports previous research findings that 
RFDs reflect the risk profiles of firms. I also find that firms in the private debt market are 
rewarded for transparency with lower cost of debt when there is more risk factor disclosure than 
expected. However, firms are not penalized with higher cost of debt for risk factor reporting below 
expectation. In the public debt market, more risk disclosure is associated with higher cost of debt, 
while less risk disclosure attracts lower cost of debt. This is consistent with the expectation that 
public debt lenders rely on public disclosures for information. In addition, I find that risk words 
relating to financial risk tend to be associated with cost of debt, suggesting financial risks are 
highly relevant in the debt market. The results are consistent when applying the same risk 
disclosure measures for Item 7-Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) of the 10-K report. 
The findings in this chapter suggest RFDs are both informative and useful to audiences (borrowers 
and lenders) outside of equity investors.   
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3. Introduction 
Beginning in 2005, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) made it mandatory for 
large companies16 to disclose the most significant risks that apply to the company or their 
securities in Item 1A-Risk factors of the annual 10-K report. The objective of this disclosure is to 
inform financial statement users on the risks to which companies are exposed. Recently, the SEC 
has issued comment letters asking for suggestions on how to make this disclosure more 
meaningful. Chapter 2 of this dissertation discussed in detail the requirements of Item 1A and 
reviewed the current literature.  
Recent studies have shown some association between Risk Factor Disclosures (RFDs) and 
earnings and returns (Kravet & Muslu, 2013), investors’ risk perception (Campbell et al., 2014), 
assessment of fundamental risk by analysts (Hope, Hu, & Lu, 2016), and creditor investors (Chiu, 
Guan, & Kim, 2017). These results suggest that RFDs are informative and are useful in decision 
making. Whether this usefulness of this information extends to the cost of debt, however, remains 
an empirical question. Furthermore, studies have used a variety of methods to measure RFDs. 
Campbell et al. (2014) use total number of words and total number of risk words, while Hope et al. 
(2016) use the specificity of risk factor words. Herein, I introduce a new measure to capture 
managers’ discretion in reporting RFDs: Abnormal RFD (ARFD). This measure is obtained by 
decomposing RFDs into normal and abnormal components based on the determinants and then 
examining the effect of managerial discretion in reporting RFDs on the debt market. 
The debt market is comprised of the private and public debt markets, and the characteristics 
of the borrowers and lenders in these two markets differ significantly. Lenders in the private debt 
market (predominantly banks) have access to private information, are more sophisticated, and are 
                                                 
16Large companies are defined as firms with more than $75m in assets. 
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better able to process information compared to lenders in the public debt market (bondholders). 
Furthermore, borrowers in the private debt market have lower accounting and disclosure quality 
compared to public debt borrowers (Bharath, Sundar, & Sunder, 2008; Dhaliwal, Khurana, & 
Pereira, 2011b). Due to the negative nature of the disclosure, RFDs create an incentive for 
managers to exercise discretion when reporting to avoid adverse impacts on the managers’ 
reputation and career. Recognizing the likelihood of inaccurate disclosure through discretionary 
reporting, banks may choose to use other private information at their disposal to estimate firm 
risks. Bondholders, on the other hand, do not have access to private information and rely solely on 
public information. Considering the institutional differences between these two markets, how 
banks and bondholders interpret managerial discretion in reporting RFDs is an empirical question 
that can be both insightful and useful. 
To my knowledge, there is no study that has examined the direct effect of RFDs and the 
indirect effects of Abnormal Risk Factor Disclosures (ARFD) on cost of debt. A related study on 
the debt market by Chiu et al. (2017) examined how RFDs affect Credit Default Swaps (CDS). 
While Chiu et al. measured RFD using a dummy variable, my study measures RFD based on the 
number of risk words. In addition, I focus not only on the direct effect of RFDs in the debt 
markets, but also on the indirect effect through discretionary reporting of RFDs. In addressing 
some of the gaps in the literature, this study seeks to provide answers to the following research 
questions: (1) Do RFDs affect the cost of debt in the private and public debt markets? (2) What is 
the impact of ARFD on the cost of debt in the private and public debt market?  
Understanding the impact of RFDs in the debt market is significant for three main reasons. 
First, debt financing has been observed to be the predominant source of external financing in the 
United States. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) report that between 1946 and 1987, 85% of capital 
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was sourced from the debt market compared to 7% sourced from the equity market. This is also 
supported by the new securities issue report for U.S. corporations issued by the Federal Reserve 
Bank which shows that over $1.6 trillion bonds were issued in 2016.17 Second, private and public 
lenders are more sophisticated than equity investors. While private lenders are mostly banks, 
public lenders are mostly institutional investors (Jiang, 2008). Third, the return in the debt market 
is fixed compared to that in the equity market. As a result, lenders in the debt market face higher 
downside risk compared to equity investors. Although this downside risk is mitigated through loan 
covenants and a higher ranking in repayment in cases of bankruptcy, lenders can still lose their 
investment if there are no significant assets for sharing. Compared to equity investors, lenders do 
not have the privilege of sharing in the company’s profit. For the above reasons, lenders should be 
interested in information that can be used to assess the riskiness of borrowers. 
This study adopts an automated content analysis method to extract and measure RFDs. I 
use the risk words developed by Campbell et al. (2014) as well as the total number of words in 
Item 1A to measure RFDs. As an additional test, I also examine whether another disclosure in the 
annual 10-K report, Item 7-Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A), contains risk 
information that is useful in the debt market. The two measures of cost of debt employed in the 
study are All-in Spread (AIS) for the private debt market, and RATING for the public debt market. 
AIS is measured as the number of basis points (bps) above LIBOR, as obtained from the DealScan 
database, while RATING is a numeric conversion of the Standard & Poor (S&P) issuer bond rating 
for the public debt market. RATING has been used in similar studies as a measure of cost of debt 
(Jiang, 2008; Francis, LaFond, Olsson, & Schipper, 2005) and is obtained from the Compustat 
database.  
                                                 
17Data available from the Federal Reserve Bank current releases 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/corpsecure/current.htm 
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For both debt markets, managerial discretion in risk factor reporting (ARFD) is measured 
as the residual obtained from the regression of RFDs on its determinants. This measure is further 
categorized as positive (PARFD) or negative (NARFD) depending on the sign of the residual. For 
private debt, the sample size to examine the direct relationship between RFDs and both the cost of 
debt and managerial discretion in reporting RFDs is 1,326 loan-years after excluding firms with 
incomplete data. For public debt, the final sample size is 3,007 firm-years. The study period covers 
2005 to 2015.  
In the private debt market, I find a positive association between RFDs and cost of debt 
which suggests that RFDs are informative. This association also implies that the information in 
RFDs is associated with the data used by banks when setting new loans, thereby confirming that 
RFDs reflect the risk profile of firms. Specifically, the results show that an average increase of 1.1 
in the number of financial risk words and 0.8 legal risk words increases cost of debt by 0.04 bps. 
The results of the effect of managerial discretion on cost of debt show that firms disclosing more 
risk factors than expected (PARFD) have a lower cost of debt. This is consistent with my 
expectation. However, for firms disclosing less risk information than expected (NARFD), the 
results did not show the assumed higher cost of debt. A likely explanation for this result is that 
banks already know the risk level of firms and thus reward risky firms for honesty. However, less 
risky firms are not penalised for lack of transparency since banks already know these firms are less 
risky. 
In the public debt market, similar to the private debt market, I also find positive 
associations between RFDs and cost of debt. On average, firms in the public debt market have a 
lower rating for every 1% increase in number of RFD words.18 In line with the expectation that 
                                                 
18 This decrease in rating, however, is not large enough to move from one debt rating category to another. 
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public debt lenders rely on RFDs, the results for the evaluation of the effect of managerial 
discretion on RFDs reveal higher costs of debt for firms disclosing more risk factors (PARFD) and 
lower cost of debt for firms disclosing less risk factors (NARFD). These findings suggest public 
debt market lenders react to RFDs and likely consider the risk information as representative of 
firm risk. The results for the supplementary tests using Item 7-MD&A also support the findings for 
both private and public debt markets that the risk profile of firms are reflected in their cost of debt. 
The results of the supplementary tests, however, only partly support the effect of managerial 
discretion in reporting RFDs on cost of debt. Overall, the results confirm that RFDs are reflected 
in the cost of debt and are useful in the debt market.  
The finding of a positive association between RFDs and cost of debt is consistent with 
Campbell et al. (2014),who argued that firms facing greater risks disclose more risk factors, and 
also with Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008) who found that banks use tighter loan contract terms, such 
as higher spread, to overcome borrower risk. Furthermore, this study makes five main 
contributions to the literature. Primarily, to my knowledge, this is one of the first studies to 
examine RFDs in the debt market, and the only study to examine the association between RFDs 
and cost of debt in the private and public debt market. RFDs are important because of the effect of 
risk on cost of debt. Uncertainties in the business environment and the fact that Item 1A-Risk 
factor disclosure is a relatively recent disclosure makes understanding the nature and usefulness of 
this section a significant aspect in the evaluation of the overall usefulness of the annual report. 
Studying the relationship between RFD and cost of debt contributes directly to the disclosure and 
debt contracting streams of literature.  
Second, this study introduces ARFD as a measure of risk information. Compared to RFD, 
ARFD captures managerial discretion in disclosing risk information. This measure enables us to 
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examine the level of transparency managers are using in reporting risk disclosures and the 
subsequent effect on cost of debt. Considering the negative nature of RFDs, this study provides an 
interesting opportunity to observe the positive effect of increased disclosure versus the negative 
effect of disclosing higher risk within the same setting. 
Third, this study extends and complements prior research by documenting a relationship 
between disclosure quality and the cost of debt. Sengupta (1998), Dhaliwal, Hogan, Trezevant, and 
Wilkins (2011a), and Chen and Yi-Ping (2015) used disclosure quality ratings, internal control 
disclosures, and segment disclosure quality, respectively, as proxies of disclosure quality to 
examine this relationship. By demonstrating a relationship between RFDs and cost of debt, the 
current study supports the importance of disclosure quality in formulating debt contracts.  
Fourth, this study provides empirical evidence underpinning the SEC’s call for information 
regarding the type of investors or audience that are most likely to value Item 1A-Risk factor 
disclosure. Providing evidence of the usefulness of this disclosure in both debt markets contributes 
to the understanding of the differences in these markets and shows that RFDs are not only 
important to equity investors but also to stakeholders in debt markets. 
Finally, through the objectives of this study, I offer valuable insights to debt providers on 
the usefulness of financial disclosures, thereby responding to Li’s (2010) call for further research 
integrating large-sample textual disclosures with debt contracting and also to the call by Kravet 
and Muslu (2013) for research on how debt markets or credit rating agencies respond to risk 
disclosures.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.1 develops the ARFD 
measure; section 3.2 discusses the background literature; section 3.3 presents the hypotheses; 
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section 3.4 discusses the research design; section 3.5 presents the results; and section 3.6 presents 
the robustness tests. Section 3.7 concludes the discussion. 
3.1. Risk Factor Disclosure Measures 
3.1.1 Risk Factor Disclosure Measures in the Literature 
Literature on RFDs has used manual or automated content analysis to extract and derive a measure 
of risk disclosure. A common measure is the count of the risk words developed by Campbell et al. 
(2014). Other measures that have been used in the literature include specificity of the words in 
RFDs (Hope et al., 2016), readability of risk disclosure (Nelson & Pritchard, 2014; Riley & 
Taylor, 2014), and an indicator variable representing firms that are required by the SEC to report 
Item 1A-RFD (Chiu et al., 2017). These various measures aim to capture the information content 
in RFDs to establish whether or not the disclosures are boilerplate. Contrary to the expectation that 
RFDs are uninformative, these studies actually find that RFDs provide useful information about 
firm risk. 
To extend the literature in this field, I develop a new measure, referred to as Abnormal 
Risk Factor Disclosure (ARFD), that captures managerial discretion in risk reporting and is 
discussed further below. 
3.1.2 New Measurement of Risk: Abnormal Risk Factor Disclosure 
ARFD is analogous to discretionary accruals or abnormal returns and is measured as the residual 
from the regression of the determinants of risk disclosure on RFD. Studies that have used a similar 
approach in the accounting literature focus on a variety of topics, including: abnormal audit fees 
measured as the residual of the regression of audit fees on audit fee determinants (Asthana & 
Boone, 2012; Blankley, Hurtt, & MacGregor, 2012); abnormal loan loss provision measured as the 
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residual from the regression of loan loss provision on the determinants (Kanagaretnam, Krishnan, 
& Lobo, 2010); abnormal positive tone measured as the residual from the regression of the 
measure of tone in earnings press releases against tone determinants as established in the literature 
(Huang, Teoh, & Zhang, Tone Management, 2014); and abnormal Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) disclosure measured as residual from the regression of CSR disclosure measure against 
factors determining CSR activities (Cahan, De Villers, Jeter, Naiker, & Van Staden, 2015). ARFD 
captures managerial discretion in RFDs by decomposing this disclosure into a normal component 
based on the determinants of RFDs and an abnormal component, thus representing the 
discretionary part of the disclosure. This abnormal component is the residual from the regression 
of the actual RFDs on the determinants. ARFD is useful in understanding how the debt markets 
interpret the managers’ choice to disclose more or less risk information than expected.  
To derive this measure, I first extract Item 1A-Risk factor disclosures from the annual 10-K 
filing and measure the actual RFDs. I discuss the details of this extraction process in section 3.4. 
Then, I derive the determinants of RFDs from the findings of three papers that review the topics 
and contents of RFDs. The first paper, Campbell et al. (2014), identified five major categories of 
risk. The second paper, Bao and Datta (2012), identified 29 risk topics, while the third paper, 
Huang and Li (2011), identified 25 risk topics. In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, I discuss these 
papers and present a manual matching of the risk topics across the three papers. This matching 
process enables the compression of all identified RFD topics into six major categories of risk: 
regulatory or legal; financial; tax; litigation; macroeconomic; and idiosyncratic or operational.19 
Regulatory risk refers to the exposure of firms to laws and regulations. Financial risk includes 
liquidity, leverage, share-price drop, takeover possibilities, credit, and other securities risk. Tax 
                                                 
19In identifying the major risk groups, I allocate the different risk categories into a general risk area. Although this is 
a subjective process, I endeavour to match similar risks to the most closely related category. 
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risk measures exposure to tax liability, and litigation risk covers risk of lawsuits from business 
operations. Macroeconomic risk captures risks such as currency risk, political risk, economic 
downturn, natural disasters, and wars, while idiosyncratic (operational) risk is firm specific risk, 
including other risks associated with the firm’s operations. 
These six categories are my determinants of RFDs and I expect RFDs will not vary 
significantly from these determinants. To develop ARFD, I assign proxies to each of the 
determinants based on measures established within the literature. Relying on Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986), I use firm size (SIZE) as a proxy for regulatory risk measured as the log of 
equity market value. It is expected that larger firms are exposed to more regulatory scrutiny and as 
such face higher regulatory and legal risk. For financial risk, I use the proxy of leverage (LEV) 
which is measured as the book value of debt divided by total assets. This proxy was identified by 
Campbell et al. (2014) to have the largest coefficient and statistical significance for all disclosures 
related to financial risk. For tax risk, the proxy used is effective tax rate (ETR). Similar to 
Campbell et al. (2014) and Campbell, Cecchini, Cianci, Ehinger, and Werner (2016), this variable 
is measured as total tax expense divided by pre-tax income. The proxy for litigation risk (LIT) 
follows Hope et al. (2016). I assign a code of 1 to firms that are within the SIC codes 2833-2836, 
3570-3577, 3600-3676, 5200-5961, 7370-7374 and 8731-8734,or zero otherwise, based on the 
evidence that firms within these SIC codes are prone to litigation.20 The proxy for macroeconomic 
risk is the monthly rate of change in Consumer Price Index (CPIChange) obtained from CRSP 
Treasury and Inflation index. Finally, as a proxy for idiosyncratic risk, I use the standard deviation 
                                                 
20 The SIC Codes are as follows: 2833-2836 – Medical/Pharmaceutical; 3570-3577 – Computers/I.T.; 3600-3676 – 
Electrical/Electronics; 5200-5961 – Retail; 7370-7374 – Services (I.T.); 8731-8734 – Services (Biological research). 
Details available at https://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/siccodes.htm. 
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of quarterly firm earnings (SD_EARN) over the last three years where quarterly earnings data is 
earnings before interest, obtained from Compustat. 
ARFD is represented by the expression below. In addition to the determinants of RFD, I 
control for disclosure comprehensiveness using the total number of words in the annual 10-K 
(FILE_TW): 
𝐴𝑅𝐹𝐷௧ = 𝑅𝐹𝐷௧   − [𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸௧ + 𝛼ଶ𝐿𝐸𝑉௧ + 𝛼ଷ 𝐸𝑇𝑅௧ + 𝛼ସ𝐿𝐼𝑇௧ + 𝛼ହ𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒௧
+ 𝛼଺ 𝑆𝐷_𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁௧ + 𝛼଻ 𝐹𝐼𝐿𝐸_𝑇𝑊௧ + 𝛼଼𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝛼ଽ𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌] … … … … … … . (1) 
For the private debt market, I use a lag model to derive a measure of ARFD such that the 
discretion in reporting RFD will precede the effect on cost of debt. This will limit endogeneity in 
the model. The lag model takes the following form: 
𝐴𝑅𝐹𝐷௧ିଵ = 𝑅𝐹𝐷௧ିଵ − [𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸௧ିଵ + 𝛼ଶ𝐿𝐸𝑉௧ିଵ + 𝛼ଷ𝐸𝑇𝑅௧ିଵ + 𝛼ସ𝐿𝐼𝑇௧ିଵ
+ 𝛼ହ𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒௧ିଵ + 𝛼଺𝑆𝐷_𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁௧ିଵ + 𝛼଻𝐹𝐼𝐿𝐸_𝑇𝑊௧ିଵ + 𝛼଼𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
+ 𝛼ଽ𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌] … … … … … … . . . (2) 
3.2. Background Literature 
3.2.1 Debt Market 
Heflin, Moon, and Wallace (2016) noted two main differences between lenders and stockholders. 
First, lenders only face downside risk and do not benefit from increased liquidity. This is because 
buying and selling of debt occurs less frequently than equity. Second, the return in the debt market 
is fixed hence lenders have more at stake compared to stockholders. Jiang (2008) also showed that 
bondholders are mostly institutional investors, more sophisticated than other investors, and have 
access to firm specific information. In the debt market, financing can be obtained from the private 
market, which is dominated by banks, or from the public market which is mainly the bond market. 
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These two markets differ in terms of the characteristics of the participants and are further 
discussed below. 
3.2.2 Private debt versus public debt market 
Extant research reveals some unique characteristics of private and public debt market borrowers. 
Bharath et al. (2008) observed that private debt market borrowers have low accounting quality 
compared to the borrowers in the public debt market. Dhaliwal et al. (2011a) also found that 
borrowers from the private debt market have low disclosure quality compared to those in the 
public debt market. Denis and Mihov (2003) observed that the decision to borrow from the private 
or public debt market is influenced by the borrower’s credit quality and default risk. In addition, 
the authors found that public debt market borrowers are larger, more profitable, and have higher 
credit ratings than private borrowers. These results corroborate the findings in Diamond (1991) 
that private debt market borrowers are mostly firms that are trying to establish financial credit and 
are usually young, less successful, and have a high probability of default.  
A recent paper by Morellec, Valta, and Zhdanov (2015) developed and tested a model of 
financing and investing decisions which allows firms to choose both the amount and the type of 
debt to issue. The findings in the study show that firms with more growth options, higher 
bargaining power of shareholders, and those operating in a more competitive product market or 
facing lower credit supply are more likely to issue bonds. Their findings also support Lin, Ma, 
Mlatesta, and Xuan (2013) whose results suggest that firms with divergence between controlling 
shareholders’ cash-flow rights and control rights tend to rely more on public than private debt 
financing. These findings indicate that firms controlled by large shareholders tend to choose public 
debt over bank debt to avoid scrutiny.  
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Overall, the above characteristics of borrowers in both debt markets suggest that public 
debt market borrowers will be more transparent in their disclosure as they are relatively successful 
and are better able to absorb the likely reaction from disclosing negative information. Borrowers in 
the private debt market, however, are still trying to establish a reputation and will likely manage 
the risk information they disclose to avoid tighter loan covenants. 
Furthermore, research findings reveal the advantage banks have in gathering and 
processing information and incorporating this information into loan contracts (Diamond, 1991). 
Banks are more efficient at monitoring debt than bondholders as bondholders are relatively 
unsophisticated and do not have the resources to commit to debt monitoring due to free-rider 
problems (Bharath et al., 2008). Banks also use a combination of priced and non-priced terms to 
design loan contracts compared to bondholders that mainly use only priced terms. The 
combination of possession of superior information by banks, coupled with low accounting and 
disclosure quality noted for private debt borrowers, suggest that banks will rely less on public 
disclosures in designing loan contracts. However, banks can use public disclosures to validate the 
information they possess in cases where lenders are not truthful and withhold information that can 
affect their default risk (Mazumdar & Sengupta, 2005).  
Overall, previous research suggest that public debt borrowers are larger, more successful, 
and have better accounting and disclosure quality than private debt borrowers. In addition, they 
have higher credit ratings, are controlled by larger shareholders, and have more growth options 
(Bharath et al., 2008; Dhaliwal et al., 2011b; Diamond, 1991; Lin et al., 2013; Morellec et al., 
2015). Private lenders on the other hand are more sophisticated, have access to private 
information, and are better at information gathering and processing, and debt monitoring compared 
to public lenders (Bharath et al., 2008; Diamond, 1991). 
 
 
84 
 
3.3. Hypotheses development 
3.3.1 Risk factor disclosure and cost of debt 
Recent research on RFDs provides evidence that risk factor disclosures are informative (Campbell 
et al. 2014; Campbell et al. 2016; Chiu et al. 2017; Hope et al. 2016). Campbell et al. (2014) 
showed that riskier firms disclose more risks and that the type of risk a firm is exposed to 
determines how much of the disclosure is devoted to that risk. These findings suggest RFDs reflect 
the risk profile of borrowers and are informative in the equity market.  
In the private debt market, RFDs may not be informative because borrowers in this market 
have lower accounting and disclosure quality, are smaller in size, and are less profitable compared 
to public debt borrowers (Bharath et al., 2008; Dhaliwal et al., 2011b). Furthermore, banks may 
use both price and non-price terms in defining loan terms. For example, firms that are considered 
risky may attract tighter loan covenants, such as collateral or shorter maturity, to compensate for 
the additional risk. Thus, the riskiness of firms may be reflected in both the cost of debt and the 
loan terms. Graham et al. (2008) show that loans initiated after restatements have high loan 
spreads, shorter maturities, higher likelihood of being secured, and more covenant restrictions. 
Furthermore, private debt lenders may consider other factors, such as reputation and relationship, 
in loan decisions.  
On the other hand, previous studies have established an association between disclosure and 
the debt market (Mazumdar & Sengupta, 2005; Sengupta, 1998). Recent evidence by Campbell et 
al. (2014) and Chiu et al. (2017) indicate that RFDs are informative to both equity investors and 
debt providers, suggesting that RFDs are useful to diverse stakeholders. In line with these recent 
findings, I expect that information in RFDs will be associated with the private information used by 
 
 
85 
 
banks in loan contracts. Thus, a positive association is expected between RFDs and cost of debt. 
The following hypothesis is proposed for the private debt market: 
H1a: There is a positive association between RFDs and cost of debt in the private debt market. 
Compared to private debt lenders, bondholders do not have access to private information 
and are considered less sophisticated than banks. Also, bondholders cannot afford to incur costs in 
monitoring debt due to free-rider problems (Bharath et al., 2008). The lack of access to private 
information gathering and processing resources and the inability to monitor debt suggests 
bondholders will rely more on public disclosures than private lenders. Furthermore, since 
borrowers in the public debt market have better accounting and disclosure quality (Bharath et al., 
2008; Dhaliwal et al., 2011b), I expect that the RFDs of public debt borrowers will adequately 
reflect the level of firm risk.  
Similar to the literature on private debt, there is evidence of an association between 
disclosure and public debt markets. Using bond yields and interest cost to proxy for borrowing 
cost, Sengupta (1998) found that a firm’s disclosure quality is useful to lenders and underwriters in 
estimating a firm’s default risk. Overall, I expect RFDs will also be important in the public debt 
market and the cost of debt will reflect the risk profile of the borrowers. As a result, I expect a 
positive association between RFD and cost of public debt. The hypothesis below is thus proposed: 
H1b: There is a positive association between RFDs and cost of debt in the public debt market. 
3.3.2 Abnormal Risk Disclosure and Cost of Debt 
Signalling theory predicts that managers use the disclosure of information to communicate the 
quality of management. This signal can demonstrate transparency and strong management 
practices that differentiate firms from their competitors. Considering the negative nature of RFDs, 
managers can also choose to provide limited risk information in an attempt to mislead the market 
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or protect their careers. The disclosure literature predicts that more disclosure should reduce 
information asymmetry and consequently reduce the cost of capital (Verrecchia, 1983). Following 
from this literature, we would expect that more risk factor disclosure should result in lower cost of 
debt. However, considering RFDs provide negative information, the effect of disclosing more or 
less risk information may not necessarily translate to cost of debt benefits.  
My measure of managers’ discretion to disclose more or less risk factors than expected 
(ARFD) is further split into positive (PARFD) and negative (NARFD) to observe the varying 
effects of positive versus negative deviations. Given the expected level of firm risk factor 
disclosure based on its determinants, when actual RFDs exceed this expected level ARFD is 
positive and referred to as PARFD. When actual RFD is less than the expected level, RFD is 
negative and referred to as NARFD.  
Financial reporting transparency reflects the extent to which financial reports reveal a 
firm’s underlying economics which includes the entity’s resources, cash flows, and the risk it faces 
(Barth & Schipper, 2008). Managers can choose to bias reports in order to manipulate the market’s 
valuation of the firm for some expected benefits (Fischer & Verrecchia, 2000). Bias in reporting 
affects firm transparency which can subsequently have an impact on cost of capital through the 
effect of information asymmetry (Easley & O’Hara, 2004; Verrecchia, 2001). In the private debt 
market, the choice to disclose more or less risk factors should not influence loan contracts since 
banks have access to reliable private information and can evaluate a firm’s risk level. However, 
public disclosures can save banks the cost of searching for information and can be used to confirm 
private information. Furthermore, Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) show that despite the market’s 
rational expectation that managers will be biased when reporting, managers may be better off to 
bias reports when the market cannot perfectly adjust for this bias. This observation suggests that 
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while banks can evaluate firm level of risk, they may not be able to perfectly adjust for the bias in 
the loan pricing terms since banks do not know the intention of the reporting bias. Therefore, 
transparency in reporting RFDs should be useful to banks.  
The choice of reporting more or less than what is expected does not have the same 
consequences for firms. Specifically, when a firm discloses more than the expected level, it reveals 
to the market that its level of risk is high, which can have a negative impact on its market value. 
Since it is costly for the firm to disclose more risk, banks are likely to recognize that the firm is 
honest and that increased disclosure reduces the information asymmetry that banks face. In such a 
case, banks are likely to reward such behaviour by reducing the interest rate. However, when a 
firm discloses less than what is expected, the firm does not bear additional cost and banks may 
view this disclosure as dishonest. Consequently, in such a case, banks could penalize such 
behaviour by increasing the interest rate. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2a: There is a negative (positive) association between PARFD (NARFD) and cost of debt for 
firms in the private debt market. 
Compared to banks, bondholders rely more on public disclosures to inform lending 
decisions, and there is no incentive for the bondholder to incur costs to search for information on 
public debt borrowers. A reason for this is the diffuse ownership of public debt and the associated 
free-rider problems, thus making it ineffective to incur monitoring cost (Diamond, 1991). 
Furthermore, bondholders are less sophisticated than banks and may lack the necessary skills to 
process RFDs in order to identify the true level of firm risk. An implication of the naivety of 
bondholders is that in the absence of contrary information and ability to process the disclosure 
information, RFDs may be considered as the true level of firm risk. Therefore, I expect that 
controlling for the level of firm risk, firms disclosing more risk information (PARFD) will be 
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considered higher risk and incur greater cost of debt, while firms with less risk disclosure 
(NARFD) will incur lower cost of debt as they are considered to be less risky. The hypothesis 
below is thus proposed: 
H2b: There is a positive (negative) association between PARFD (NARFD) and cost of debt for 
firms in the public debt market. 
3.4. Research Design 
3.4.1. Sample Selection 
The initial sample for private debt was all loan facilities issued between 2005 and 2015 in the 
DealScan database. A total of 106,183 facilities were identified. For firms with multiple facilities 
within the same year, I used the sum of all facilities per year to calculate the weighted average of 
the AIS (spread) and the loan maturity to form panel data. Non-U.S. firms, firms with negative AIS, 
and firms classified as private in DealScan were excluded from the sample, resulting in 8,543 loan-
year observations. After excluding observations with no EDGAR or Compustat data and with less 
than 30 words in Item 1A-RFD, the final sample includes 1,326 loan-year observations.  
To obtain the sample for public debt, all firms with S&P issuer debt ratings from 2005 to 
2015 were obtained from Compustat resulting in 205,191 monthly ratings data. The Compustat 
data was matched to the ratings data by date corresponding to three months after the fiscal year, 
yielding 15,187 observations. Similar to the private debt sample, I excluded firms with Item 1A of 
less than 30 words to be sure that the firms actually discussed risk as opposed to general 
statements pointing to other sections in the annual 10-K that discuss risk information (Filzen, 
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2005; Hu, Johnson, & Liu 2017).21 The final data for the public debt sample was 3,007 loan-year 
observations. The sample summary for private and public debt is presented in Table 1.  
3.4.2. Method 
To develop the RFD measure, which is the independent variable of interest for H1a and H1b and 
the first stage dependent variable for H2a and H2b, I rely on the risk words developed by 
Campbell et al. (2014) in addition to the total number of words in Item 1A. Campbell et al. 
identified five categories of risk words including financial risk, other idiosyncratic risks, other 
systematic risks, legal risks, and tax risks. I amended some of the risk words to avoid duplication 
in the word count.22 The six measures of RFDs in this study are the total number of words in 
Item1A, the total number of risk words, and risk words from four of the five risk categories based 
on Campbell et al. Compared to the determinants of RFDs identified earlier, financial, 
idiosyncratic, and tax risk are common to both Campbell et al. (2014) and my study. These risk 
words are presented in Appendix 1 with the amended words identified with an asterisk.23 
The risk words were extracted from the annual 10-K filing using content analysis software. 
First, I extracted the links to the 10-K filling from EDGAR database form Z. Then, I downloaded 
the actual files from EDGAR using both file transfer protocol (ftp) and WGET software.24 I then 
processed the files through the content analysis software to extract the total number of words and 
                                                 
21Filzen (2015) excluded less than 200 words while Hu et al. (2017) excluded less than 30 words. I follow Hu et al. 
2017 to limit further data loss.  
22 The software is not designed to disallow suffix or prefix in words. Some words such as ‘operating’ can therefore 
be counted as both ‘operating’ and ‘rating’. In such instances, I use a phrase such as ‘operating loss’ rather than a 
single word. 
23 I exclude the tax risk words as I was losing large amounts of data when forming a final sample. For example, in 
the private debt sample, data with zero tax words are 1,474 loan-years. Also, the tax words are not very robust. 
Campbell et al. (2016) added many more words to this category to study tax risk. Including the tax risk has no 
significant effect on the results. 
24 I used Windows FTP to download the 10-K files. However, effective Dec. 31, 2016 FTP was disabled on 
EDGAR. 
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the number of risk words for the private and public debt sample. To test the software, I randomly 
selected 100 files from the full data set to confirm the correct section was extracted and manually 
tested 10 files for accuracy of the risk word count using the financial risk word list. This test 
yielded an accuracy level of 70% for the extracted sections and 100% for the risk word count.25 
The details of this software are presented in Appendix 2. 
To test H1a and H1b, I used six measures of RFDs as follows: the natural log of (1) the 
total number of words; (2) the number of all risk words; (3) the number of financial risk words; (4) 
the number of idiosyncratic risk words; (5) the number of systematic risk words; and (6) the 
number of legal risk words. As earlier discussed, these risk words are based on Campbell et al. 
(2014).  
For public debt, I used ordered probit regressions since RATING is a categorical variable 
ranging from 1 to 22. Details of the variables are presented in Table 2 and the regression models 
are presented below. 
𝐴𝐼𝑆௧ = 𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒௧ + 𝛼ଶ𝐹𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑀𝑇௧ + 𝛼ଷ𝑀𝐴𝑇௧ + 𝛼ସ𝑆𝐸𝐶௧ + 𝛼ହ𝑅𝐸𝑉௧ + 𝛼଺𝑅𝐸𝑆௧
+ 𝛼଻𝐹𝐼𝐿𝐸_𝑇𝑊௧ + 𝛼଼𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇௧ + 𝛼ଽ𝐵𝑇𝑀௧ + 𝛼ଵ଴𝑅𝑂𝐴௧ + 𝛼ଵଵ𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆௧ + 𝛼ଵଶ𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁௧
+ 𝛼ଵଷ𝑜𝑍_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸௧ + 𝛼ଵସ𝑇𝐼𝐸௧ + 𝛼ଵହ𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 +  𝛼ଵ଺𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌
+ 𝜀௜௧ … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … (3) 
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺௧ = 𝛼ଵ𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒௧ + 𝛼ଶ𝐹𝐼𝐿𝐸_𝑇𝑊௧ + 𝛼ଷ𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇௧ + 𝛼ସ𝐵𝑇𝑀௧ + 𝛼ହ𝑅𝑂𝐴௧
+ 𝛼଺𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆௧ + 𝛼଻𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁௧ + 𝛼଼𝑜𝑍_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸௧ + 𝛼ଽ𝑇𝐼𝐸௧ + 𝛼ଵ଴𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
+  𝛼ଵଵ𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝜀௜௧ … … … … … … … . … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … (4) 
                                                 
25 The 70% accuracy in identifying the correct section is lower than Campbell et al.’s (2014) 98% accuracy, but the 
accuracy of the risk word count, which is the variable of interest, is higher than Filzen’s (2015) reported correlation 
of 0.97. 
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For the private debt market, cost of debt is measured as All-in drawn spread (AIS) which is 
the number of basis points above LIBOR (available in the DealScan database). Risk disclosure is 
the log of one of the six measures of RFD: the total number of words in Item 1A (1A_TW); the 
total number of risk words in Item 1A (1A_CRW); the number of financial risk words in Item 1A 
(1A_CFRW); the number of idiosyncratic risk words in Item 1A (1A_CIRW); the number of 
systematic risk words in Item 1A (1A_CSRW); and the number of legal risk words in Item 1A 
(1A_CLRW). The control variables include loan and firm characteristics. The loan characteristics 
are: FACAMT which is the sum of all borrowings in the year measured in $millions; MAT controls 
for loan maturity and is measured in months; SEC is a dummy variable for whether the loan is 
secured or not; RES is the control for loan purpose and is a dummy variable which takes the value 
of 1 for restructure loans, which are loans designated as CP back up, corporate purposes, and 
working capital, otherwise it takes a value of zero; and REV is the control for loan type and is also 
a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for revolving loans or zero otherwise. FILE_TW is 
total words in the 10-K and controls for disclosure comprehensiveness. FILE_TW should be 
positively associated with RFD as larger 10-K files should have longer Item 1A-RFD (Dyer, Lang, 
& Stice-Lawrence, 2016). I expect loan maturity (MAT) and secured loan (SEC) to have a positive 
association with cost of debt, while facility amount (FACAMT) should have a negative association 
with cost of debt (Costello & Wittenberg-Moerman, 2011; Sengupta, 1998). I do not predict a 
direction for revolving loans and restructuring loans as the effect on cost of debt is not clear for 
RFDs compared to corporate risk disclosures.   
The controls for firm characteristics include LASSET measured as the natural log of total 
asset, BTM as the book value of equity to market value of equity ratio, and ROA is return on asset. 
Other controls include LOSS which takes a value of 1 if earnings before interest and taxes are 
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negative, BIGN which takes a value of 1 for firms audited by large auditors, and oZ_SCORE is the 
orthogonal value of Z_score based on Altman (1968) after removing the impact of SIZE, BTM, 
ROA, LASSET, and LOSS. The control for firm liquidity is Times Interest Earned (TIE) measured 
as the ratio of interest paid to earnings before interest.26LASSET and BTM control for firm size and 
growth opportunities respectively, ROA and LOSS both control for firm profitability, while TIE 
controls for firm liquidity. BIGN is the control for audit quality and oZ_SCORE is the control for 
bankruptcy risk. Previous findings have shown that these variables are associated with risk 
disclosure. Khlif and Hussainey (2014) showed that risk reporting is positively associated with 
size, leverage, profitability, and risk factor (Beta, probability of bankruptcy). Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986) predicted that larger companies disclose more information and are more 
susceptible to regulatory scrutiny. Therefore, I expect large firms, profit making firms, firms with 
lower risk of bankruptcy, and firms audited by large auditors to have increased scrutiny over the 
reporting process and have more transparent disclosure. On the other hand, loss making firms may 
attempt to hide risk information to avoid further losses and are likely to have less transparent RFDs. 
Thus, I expect all the control variables except LOSS to be positively associated with discretionary 
reporting in RFDs.  
I further control for industry effects based on Fama-French 12-industry classification and 
time effects by including a dummy variable for each year. The t-statistics presented in the 
regressions are calculated using standard errors that are clustered by firm to control for serial 
correlation. I evaluate the effect of multicollinearity using variance inflation factor (VIF).  
For the public debt market, the dependent variable is the credit rating based on Standard & 
Poor’s long-term issuer credit rating of three months after the fiscal year end. RATING takes a 
                                                 
26 The objective of using the orthogonal value of Z_SCORE is to capture the potential effect of Z_SCORE after 
excluding the effect of other predictors in the regression model that may be collinear with Z_SCORE. 
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value from 1 to 22 ranging from best to worst. For example, a debt rating of AAA takes the value 
of 1, AA+ takes the value of 2, and on the other end of the spectrum, an SD rating has a value of 
22. This rating makes it easier to interpret the results as a direct relationship since a poorer 
RATING value implies higher cost of debt. Control variables for public debt regression are the 
same as those for private firms excluding the controls for loan characteristics. FILE_TW is also 
included to control for disclosure comprehensiveness of the annual 10-K.  
To test H2a and H2b, a two-stage regression was conducted. The first stage is the 
regression of RFD on its determinants to derive the Abnormal Risk Factor Disclosure Measure 
(ARFD) and the second stage is the regression of cost of debt (AIS or RATING) on the absolute 
value of the residual from the first stage (ARFD) after separating by the sign of the coefficient 
(PARFD and NARFD). Separating into PARFD and NARFD enables us to observe the different 
effects for disclosing more or less risk factors based on an expected risk level. For the private debt 
sample in H2a, I use a lagged model to derive the measure of managerial discretion in risk factor 
disclosure (PARFD or NARFD). Using the lagged variable is important to observe the reaction of 
banks to transparency of RFDs as banks already have information on firm risk and use public 
disclosure to confirm their information. The lagged model therefore tests whether the information 
used in the RFD is correlated with the information used by banks. In line with the same reasoning, 
the accounting variables in the second stage are also lagged to examine H2a. The cost of debt 
measure for public debt (RATING) is measured three months after the fiscal year end, hence a 
lagged model is used to test H2b as the RFD already precedes the cost of debt effect. This model 
further ensures that the risk of endogeneity is minimized.  
The regression for the second stage takes the form below for the private debt and the public 
debt, respectively: 
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𝐴𝐼𝑆௧ = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝑃𝐴𝑅𝐹𝐷(𝑁𝐴𝑅𝐹𝐷)௧ିଵ + 𝛽ଶ𝐹𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑀𝑇 + 𝛽ଷ𝑀𝐴𝑇 + 𝛽ସ𝑆𝐸𝐶 + 𝛽ହ𝑅𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽଺𝑅𝐸𝑆
+ 𝛽଻𝐹𝐼𝐿𝐸_𝑇𝑊௧ିଵ + 𝛽଼𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇௧ିଵ + 𝛽ଽ𝐵𝑇𝑀௧ିଵ + 𝛽ଵ଴𝑅𝑂𝐴௧ିଵ + 𝛽ଵଵ𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆௧ିଵ
+ 𝛽ଵଶ𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁௧ିଵ + 𝛽ଵଷ𝑜𝑍_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸௧ିଵ + 𝛽ଵସ𝑇𝐼𝐸௧ିଵ  + 𝛽ଵହ𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝛽ଵ଺𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌
+ 𝜇௜௧ … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . … . (5) 
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺௧ = 𝛽ଵ𝑃𝐴𝑅𝐹𝐷(𝑁𝐴𝑅𝐹𝐷)௧ + 𝛽ଶ𝐹𝐼𝐿𝐸_𝑇𝑊௧ + 𝛽ଷ𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇௧ + 𝛽ସ𝐵𝑇𝑀௧ + 𝛽ହ𝑅𝑂𝐴௧
+ 𝛽଺𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆௧ + 𝛽଻𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁௧ + 𝛽଼𝑜𝑍_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸௧ + 𝛽ଽ𝑇𝐼𝐸௧ + 𝛽ଵ଴𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝛽ଵଵ𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌
+ 𝜇௜௧. . . . (6) 
All variables are as described above. Similar to the private debt sample, the continuous 
variables are winsorized at 2% and 98% to reduce the effect of outliers, standard errors are 
clustered by firms, and VIFs are used to evaluate the influence of multicollinearity. 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Tables 3a and 3b present a general overview of the descriptive statistics for the private and public 
debt sample, respectively. The average cost of debt (AIS) for the private debt sample in Table 3a is 
roughly 181bps. The median is 160bps, while the lower and upper quartiles are 112bps and 
225bps, respectively. The lower quartile facility amount (FACAMT) is $200m while the upper 
quartile is $1.25b with a mean of $1.17b. The firms in this sample are large firms since RFDs are 
only mandatory for firms with over $75m in assets. To appreciate the importance of loans, I 
compute the ratio of average facility amount to average total firm asset (AT). The calculation 
shows that, on average, loans represent almost 12% of total assets.27 The average maturity (MAT) 
of private loans is 51 months with a standard deviation of 17 months. Less than half of the loans 
                                                 
27 Average total assets is $10.145b. 
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are secured (SEC), while restructuring loans (RES) constitute more than half of the loans. Most of 
the firms are profitable (ROA), generally audited by large audit firms (BIGN), and have a low risk 
of bankruptcy as indicated by the average Z_SCORE of 4.0.28 Compared to studies on debt 
contracting, the statistics are similar to Bharath et al. (2008) and Kim, Song, and Zhang (2011), 
whose results showed a mean AIS of 185.5 and 186.4 and mean loan maturity of 41 and 53 
months, respectively. The mean facility amount of $1.17b, however, differs from Bharath et al. 
(2008) and Kim et al. (2011) who found mean facility amounts of $246 m and $478m, 
respectively. This difference can be attributed to the current study sample as it includes firms 
disclosing risk factors, which is only mandatory for large firms.  
In terms of the independent variables of interest, the average number of words in Item 1A 
is 15,028 words, while the means of the number of risk words are 760, 115, 248, 292, and 80 for 
total risk words, financial, systematic, idiosyncratic, and legal risk words, respectively.29 
Compared to Campbell et al. (2014), there is a significant difference between the results for the 
average number of risk words in the current study. Campbell et al. reported the number of words in 
Item 1A as 4,902 with averages of 293, 36, 101, 103, and 45 for the total risk words, financial, 
systematic, idiosyncratic, and legal risk words, respectively.30 The sample in my study is made up 
of firms with debt while Campbell et al. examine the entire population of firms reporting RFDs. 
Also, the average firm size (SIZE) measured as log of market value of equity in my sample is 7.77 
compared to the average SIZE in Campbell et al.’s study of 6.46.  
                                                 
28 The orthogonal value of this measure is used in the regressions. 
29 Compared to the other tables in the paper, the risk words in Tables 3a and 3b are the raw measures. 
30 The software did not accurately identify some Item-1As due to the different formats of reporting the 10-K. Some 
of the files included other sections as part of Item 1A. The test on 10 random files reveals 70% accuracy in section 
extraction but 100% accuracy in the risk word count. 
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Table 3b presents the descriptive statistics for the public debt sample. The average debt 
rating for the public debt sample is 10.28, which is between a BBB- and BB+ rating and close to 
the 50th percentile of 10 which is BBB-. Compared to the private firms, the public debt firms are 
larger, as measured by SIZE of $8.29b, which is similar to previous findings by Dhaliwal et al. 
(2011b) and Bharath et al. (2008), and more firms are audited by large audit firms (mean of 0.97). 
Despite these differences, the statistics for the independent variables of interest are similar 
to that of the private debt sample. The mean of aggregate, financial, systematic, idiosyncratic, and 
legal risk words are 827, 123, 287, 301, and 87, respectively, while the mean of the total number 
of words in Item 1A is 16,762 words.  
3.5.2. Univariate analyses 
Table 4a presents the correlation analysis for private firms. Consistent with H1a, AIS is positively 
correlated with total number of risk words (1A_CRW) and financial risk words (IA_CFRW). 
However, AIS is not significantly correlated with the other four RFD measures (1A_TW, 
1A_CIRW, 1A_CSRW, and 1A_CIRW). The positive correlation between AIS and risk words 
provides preliminary evidence that AIS contains risk information that is similar to the content of 
RFDs. The negative correlation between earnings volatility (SD-EARN) and AIS is surprising as 
firms with volatile earnings should have higher cost of debt to compensate for the level of risk. AIS 
is positively correlated with macroeconomic risk proxy (CPIChange), leverage (LEV), secured 
loans (SEC), revolving loans (REV), and negative earnings (LOSS) in line with the expectation 
that non-profitable firms, and highly levered firms, attract higher cost of debt to compensate for 
the additional risk. High-risk firms are also offered secured loans to mitigate risk of default. 
Understandably, firms that are profitable (ROA) and large (SIZE & LASSET) attract lower cost of 
debt. Similarly, firms with high facility amounts (FACAMT), those audited by large audit firms 
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(BIGN), those with a higher interest coverage ratio (TIE), and those with low risk of bankruptcy 
(oZ_SCORE) also attract lower cost of debt. Firms with longer maturity (MAT) attract higher cost 
of debt because of their greater risk exposure. Revolving loans (REV) are positively correlated 
with AIS while restructuring loans (RES) are negatively correlated with AIS. As expected, all the 
measures of risk disclosure and the proxy for disclosure comprehensiveness (FILE_TW) are 
positively correlated with one another and are significant at 5% or better. 
Table 4b presents the correlation for public firms. The correlation between debt ratings and 
the various measures of risk disclosure is positive and significant for all risk factor disclosure 
measures except legal risk words (1A_CLRW) providing initial evidence in support of H1b. 
RATING has a negative correlation with the total number of words in the annual 10-K (FILE_TW), 
suggesting that there are capital market benefits from comprehensive disclosures. Also, larger 
firms (SIZE and LASSET), more profitable firms (ROA), firms audited by large auditors (BIGN), 
firms with low risk of bankruptcy (oZ_SCORE), and firms with high interest coverage ratio (TIE) 
are correlated with lower cost of debt, while high leverage (LEV) and loss (LOSS) firms have 
higher cost of debt, as expected. Control for earnings volatility (SD_EARN) is also negatively 
correlated with RATING. All risk factor disclosure measures are positively correlated to one 
another. 
3.5.3. Multivariate analyses 
Table 5 presents the results for the test of H1a on the association between RFDs and cost of debt 
for the private debt market. The results reveal significant positive associations between cost of 
debt (AIS) and two RFD measures: financial risk words (1A_CFRW) and legal risk words 
(1A_CLRW). This result confirms H1a that RFDs are associated with banks’ access to private 
information. The results are also consistent with the findings of a positive association between 
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changes in the spread of credit default swaps and changes in the number of RFDs by Chiu et al. 
(2017). For financial and legal risk words that are significant, the economic implication is quite 
limited as disclosing an additional 1.1 financial or 0.8 legal risk words, on average, increases cost 
of debt by 0.04 bps.31 In addition to confirming that the risk profile of firms is associated with their 
cost of debt, the significant results also support the argument presented in previous studies that 
RFDs are informative. Current literature on corporate disclosure and cost of debt has mostly 
reported negative associations between disclosure and cost of debt (Mazumdar & Sengupta, 2005; 
Sengupta, 1998). However, these studies focus on general corporate disclosures which are 
considerably different from RFDs, not only because RFDs are mandatory, but also because they 
are negative in nature and can have adverse effects on the firm.  
The results for the control variables show that AIS increases with maturity (MAT), secured 
loans (SEC), and disclosure comprehensiveness (FILE_TW), as expected. Revolving loans (REV) 
are negatively associated with AIS, while restructuring loans (RES) have a positive association 
with AIS. Since banks can employ other non-price factors, loans requiring collateral (SEC) likely 
incur higher cost of debt since such firms may have higher probability of default. In the case of 
restructuring loans (RES), firms may incur lower cost of debt because such loans are massive and 
often supported by a range of banks or investment firms. For example, some of the comments in 
the data for restructuring loans discuss lead banks, joint lead arrangers, and the possibility of 
increasing loan amount based on specific criteria. The positive association between AIS and 
FILE_TW suggests some large files actually contain relevant information. Contrary to what was 
expected, the proxy for size (LASSET), growth firms (BTM), and bankruptcy risk (oZ_SCORE) are 
negatively associated with AIS. This may be because large firms are better able to negotiate deals 
                                                 
31 Since RFD is a log measure, an additional 1% of RFD is calculated as 1% of average number of financial risk 
words (115) and legal risk words (79) which are 1.1 and 0.8 risk words, respectively. 
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with the banks as they likely have other options of obtaining finance due to their size. Firms may 
also choose to disclose less risk information to avoid revealing sensitive, negative information 
publicly. Surprisingly, the control for profitability (ROA), loss firms (LOSS), and liquidity risk 
(TIE) are not significantly associated with cost of debt. The average R2 for the test of H1a in this 
study is 0.53 which is similar to the adjusted R2 range of 0.50 to 0.66 reported in similar studies on 
disclosure and cost of debt (Mazumdar & Sengupta, 2005; Sengupta, 1998). 
For the public debt market, the results for H1b assessing the association between RFDs and 
cost of debt are presented in Table 6. All risk disclosure measures have a strong positive 
association with RATING at 1% significance. This provides evidence for H1b that RFDs are 
important in the public debt market. Economically, the results show that, on average, firms that 
disclose an additional 1% RFDs have significantly less favourable debt rating and, consequently, 
significantly higher cost of debt. Although this deterioration in RATING is not large enough to 
move firms from one bond rating category to another, the results show more significant 
associations between RFDs and cost of debt as compared to the private debt market. The direction 
of the effects for some of the control variables are the same as that of the private debt market. 
Specifically, the control for firm size (LASSET) and risk of bankruptcy (oZ-SCORE) have negative 
associations with RATING, while audit quality control (BIGN) and control for firm liquidity (TIE) 
are not significant. Contrary to the private debt sample, however, disclosure comprehensiveness 
(FILE_TW) is not significant in the public debt sample, while the control for profitability (ROA) 
and LOSS are significant for public debt although not in the expected direction. The control for 
growth firms (BTM) is significantly positive as expected. In the case of disclosure 
comprehensiveness, the result is contrary to expectation as borrowers in the public debt market are 
assumed to have better disclosure quality. Ruling out the possibility of the irrelevance of the 
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information in the annual 10-K,32 the other explanation for this result is that most of the 
information in theses firms’ annual 10-K focuses on other issues not important to the debt market. 
The McFadden’s Pseudo R2 is around 0.15, and this value is comparable to that obtained from 
studies that have used bond ratings as a measure of cost of debt. For example, Bharath et al. (2008) 
reported Pseudo R2 between 0.05 and 0.33, while Jiang (2008) reported generalized R2 of 0.11 to 
0.18 in some regressions.33 In summary, the results fully support H1b that RFDs are useful to 
bondholders. This is in line with the assumption that bondholders do not have access to private 
information and will rely on public disclosures. The results also suggest RFDs reflect the risk 
profile of firms thereby supporting the findings in other papers that RFDs are informative and not 
boilerplate (Campbell et al., 2014; Chiu et al., 2017; Hope et al., 2016) 
The results to test H2a for the private debt market are presented in Tables 7a to 7c. Table 
7a reports the results of the first stage regression of RFDs on the determinants for the private debt 
sample. The residual from this regression forms the dependent variable for the second stage 
regression which is the main test of H2a. Table 7a shows regressions of the six determinants of 
RFDs. I expect a positive association between these determinants and RFDs since these variables 
determine the content of RFDs. The results show that the proxy for financial risk (LEV) is positive 
and significant for financial risk words (1A_CFRW), further highlighting the importance of 
financial risk in debt contracts (Chiu et al., 2017). SIZE and SD_EARN, the proxies for regulatory 
and idiosyncratic risks, respectively, have negative associations which are contrary to expectation. 
Specifically, SIZE is negatively associated with financial risk words (1A_CFRW), while SD_EARN 
is negatively associated with all risk words except financial risk words (1A_CFRW). The litigation 
risk proxy (LIT) is not significant for any of the measures. A possible explanation for the lack of 
                                                 
32 Research using various types of information in the 10-K is vast and not limited to only Item 1A-RFDs.  
33 Although, the variables of interest differ from those in my study, the information is provided for comparison.  
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significant results for these measures is that they capture many dimensions of firm risk which may 
not be directly reflected in the cost of debt. The R2 for the regressions vary between 0.09 and 0.20 
which is comparable to similar literature on determinants of textual data with R2 ranging from 
4.41% in Huang et al. (2014) to 36% in Cahan et al. (2015).  
Table 7b presents the results of the regression of AIS against the positive residuals from the 
stage 1 regression (PARFD) and the control variables. Consistent with H2a, the results show that 
PARFD is negatively associated with AIS for total number of risk words (1A_CRW) and financial 
risk words (1A_CFRW). Specifically, PARFD firms have on average lower cost of debt by 0.07 
bps. Based on the cost of information hypothesis, a possible reason for this result is that public 
disclosure can save banks the cost of information acquisition (Mazumdar & Sengupta, 2005). The 
results suggest that banks recognize the firms as honest and reward them for being transparent 
since the disclosure can reduce the bank’s risk and monitoring costs. The results for the control 
variables are similar to that obtained in H1a. Loan maturity (MAT), secured loans (SEC), revolving 
loans (REV), facility amount (FACAMT), control for loss firms (LOSS), audit quality (BIGN), and 
disclosure comprehensiveness (FILE_TW) are positively associated with AIS, while restructuring 
loans (RES), large firms(LASSET), control for profitability(ROA), and bankruptcy risk 
(oZ_SCORE) are negatively associated with AIS. The control for growth firms (BTM) and liquidity 
risk (TIE) are not significantly associated with AIS for positive residual (PARFD) firms. Since 
PARFD firms disclose more risks than expected, banks may impose tighter loan covenants such as 
the need to provide collateral. The average R2 is around 0.59 and is consistent with the R2 of 
similar papers in the range of 13% to 54% (Cahan et al. 2015; Huang et al. 2014).  
Table 7c presents the results of the regression of AIS against the negative residuals 
(NARFD) and the control variables from the stage 1 regression. Contrary to the prediction in H2a, 
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the results show negative associations between AIS and NARFD for all the risk word measures. 
Specifically, NARFD firms have on average lower cost of debt of 0.11bps. Since NARFD firms 
under report risk factors, it is possible that banks disregard the lack of transparency knowing that 
these firms are less risky and hence have no further need to adjust cost of debt. The negative 
relationship with AIS, therefore, reflects the lower levels of risk exposure. The association between 
the control variables and AIS are in similar directions to PARFD firms with the exception of the 
proxies for losses (LOSS), audit quality (BIGN), and disclosure comprehensiveness (FILE_TW) 
that are not significant for NARFD but significant for PARFD. The R2 is around 0.49 and is 
comparable to the R2 in the literature discussed above.   
Tables 8a to 8c present the results for the test of H2b.The results for the first stage 
regressions are presented in Table 8a. Similar to the private debt sample, and contrary to 
expectation, the regulatory risk proxy (SIZE) is negatively associated with RFDs. This negative 
correlation can be the effect of proprietary cost of information. It is possible these firms disclose 
just enough information to comply with regulations and avoid regulatory scrutiny. The financial 
risk proxy (LEV) is significant for financial risk words (1A_CFRW) and legal risk words 
(1A_CLRW). This result also underscores the importance of financial risks in debt contracts. Tax 
risk proxy (ETR) is negative for all RFDs except financial risk words (1A_CFRW). This result is 
not surprising as RFDs rarely focus on tax issues except in uncommon cases of changes in tax law 
and regulations that may affect their businesses. Litigation risk proxy (LIT) and macroeconomic 
risk proxy (CPIChange) are not significant. Operational risk proxy (SD_EARN) is negatively 
associated with RFDs which is contrary to the expectation that firms with high volatility in 
earnings will be riskier and hence have more RFDs. Similar to the R2 of the private debt market, 
the R2 for the public debt market is also between 0.08 and 0.19.  
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Tables 8b and 8c present the results for PARFD and NARFD firms respectively for the 
public debt sample. In Table 8b for PARFD, legal risk words (1A_CLRW) have a significantly 
positive association with RATING, in support of H2b. This result is consistent with the expectation 
that more disclosure implies higher risk especially since lenders in the public market may not be 
sophisticated enough to see through this disclosure. As expected, loss firms (LOSS) have higher 
cost of debt. Large (LASSET), profitable (ROA), and low bankruptcy risk firms (oZ_SCORE) have 
lower cost of debt as they are considered less risky. Table 8c presents the results for the negative 
residual firms (NARFD). In line with H2b, the results reveal significant negative associations 
between RATING and NARFD for all RFDs. This supports the argument that for public debt 
lenders, less risk disclosure is interpreted as lower actual risk by bondholders. In line with 
expectations and similar to the results for PARFD firms, LOSS and FILE_TW have positive 
associations with RATING, while LASSET, ROA, and oZ_SCORE are negatively associated with 
RATING.  
Overall, the results for the private debt market partly support H2a that PARFD is 
negatively associated with the cost of debt as a reward for transparency. However, NARFD is 
negatively associated with AIS which contradicts the expectation of a higher cost of debt as penalty 
for the lack of transparency. In the case of NARFD firms, banks already know these firms are less 
risky, so there is no need to increase the cost of debt. The public debt market results support H2b 
as firms with more risk disclosure (PARFD) have higher cost of debt, while firms with less risk 
disclosure (NARFD) have lower cost of debt. These results suggest bondholders take RFDs as 
representative of the actual firm risk and react accordingly.  
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3.6. Robustness test 
3.6.1 Risk Words in Item 7-MD&A 
In the annual 10-K report, Item 7-Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) also contains 
comments on several issues affecting businesses including the firms’ exposure to risk. In this 
section, I examine the research questions by applying the same set of risk words discussed above 
to Item 7-MD&A. The objective of this test is to understand whether other disclosures in the 
annual 10-K can substitute for Item 1A-RFDs. 
Untabulated results support H1a by showing a positive association between cost of debt 
(AIS) and RFDs for financial risk words (1A_CFRW), while other risk words are not significant. 
Similar to the result for Item 1A, H1b is also supported for Item 7-MD&A for public debt. All risk 
factor disclosure measures have a significantly positive association with RATING. These results 
imply that the information in Item7also includes risk disclosures that are informative to the debt 
market.  
The results for H2a for the private debt market show negative associations for both PARFD 
and NARFD firms. This is the same as the findings for Item 1A-RFDs but contrary to the 
expectation of a positive association for NARFD firms. Therefore, the hypothesis that banks will 
penalize NARFD firms with higher cost of debt (H2a) is only partly supported. The results for the 
public debt market, however, support H2b. For the PARFD sample, all RFD measures are positive 
and significant. Similarly, NARFD results show significant negative associations between cost of 
debt (RATING) and RFDs for risk all risk factor measures.  
Overall, the results support H1a, H1b, H2b, and partly support H2a, and suggest that 
similar to Item 1A, Item 7-MD&A also contains useful information about firm risk.  
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A question that comes to mind is that if more risk disclosure attracts higher cost of debt, 
what is the incentive for honesty in disclosure? A possible answer to this question is the potential 
reward for disclosure transparency in the private debt market. Since most firms have both private 
and public debt, the expectation of reward in the private debt market creates an incentive for 
increased transparency in disclosure at the expense of punishment in the public debt market.34 
These firms may be hopeful that the capital market benefits of disclosure transparency will exceed 
the adverse outcome of higher risk. Furthermore, the reward for transparency extends beyond the 
debt market. Firms can also be rewarded for disclosure transparency in the equity market and in 
the level of accuracy of analyst forecasts (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000). 
3.7. Conclusion 
This chapter examines the informativeness and usefulness of risk factor disclosures in the annual 
10-K report. The first test examines the direct association between RFDs and cost of debt in the 
private and public debt market, while the second test examines the effect of managerial discretion 
in reporting more or less risk information on cost of debt in the two debt markets. In the private 
debt market, the results show that higher risk disclosures are associated with higher cost of debt in 
support of H1a. The results partly support H2a that banks will reward transparency with lower cost 
of debt and penalize firms that lack transparency. As expected, the results show that firms 
disclosing more risk (PARFD) have lower cost of debt. However, contrary to expectation, firms 
disclosing less risk (NARFD) also have lower cost of debt.  
The public debt market results also show a positive association between RFDs and cost of 
debt in support of H1b. The findings further support H2b that public debt lenders rely on public 
                                                 
34 I test H2a and H2b using a sub-sample of firms with both private and public debts. The result did not show any 
significant result for PARFD in the public debt markets. Thus, these firms can disclose more as they will be 
rewarded with lower cost of debts in the private debt markets.  
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disclosures. The results show that disclosing more risk (PARFD) than the expected level results in 
higher cost of debt. Similarly, RFDs below the expected level (NARFD) result in lower cost of 
debt. The results for the public debt market suggest bondholders take RFDs as representative of 
firm risk.  
In addition to confirming the informativeness of RFDs, the results reveal two important 
observations. First, institutional differences in the two debt markets matter when considering the 
usefulness of RFDs. Second, financial risk has more effect on cost of debt than other risk factor 
categories. The role of financial risk in debt contracting is supported by the findings in Chiu et al. 
(2017) on the importance of financial risk to creditors. Furthermore, when the risk words are 
applied to Item 7-MD&A, the findings are consistent for H1a and H1b suggesting that this section 
of the 10-K is also informative about firm risk.  
A limitation in this study is the loss of data from the data extraction software due to the 
format of the 10-K files. This data loss significantly reduced the sample size of this study. 
Improving the data extraction software can increase the sample size which can improve the ability 
to generalize the results of this study. 
This study contributes to the literature on informativeness of RFDs and to the literature on 
textual disclosures and debt contracting. It is not only the first study to examine the association 
between RFDs and cost of debt, but also the first study on the determinants of RFDs. Future 
studies can examine RFDs and other compensating or debt contracts. The analysis can also be 
extended to understanding the role of corporate governance in the relationship between RFDs and 
cost of debt. The results discussed herein provide some valuable insights to debt providers and 
regulators on the usefulness of RFDs.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Risk words list 
Financial Other Idiosyncratic Legal and 
Regulatory 
Other systematic Tax 
Anti-takeover 
provision 
Acquisition Adverse 
judgement 
Economic 
uncertainties*(exclu
ded) 
Uncertain tax 
position 
Bank debt Adequate staffing Anti-trust Economy VAT*(exclude
d) 
Capital expenditure Advertising Casualty Electricity Value Added 
Tax 
Capital lease Asset impairment(s)* Charged Energy Aggressive tax 
position(s)* 
chapter 11 Asset 
securitization(s)* 
Class action EU*(excluded) Back taxes 
chapter 7 Assimilation Compliance E.U*(excluded) Deferred tax 
asset 
chapter 9 Backlog Comply Euro Deferred tax 
liability 
collateral Brand Conflict of 
interest(s)* 
European Union Excise tax 
concentrated 
ownership 
Brand recognition Contamination Exchange rate(s) FIN 48 
covenant California power crisis Defendant Financial Crisis Internal 
Revenue Service
credit facility Certification Deregulation Fiscal Policy IRS*(excluded) 
credit rating Clinical trial(s)* Effects of 
implementing 
new standard(s)* 
Foreign currency I.R.S*(excluded
) 
Credit risk Commercialize Effects of 
implementing 
new method(s)* 
Afghanistan IRS audit 
Debt burden Concentration IFRS*Internationa
l Financial 
Reporting 
Standard 
Aggregate demand IRS judgment 
Decline in stock 
price 
Consolidation Infringe Asian crisis Loss carryback 
Default Construction Injury Business 
condition(s)* 
Loss 
carryforward 
Defined benefit Contract(s)* Inquir(ies)* Call*(deleted) Property 
tax(es)* 
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Financial Other Idiosyncratic Legal and 
Regulatory 
Other systematic Tax 
Dilution Copyright(s)* Inquir(y)* Capacity Provision for 
income tax 
Dividend(s)* Corporate culture Intellectual 
property 
Foreign exchange State tax 
Downgrade Cost control Investigation Forward(s)* Tax 
audit*(excluded
) 
Family Customer 
concentration 
Legislation Fuel Tax 
authorit*(exclud
ed) 
Financial condition Customer service Litigation Future Tax 
liability*(exclud
ed) 
Financing cost(s)* Delivery Pay damages Gas Tax 
penalt*(exclude
d) 
Funded status Distribution(s)* Penalt(*) Gasoline Taxable 
Illiquid market Distributor(s)* Enforceability of 
judgement(s)* 
GDP*(Gross 
Domestic Product) 
Taxes 
Improvement(s)* Downsizing Enforcement G.D.P*(excluded) 
 
Indebtedness Economies of scale Environment GNP*(Gross 
National Product) 
 
Insider sale(s)* Embargo FDA approval G.N.P*(excluded) 
 
Reserves Enron Federal General business 
risk(s)* 
 
Revolver Expand(s)* Fines General condition(s)*
 
Sale of productive 
asset(s)* 
Expand(ing)* Fraud General economic 
conditions*(excluded
) 
 
Stock market 
listing 
Expansion Government 
investigation 
Gold 
 
Stock price drop Export(s)* Government 
policy 
Growth rate(s)* 
 
Stock price 
volatility 
Facilities*Facility/Faci
lities 
Government 
approval 
Hedg(e)* 
 
Underfunded 
pension(s)* 
Franchise Hazardous Hedg(ing)* 
 
Underwriting Franchis(ee)* Pending 
lawsuit(*) 
Housing 
 
Volatility of 
operating result(s)*
Goodwill*(excluded) Plaintiff Housing starts 
 
Volatility of 
revenue(s)* 
Goodwill impairment Possibility of 
restatement(s)* 
Industry 
condition(s)* 
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Financial Other Idiosyncratic Legal and 
Regulatory 
Other systematic Tax 
Volatility of 
sale(s)* 
Impairment*(excluded
) 
Potential 
lawsuit(*) 
Industry environment
 
Working capital Intangible Product liability Inflation 
 
Investment in 
equipment 
Integrat(e)* Regulation(s)* Iraq 
 
Investment in plant Integrat(ing)* Regulatory Coal 
 
lease*(excluded) Integrat(ion)* Regulatory 
approval 
Commodit(y/ies)* 
 
leasing Intellectual Regulatory 
change 
Competition 
 
Lease commitment Internal control(s) Regulatory 
compliance 
Competitor(s)* 
 
Leverage Internet Regulatory 
environment 
Complement 
 
Leveraged 
lease(s)* 
Investment in 
subsidiary(y/ies) 
Related 
part(y)/part(ies) 
Concentration 
 
Limited trading IT* (Information 
technology) 
Remediation Consumer confidence
 
Liquidity I.T.*(excluded) Restatement(s) Consumer spending 
 
Loan Joint venture Safety Consumption 
 
Locked-in lease(s)* keep and retain top 
management 
Superfund Currency collapse 
 
Mandatory 
contribution 
key personnel Uncertainties 
regarding 
accounting 
estimates 
Currency 
fluctuation(s)* 
 
Maturity Labor cost(s)* 
 
Cyclical 
 
Negative operating 
cash flow 
Labor relations 
 
Demand 
 
New financing Labor union(s)* 
 
Derivative(s)* 
 
Obligations license(es)* 
 
Discounting 
 
OPEB *(Excluded) Limited operating 
history 
 
Economic 
 
O.P.E.B*(Other 
post employment 
benefit) 
Maintenance 
 
Economic 
condition*(excluded) 
 
Operating loss(es)* Management retention
 
Economic 
downturn*(excluded)
 
Penny stock Market acceptance 
 
Economic growth* 
(excluded) 
 
Postretirement Marketing 
 
Petroleum 
 
Rating*(Debt 
rating) 
Information 
technology 
 
Political climate 
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Financial Other Idiosyncratic Legal and 
Regulatory 
Other systematic Tax 
Refinance*(refinan
ce) 
Innovation 
 
Political instability 
 
Refinancing*(refin
ance) 
Insurance coverage 
 
Pound 
 
Reinsurance Secret(s)* 
 
Market(s)* 
 
Renegotiation Security 
 
Market demand 
 
Reorganization Shortages 
 
Market supply 
 
 
Single customer 
 
Marketplace 
 
 
single supplier 
 
Materials 
 
 
software 
 
Metal(s)* 
 
 
sole supplier(s)* 
 
Middle East 
 
 
SPE*(excluded) 
 
mineral 
 
 
S.P.E*(excluded) 
 
Mining 
 
 
Special purpose entity 
 
Monetary policy 
 
 
strike 
 
Mortgage 
 
 
supplier 
 
Natural gas 
 
 
supply chain 
 
Obsolescence 
 
 
synergy(ies)* 
 
Oil 
 
 
systems 
 
Operating 
environment 
 
 
tariff(s)* 
 
Option 
 
 
technological 
obsolescence 
 
Ore*(excluded) 
 
 
technologies 
 
Overstocked 
 
 
technology 
 
Peso 
 
 
trade 
 
Price pressure 
 
 
Material 
weakness(es)* 
 
Prices 
 
 
MBS*(excluded) 
 
Pricing Power 
 
 
M.B.S*(excluded) 
 
Raw material(s)* 
 
 
Merger 
 
Real*(excluded) 
 
 
Mortgage backed 
securities 
 
Real estate 
investment trust 
 
 
Mortgage servicing 
rights 
 
Recession 
 
 
MSR*(excluded) 
 
REIT*(excluded) 
 
 
M.S.R*(excluded) 
 
R.E.I.T*(excluded) 
 
 
Natural disasters 
 
Renmenbi 
 
 
New construction 
 
RMB*(excluded) 
 
 
New product 
acceptance 
 
Ruble 
 
 
 
116 
 
Financial Other Idiosyncratic Legal and 
Regulatory 
Other systematic Tax 
 
New product 
development 
 
Rupee 
 
 
No current operation 
 
saving 
 
 
Online 
 
seasonal 
 
 
Orders 
 
September 11 
 
 
Patent 
 
Short*(excluded) 
 
 
Personnel 
 
Silver 
 
 
Preclinical 
 
Steel 
 
 
Product(s)* 
 
Substitute 
 
 
Product development 
 
swap 
 
 
Product mix 
 
Terrorism 
 
 
Product performance 
 
U.S. dollar 
 
 
Production 
 
Underlying 
 
 
Trademark(s)* 
 
Unsalable Inventory 
 
 
Training 
 
war*(excluded) 
 
 
Union election 
 
Yen 
 
 
Variable interest 
entity 
 
Yuan 
 
 
Vendor 
   
 
VIE*(excluded) 
   
 
V.I.E*(excluded) 
   
 
Weather 
   
 
Web security 
   
 
website(s)* 
   
 
Proprietary 
   
 
Publicity 
   
 
Redundancy 
   
 
Reliance on key 
customer(s)* 
   
 
Reliance on key 
supplier(s)* 
   
 
Reporting controls 
   
 
Research and 
development 
   
 
Restructuring 
   
 
Restructuring 
implementation 
   
 
Sarbanes-Oxley 
   
 
SARS*(Suspicious 
Activity Report) 
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Appendix 2: Software description 
Requirements  
 Obtain a list of public companies from Edgar's Form Z (available online at 
www.sec.gov/edgar).  
 Generate a short list of qualified companies (criteria: Firms with private and public 
debt) 
 Use the CIK numbers for the qualified companies to generate a comprehensive 10-
K filing listing with the following header: 
◦ Form Type 
◦ Company Name 
◦ CIK 
◦ Date Filed 
◦ File Name 
 Download all qualified 10-K filing data from Edgar 
 Create a software module to perform “HTML tag removal” on the downloaded 
Edgar 10-K files. This is necessary for reliable word counts. 
 Create a software module to extract item sections named: 
◦ “Item 1A” (Risk Factors) 
◦ “Item 7” (Market Risk) 
◦ “Item 7A” (Management Discussion & Analysis) 
 For each qualified company, generate the following result: 
◦ Total Words 
◦ Risk Words 
◦ 1A Total Words 
◦ 1A Risk Words 
◦ 7 Total Words 
◦ 7 Risk Words 
◦ 7A Total Words 
◦ 7A Risk Words 
 Repeat the process for years 2005 – 2015 
Sample Report: 
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User Interface: 
 
 
 
 
 
Start 
Generate qualified list of Edgar 
companies from form Z 
Download 
Edgar 
Perform HTML 
Removal 
Extract sections 1A, 7 
and 7A from Edgar files 
Generate Risk word counts 
Risk Word 
Count 
End 
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Tables 
Table 1: Sample Selection 
 Private Debt Public Debt 
All facilities from 2005 to 2015/ All S&P ratings data from 2005 
to 2015 
106,183 205,191 
Loan-year observations after forming panel data 8,543 15,187 
No EDGAR data (2,064) (3,504) 
Exclude data with less than 30 words in Item 1A (2,085) (3,921) 
Exclude firms with incomplete data (3,068) (4,755) 
Final data  1,326 3,007 
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Table 2: Description of Variables 
  Variable Proxies 
1 AIS Log of weighted average of AIS: All-In-Drawn spread 
2 RATING S&P debt issuer rating. RATING takes values from 1 to 22 from the best to the 
worst: AAA=1, AA+=2, AA=3, AA- =4, A+=5, A=6,  A- =7, BBB+=8, 
BBB=9, BBB- =10,  BB+=11, BB=12, BB- =13, B+=14, B=15, B-=16, 
CCC+=17, CCC=18, CCC-=19, CC=20, D=21, SD=22. 
3 1A_TW Log of total number of words that appear in the firm’s 10-K disclosure item IA 
+ 1 
4 1A_CRW Log of total number of risk words that appear in the firm’s 10-K disclosure item 
IA + 1 based on Campbell et al. (2014) 
5 1A_CFRW Log of total number of financial risk words that appear in the firm’s 10-K 
disclosure item 1A + 1 based on Campbell et al. (2014) 
6 1A_CIRW Log of total number of idiosyncratic risk words that appear in the firm’s 10-K 
disclosure item 1A + 1 based on Campbell et al. (2014) 
7 1A_CSRW Log of total number of systematic risk words that appear in the firm’s 10-K 
disclosure item 1A + 1 based on Campbell et al. (2014) 
8 1A_CLRW Log of total number of legal risk words that appear in the firm’s 10-K disclosure 
item 1A + 1 based on Campbell et al. (2014) 
9 PARFD Equals raw value of positive residual from the regression of risk disclosure on 
its determinants if residual is greater than zero 
10 NARFD Equals raw value of negative residual from the regression of risk disclosure on 
its determinants if residual is less than zero 
11 FILE_TW Log of total number of words in 10-K 
12 LEV Book value of debt divided by total assets 
13 LIT Litigation =1 for firms within SIC code 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3676, 
5200-5961, 7370-7374, and 8731-8734 
14 SIZE Market value of equity 
15 ETR Total tax expense divided by pre-tax income 
16 CPIChange Change in CPI (Inflation) from CRSP Treasury and Inflation Index 
17 MAT Natural log of loan maturity in months 
18 FACAMT Sum of all borrowings for the year per firm in $m 
19 SEC Dummy variable = 1 for secured loans 
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  Variable Proxies 
20 BTM Book value of equity divided by market value of equity 
21 REV Dummy variable= 1 for revolving loans 
22 RES Dummy variable =1 for loans classified as CP back up, corporate purposes, and 
working capital purpose 
23 BIGN Dummy variable=1 for BIGN auditor. AU data in Compustat of auditor code. 
Auditors coded 1-8 are classified as BIGN 
24 LOSS Dummy variable=1 if firm has negative earnings, i.e. earnings before interest 
and tax is less than zero 
25 oZ_SCORE 
(Altman) 
Orthogonized Z-score= 1.2 * (working capital/total assets) +1.4*(Retained 
earnings) +3.3*(earnings before interest and tax/total assets) +0.6*(market value 
of equity/total liability) +0.999*(Sales/total asset) 
26 SD_EARN Standard deviation of quarterly earnings over the past three years starting from 
the current quarter 
27 LASSET Log of total assets 
28 TIE Times Interest earned = tax expense divided by income before taxes 
29 ROA Return in asset measured as net income divided by total assets 
30 INDUSTRY Fama-French 12-industry classification 
31 YEAR Control for year effects 
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Table 3a: Descriptive Statistics for Private Debt Sample 
(N=1,326) 
 
  Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Lower 
Quartile 
Upper 
Quartile 
AIS 181.37 160.00 109.96 112.50 225.00 
1A_TW 15,028.06 6,779.00 20,160.71 3,765.00 20,809.00 
1A_CRW 759.90 461.50 905.18 274.00 980.00 
1A_CFRW 114.70 54.00 355.26 24.00 155.00 
1A_CSRW 247.63 133.00 333.67 77.00 303.00 
1A_CIRW 292.27 186.00 287.29 102.00 395.00 
1A_CLRW 79.85 60.00 69.58 35.00 106.00 
FILE_TW 266,684.20 244,119.50 242,741.40 67,650.00 400,588.00 
SD_EARN 107.09 20.85 407.91 7.00 72.89 
CPIChange 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ETR 0.49 0.31 8.97 0.19 0.37 
LEV 0.26 0.25 0.17 0.15 0.35 
SIZE 7.77 7.78 1.78 6.73 8.96 
LIT 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.00 
FACAMT 1,172.16 500.00 2,382.93 200.00 1,250.00 
MAT 51.30 60.00 16.50 41.00 60.00 
SEC 0.40 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
RES 0.66 1.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 
REV 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.00 
LASSET 7.96 7.92 1.60 6.87 9.01 
BTM 0.48 0.45 2.21 0.27 0.71 
ROA 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.02 0.08 
LOSS 0.07 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 
BIGN 0.91 1.00 0.28 1.00 1.00 
Z_SCORE 4.52 4.01 2.90 2.62 5.75 
TIE 11.09 4.70 45.37 2.07 10.23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
123 
 
Table 3b: Descriptive Statistics for Public Debt Sample 
(N=3,007) 
 Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Lower 
Quartile 
Upper 
Quartile 
RATING 10.28 10.00 3.31 8.00 13.00 
FILE_TW 244,019.20 161,115.00 228,195.10 67,479.00 385,213.00 
1A-TW 16,762.64 6,737.00 21,306.10 3,783.00 26,033.00 
1A_CRW 827.54 466.00 923.87 263.00 1,132.00 
1A-CFRW 123.25 58.00 267.97 24.00 177.00 
1A_CSRW 286.80 137.00 389.15 77.00 348.00 
1A_CIRW 301.25 181.00 304.55 92.00 420.00 
1A_CLRW 86.98 62.00 83.59 35.00 111.00 
SD_EARN 162.18 40.94 562.68 15.13 114.58 
CPIChange 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ETR 0.41 0.32 7.93 0.20 0.37 
LEV 0.30 0.27 0.18 0.19 0.38 
SIZE 8.29 8.25 1.65 7.21 9.35 
LIT 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.00 
LASSET 8.58 8.45 1.33 7.65 9.45 
BTM 39.88 0.44 1,614.16 0.26 0.68 
ROA 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.08 
LOSS 0.05 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.00 
BIGN 0.97 1.00 0.18 1.00 1.00 
Z_SCORE 3.96 3.61 2.31 2.30 4.97 
TIE 10.42 3.86 65.72 1.83 7.93 
Tables 3a and 3b report descriptive statistics for all variables included in the analyses. Statistics presented include the 
number of observations (N), mean, median, standard deviation, lower quartile and upper quartile. All the variables are 
defined in table 2 AIS is the weighted average All-in-Drawn. RATING is the numerical value of S&P debt issuer 
rating. 1A_TW is the total number of words in Item- 1A. 1A_CRW is total number of risk words in Item-1A. 
1A_CFRW is total number of financial risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CIRW is total number of idiosyncratic risk words in 
Item-1A. 1A_CSRW is total number of systematic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CLRW is total number of legal risk 
words in Item-1A. FILE_TW is total number of words in annual 10-K report. SD_EARN is standard deviation of 
quarterly earnings over 3 years. CPIChange is the proxy for economic risk. ETR is the proxy for tax risk. LEV is firm 
leverage. SIZE is log of market value of equity. LIT is the proxy for litigation risk. FACAMT is the facility amount in 
$’m. MAT is the proxy for loan maturity. SEC is the dummy for secured loans. RES is the proxy for restructuring 
loans. REV is the proxy for revolving loans. LASSET is the log of total assets. BTM is book value of equity to market 
value of equity. ROA is return on assets. LOSS is the dummy for firms with negative earnings. BIGN is the dummy for 
large auditors. Z_SCORE is bankruptcy score based on Altman (1968). TIE is times interest earned ratio.
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Table 4a: Correlation for Private Debt Sample 
 AIS 1A_TW CRW CFRW CIRW CSRW CLRW FILE_TW SD CPI ETR LEV SIZE 
AIS 1             
1A_TW 0.05 1            
1A_CRW 0.06 0.96 1           
1A_CFRW 0.19 0.89 0.89 1          
1A_CIRW 0.04 0.92 0.93 0.77 1         
1A_CSRW 0.03 0.86 0.93 0.82 0.76 1        
1A_CLRW 0.05 0.74 0.8 0.66 0.71 0.7 1       
FILE_TW 0.01 0.15 0.2 0.14 0.19 0.17 0.29 1      
SD_EARN -0.10 -0.05 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.02 0.00 0.15 1     
CPIChange 0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.05 -0.09 -0.07 -0.02 1    
ETR 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.00 1   
LEV 0.21 -0.01 0.02 0.11 -0.04 0.03 0.05 0.13 0.03 -0.09 0.02 1  
SIZE -0.48 0.00 0.04 -0.09 0.04 0.05 0.16 0.41 0.31 -0.08 0.02 0.02 1 
LIT 0.01 0.05 0.02 -0.02 0.13 -0.09 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.15 -0.02 -0.07 0.08 
FACAMT -0.13 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.21 0.38 -0.08 -0.01 0.13 0.48 
MAT 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.13 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.00 
SEC 0.46 0.10 0.08 0.16 0.07 0.05 0.00 -0.18 -0.09 0.10 0.02 0.10 -0.47 
RES -0.12 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.14 0.08 0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.13 
REV 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.20 -0.03 
LASSET -0.35 0.02 0.07 -0.01 0.01 0.10 0.19 0.42 0.37 -0.11 0.02 0.16 0.89 
BTM -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 -0.09 -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.11 -0.04 
ROA -0.20 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.08 -0.01 0.04 0.00 -0.13 0.32 
LOSS 0.21 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.00 -0.10 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.04 -0.30 
BIGN -0.19 0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.07 0.06 0.12 0.21 0.08 -0.05 0.01 0.07 0.41 
Z_SCORE -0.14 -0.04 -0.09 -0.13 0.01 -0.15 -0.13 -0.13 -0.09 0.12 -0.03 -0.44 -0.03 
TIE -0.10 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.21 0.12 
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Panel B: Table 4a (Continued) 
 
 LIT FAC MAT SEC RES REV LASSET BTM ROA LOSS BIGN Z_SCORE TIE 
LIT 1             
FACAMT 0.05 1            
MAT -0.02 -0.14 1           
SEC 0.03 -0.16 0.11 1          
RES 0.01 -0.02 0.10 -0.17 1         
REV -0.03 0.09 -0.06 0.13 -0.11 1        
LASSET -0.01 0.53 -0.02 -0.40 0.13 0.03 1       
BTM -0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.05 1      
ROA 0.00 0.03 0.07 -0.20 0.05 -0.07 0.17 0.01 1     
LOSS 0.04 -0.08 -0.16 0.21 -0.03 -0.01 -0.22 -0.02 -0.47 1    
BIGN 0.00 0.13 0.11 -0.23 0.09 0.00 0.42 -0.06 0.11 -0.11 1   
Z_SCORE 0.22 -0.14 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.10 -0.26 -0.01 0.23 -0.13 -0.07 1  
TIE 0.06 -0.03 0.04 -0.11 0.05 -0.07 -0.02 -0.04 0.31 -0.21 -0.02 0.37 1 
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Table 4b: Correlation for Public Debt Sample 
 RATING 1A_TW 1A_CRW 1A_CFRW 1A_CIRW 1A_CSRW 1A_CLRW FILE_TW SD_EARN CPI 
RATING 1          
1A_TW 0.08 1         
1A_CRW 0.09 0.96 1        
1A_CFRW 0.25 0.9 0.89 1       
1A_CIRW 0.05 0.92 0.93 0.79 1      
1A_CSRW 0.07 0.87 0.94 0.83 0.78 1     
1A_CLRW 0.03 0.79 0.84 0.7 0.75 0.75 1    
FILE_TW -0.11 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.22 1   
SD_EARN -0.12 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 0.09 1  
CPIChange -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.01 1 
ETR -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.03 
LEV 0.44 0.04 0.04 0.15 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.03 -0.04 -0.09 
SIZE -0.72 -0.06 -0.04 -0.20 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.26 0.26 0.04 
LIT -0.07 -0.01 -0.05 -0.09 0.07 -0.14 -0.11 -0.03 0.04 0.23 
LASSET -0.55 -0.05 -0.03 -0.14 -0.03 0.00 0.03 0.29 0.36 -0.04 
BTM 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 
ROA -0.38 -0.03 -0.05 -0.11 -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 0.02 0.04 0.09 
LOSS 0.31 0.00 0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.05 -0.01 -0.05 0.06 -0.02 
BIGN -0.14 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.03 
Z_SCORE -0.18 -0.06 -0.11 -0.16 0.01 -0.18 -0.16 -0.12 -0.05 0.18 
TIE -0.11 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.05 
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Panel B: Table 4b (Continued) 
 
 ETR LEV SIZE LIT LASSET BTM ROA LOSS BIGN Z_SCORE TIE 
ETR 1           
LEV 0.00 1          
SIZE 0.01 -0.34 1         
LIT 0.00 -0.12 0.16 1        
LASSET 0.02 -0.19 0.85 0.11 1       
BTM 0.00 0.03 -0.18 0.00 0.00 1      
ROA -0.01 -0.23 0.34 0.07 0.13 -0.01 1     
LOSS -0.01 0.10 -0.20 0.01 -0.11 -0.01 -0.37 1    
BIGN 0.00 -0.08 0.20 0.03 0.21 0.00 0.10 -0.03 1   
Z_SCORE -0.02 -0.35 0.17 0.30 -0.07 -0.03 0.33 -0.18 0.06 1  
TIE 0.00 -0.16 0.11 0.12 0.04 0.00 0.14 -0.05 0.02 0.21 1 
Tables 4a and 4b present Pearson correlation matrix for private debt. Variables significant at 5% and below are in bold. All the variables are defined in table 2. 
AIS is log of weighted average All-in-Drawn. RATING is the numerical value of S&P debt issuer rating. 1A_TW is the log of total number of words in Item- 1A. 
1A_CRW is log of total number of risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CFRW is the log of total number of financial risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CIRW is the log of total 
number of idiosyncratic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CSRW is the log of total number of systematic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CLRW is the log of total number of 
legal risk words in Item-1A. FILE_TW is the log of total number of words in annual 10-K report. SD_EARN is standard deviation of quarterly earnings over 3 
years. CPIChange is the proxy for economic risk. ETR is the proxy for tax risk. LEV is firm leverage. SIZE is market value of equity. LIT is the proxy for litigation 
risk. FACAMT is the facility amount in $’m.  MAT is the proxy for loan maturity.  SEC is the dummy for secured loans. RES is the proxy for restructuring loans. 
REV is the proxy for revolving loans.  LASSET is the log of total assets. BTM is book value of equity to market value of equity. ROA is return on assets. LOSS is the 
dummy for firms with negative earnings. BIGN is the dummy for large auditors. Z_SCORE is bankruptcy score based on Altman (1968). TIE is times interest 
earned ratio. 
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Table 5: H1a for Private Debt Market 
  Sign 1A_TW 1A_CRW 1A_CFRW 1A_CIRW 1A_CSRW 1A_CLRW 
Dependent Variable   AIS 
Risk Disclosure + 0.01 0.03 0.05*** 0.02 0.01 0.04* 
    (0.91) (1.36) (3.39) (1.00) (0.74) (1.73) 
FACAMT - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (1.44) (1.46) (1.50) (1.45) (1.44) (1.49) 
MAT + 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 
    (2.29) (2.30) (2.23) (2.30) (2.30) (2.26) 
SEC + 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.38*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.39*** 
    (12.25) (12.22) (11.85) (12.23) (12.34) (12.17) 
REV ? 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 
    (3.20) (3.19) (3.13) (3.20) (3.20) (3.20) 
RES ? -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** 
    (-3.85) (-3.83) (-3.82) (-3.83) (-3.85) (-3.82) 
FILE_TW + 0.05* 0.05* 0.04 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 
    (1.93) (1.86) (1.61) (1.93) (1.92) (1.86) 
LASSET + -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** 
    (-6.09) (-6.12) (-6.06) (-6.07) (-6.15) (-6.26) 
BTM + -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
    (-4.34) (-4.32) (-4.24) (-4.34) (-4.34) (-4.21) 
ROA + -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 
    (-1.49) (-1.48) (-1.49) (-1.47) (-1.49) (-1.46) 
LOSS - 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 
    (1.16) (1.14) (1.17) (1.16) (1.15) (1.14) 
BIGN + -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
    (-0.54) (-0.57) (-0.55) (-0.57) (-0.55) (-0.59) 
oZ_SCORE + -0.70*** -0.70*** -0.67*** -0.70*** -0.70*** -0.71*** 
    (-3.23) (-3.25) (-3.25) (-3.22) (-3.27) (-3.32) 
TIE + 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (-0.33) (-0.33) (-0.30) (-0.34) (-0.32) (-0.28) 
Constant   4.32*** 4.30*** 4.34*** 4.35*** 4.38*** 4.35*** 
    (14.11) (14.21) (14.22) (14.45) (14.56) (14.05) 
                
Observations   1,326 1,326 1,326 1,326 1,326 1,326 
R-squared   0.52 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.52 
Year FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1(significant variables at two-tailed test) 
This table presents coefficient estimates from the regression of AIS on risk disclosure measures and the control variables. t-
statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by firm. The variables are 
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winsorized at 2% and 98%.  All the variables are defined in table 2. AIS is log of weighted average All-in-Drawn. Risk 
disclosure is one of 1A_TW, 1A_CRW, 1A_CFRW, 1A_CIRW, 1A_CSRW, and 1A_CLRW. 1A_TW is the log of total 
number of words in Item- 1A. 1A_CRW is log of total number of risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CFRW is the log of total number 
of financial risk words in Item -1A. 1A_CIRW is the log of total number of idiosyncratic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CSRW is 
the log of total number of systematic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CLRW is the log of total number of legal risk words in Item-
1A. FACAMT is the facility amount in $’m.  MAT is the proxy for loan maturity. SEC is the dummy for secured loans.  REV is 
the proxy for revolving loans. RES is the proxy for restructuring loans. FILE_TW is the log of total number of words in annual 
10-K report. LASSET is the log of total assets. SD_EARN is standard deviation of quarterly earnings over 3 years. BTM is book 
value of equity to market value of equity. LEV is firm leverage. ROA is return on assets. LOSS is the dummy for firms with 
negative earnings. BIGN is the dummy for large auditors. oZ_SCORE is bankruptcy score based on Altman (1968). TIE is 
times interest earned ratio. 
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Table 6: H1b for Public Debt 
    1A_TW 1A_CRW 1A_CFRW 1A_CIRW 1A_CSRW 1A_CLRW 
Dependent Variable Sign RATING 
Risk Disclosure + 0.08*** 0.13*** 0.18*** 0.08*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 
    (5.04) (6.49) (12.09) (4.04) (6.50) (6.10) 
FILE_TW + 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 
    (0.81) (0.62) (0.22) (0.91) (0.64) (0.67) 
LASSET + -0.61*** -0.61*** -0.59*** -0.61*** -0.61*** -0.61*** 
    (-33.70) (-33.79) (-32.82) (-33.80) (-34.05) (-34.02) 
BTM + 0.00** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 
    (2.19) (2.20) (2.62) (2.15) (2.17) (2.10) 
ROA + -2.75*** -2.74*** -2.72*** -2.74*** -2.75*** -2.74*** 
    (-12.82) (-12.78) (-12.67) (-12.77) (-12.80) (-12.73) 
LOSS - 0.75*** 0.74*** 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.73*** 0.75*** 
    (8.10) (8.07) (8.19) (8.11) (7.97) (8.10) 
BIGN + 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.13 
    (1.43) (1.42) (1.54) (1.49) (1.37) (1.19) 
oZ_SCORE + -0.38*** -0.38*** -0.37*** -0.38*** -0.38*** -0.38*** 
    (-15.07) (-15.09) (-14.60) (-15.13) (-15.00) (-14.97) 
TIE + 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (-0.66) (-0.62) (-0.40) (-0.68) (-0.68) (-0.58) 
                
Observations   3,007 3,007 3,007 3,007 3,007 3,007 
Year FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2   0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1(significant variables at two-tailed test) 
This table presents coefficient estimates from the regression of RATING on risk disclosure measures and the control variables. 
z-statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by firm. The variables are 
winsorized at 2% and 98%.  All the variables are defined in table 2. RATING is the numerical value of S&P debt issuer rating. 
Risk disclosure is one of 1A_TW, 1A_CRW, 1A_CFRW, 1A_CIRW, 1A_CSRW, and 1A_CLRW. 1A_TW is the log of total 
number of words in Item- 1A. 1A_CRW is log of total number of risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CFRW is the log of total number 
of financial risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CIRW is the log of total number of idiosyncratic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CSRW is 
the log of total number of systematic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CLRW is the log of total number of legal risk words in Item-
1A. FILE_TW is the log of total number of words in annual 10-K report. LASSET is the log of total assets. SD_EARN is 
standard deviation of quarterly earnings over 3 years. BTM is book value of equity to market value of equity. LEV is firm 
leverage. ROA is return on assets. LOSS is the dummy for firms with negative earnings. BIGN is the dummy for large auditors. 
oZ_SCORE is bankruptcy score based on Altman (1968). TIE is times interest earned ratio. 
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Table 7a: Stage 1 H2 for Private Debt  
Sign 1A_TW 1A_CRW 1A_CFRW 1A_CIRW 1A_CSRW 1A_CLRW 
SIZE + -0.05* -0.03 -0.13*** -0.03 -0.01 0.02   
(-1.92) (-1.31) (-4.34) (-1.32) (-0.34) (0.90) 
FILE_TW + 0.28*** 0.25*** 0.34*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.22***   
(4.82) (4.82) (5.18) (4.47) (4.71) (4.52) 
LEV + -0.11 -0.02 0.76*** -0.24 -0.03 0.01   
(-0.49) (-0.11) (2.90) (-1.24) (-0.17) (0.05) 
ETR + 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00***   
(0.42) (-0.15) (0.55) (0.58) (-0.34) (-3.39) 
LIT + 0.04 -0.02 -0.06 0.06 -0.06 -0.13   
(0.28) (-0.16) (-0.39) (0.59) (-0.55) (-1.38) 
CPIChange + -10.98 -8.06 -22.84* -5.75 -5.15 -10.13   
(-0.98) (-0.86) (-1.77) (-0.61) (-0.53) (-1.02) 
SD_EARN + -0.00** -0.00** 0.00 -0.00** -0.00** -0.00**   
(-2.14) (-2.30) (-1.43) (-2.53) (-1.97) (-2.51) 
Constant 
 
6.31*** 3.75*** 0.97 3.07*** 2.29*** 1.40**   
(8.51) (5.67) (1.19) (4.30) (3.44) (2.31) 
Observations 
 
1,326 1,326 1,326 1,326 1,326 1,326 
R-squared 
 
0.09 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.20 
Year FE 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1(significant variables at two-tailed test) 
Table 7a present coefficient estimates from the regression of RFDs on the determinants for the private debt sample. t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses and are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by firm. The variables are lagged and 
winsorized at 2% and 98%.  All the variables are defined in table 2. 1A_TW is the log of total number of words in Item- 1A. 
1A_CRW is log of total number of risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CFRW is the log of total number of financial risk words in Item-
1A. 1A_CIRW is the log of total number of idiosyncratic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CSRW is the log of total number of 
systematic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CLRW is the log of total number of legal risk words in Item-1A. SIZE is the proxy for 
regulatory risk and measured as the market value of equity. FILE_TW is the log of total number of words in annual 10-K report. 
LEV is firm leverage. ETR is the proxy for tax risk. LIT is the proxy for litigation risk. CPIChange is the proxy for economic 
risk. SD_EARN is the proxy for idiosyncratic risk and is measured as the standard deviation of quarterly earnings over 3 years. 
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Table 7b: Stage 2 H2 for Positive Residuals Private Debt 
AIS Sign 1A_TW 1A_CRW 1A_CFRW 1A_CIRW 1A_CSRW 1A_CLRW 
PARFD - -0.05 -0.07* -0.07** -0.05 -0.04 0.01  
 (-1.36) (-1.96) (-2.26) (-1.29) (-1.10) (0.25) 
FACAMT + 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00  
 (1.21) (1.55) (1.84) (1.59) (1.72) (0.98) 
MAT + 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00*  
 (1.93) (1.62) (1.80) (2.12) (2.82) (1.81) 
SEC + 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.37*** 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.37***  
 (8.32) (8.80) (8.67) (8.61) (8.99) (9.09) 
REV ? 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.24*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.16***  
 (3.82) (4.35) (5.17) (4.01) (4.08) (3.52) 
RES ? -0.11*** -0.11** -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.14*** -0.12***  
 (-2.59) (-2.57) (-2.73) (-2.90) (-3.48) (-3.09) 
FILE_TW + 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.09***  
 (2.89) (3.20) (3.38) (3.25) (3.76) (2.96) 
LASSET - -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.13*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.14***  
 (-7.42) (-7.68) (-6.88) (-8.34) (-8.08) (-7.95) 
BTM - -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02  
 (-0.55) (-0.26) (-0.52) (-0.61) (-0.71) (-0.84) 
ROA - -0.71*** -0.14 -0.75*** -0.80*** -0.16 -0.15  
 (-2.60) (-0.80) (-2.78) (-3.17) (-0.96) (-0.91) 
LOSS + 0.16* 0.23*** 0.09 0.15* 0.25*** 0.25***  
 (1.75) (2.72) (1.01) (1.67) (3.00) (3.08) 
BIGN - 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.12*  
 (0.61) (0.41) (0.27) (0.69) (0.21) (1.68) 
oZ_SCORE - -0.44*** -0.47*** -0.50*** -0.43*** -0.35*** -0.54***   
(-2.99) (-3.38) (-3.47) (-3.35) (-2.82) (-4.16) 
TIE + 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
(-0.29) (0.01) (-0.01) (0.12) (-0.37) (0.68) 
Constant 
 
4.03*** 4.03*** 3.93*** 4.07*** 3.70*** 4.00***   
(9.91) (10.21) (10.05) (10.20) (9.40) (10.28) 
Observations 
 
554 616 636 649 614 708 
R-squared 
 
0.61 0.59 0.58 0.60 0.59 0.56 
Year FE 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1(significant variables at two-tailed test) 
Table 7b present coefficient estimates from the regression of AIS on the positive residuals from Table 7a including the control 
variables for the private debt sample. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated using robust standard errors 
clustered by firm. The variables are winsorized at 2% and 98%.  All the variables are defined in table 2. PARFD is the positive 
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residuals from stage 1 regression AIS is log of weighted average All-in-Drawn. 1A_TW is the log of total number of words in 
Item- 1A. 1A_CRW is log of total number of risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CFRW is the log of total number of financial risk 
words in Item-1A. 1A_CIRW is the log of total number of idiosyncratic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CSRW is the log of total 
number of systematic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CLRW is the log of total number of legal risk words in Item-1A. FACAMT is 
the facility amount in $’m. MAT is the proxy for loan maturity.  SEC is the dummy for secured loans. REV is the proxy for 
revolving loans. RES is the proxy for restructuring loans. FILE_TW is the log of total number of words in annual 10-K report. 
LASSET is the lag of log of total assets. BTM is the lagged book value of equity to market value of equity. ROA is lagged return 
on assets. LOSS is the lag value of dummy for firms with negative earnings. BIGN is the lagged dummy for large auditors. 
oZ_SCORE is lagged bankruptcy score based on Altman (1968). TIE is lagged times interest earned ratio. 
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Table 7c: Stage 2 H2 for Negative Residuals Private Debt 
AIS Sign 1A_TW 1A_CRW 1A_CFRW 1A_CIRW 1A_CSRW 1A_CLRW 
NARFD + -0.14*** -0.12*** -0.17*** -0.07** -0.10*** -0.08** 
    (4.03) (3.23) (6.44) (2.18) (2.94) (2.35) 
FACAMT + 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00* 0.00** 0.00** 
    (2.57) (2.29) (2.45) (1.91) (2.07) (2.18) 
MAT + 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00* 0.00*** 
    (2.70) (2.84) (2.24) (2.69) (1.91) (2.73) 
SEC + 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 
    (7.91) (7.54) (7.73) (7.70) (7.73) (6.81) 
REV ? 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.09* 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.17*** 
    (3.22) (2.77) (1.88) (3.00) (2.92) (3.39) 
RES ? -0.12*** -0.14*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.10** -0.12*** 
    (-3.07) (-3.27) (-2.81) (-2.79) (-2.54) (-2.77) 
FILE_TW + 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.03 
    (1.55) (1.10) (0.89) (0.97) (0.15) (0.99) 
LASSET - -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.14*** 
    (-8.67) (-7.84) (-9.27) (-7.38) (-7.88) (-7.25) 
BTM - 0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 
    (0.97) (-0.13) (0.58) (1.12) (0.42) (1.13) 
ROA - -0.31* -1.39*** -0.26 -0.26 -1.29*** -1.55*** 
    (-1.67) (-4.07) (-1.40) (-1.31) (-3.77) (-3.88) 
LOSS + 0.04 -0.08 0.09 0.05 -0.12 -0.14 
    (0.44) (-0.87) (0.97) (0.52) (-1.24) (-1.32) 
BIGN - -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.10 
    (-0.68) (-0.64) (-0.33) (-0.26) (-0.26) (-1.25) 
oZ_SCORE - -0.67*** -0.66*** -0.57*** -0.77*** -0.88*** -0.59*** 
    (-5.08) (-4.68) (-4.40) (-4.93) (-5.43) (-3.85) 
TIE + 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 
    (1.14) (1.28) (1.06) (1.15) (1.82) (1.18) 
Constant   4.76*** 4.90*** 5.13*** 4.65*** 5.38*** 4.94*** 
    (11.30) (11.15) (11.88) (10.65) (12.27) (10.74) 
Observations   772 710 690 677 712 618 
R-squared   0.48 0.49 0.52 0.46 0.50 0.51 
Year FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1(significant variables at two-tailed test) 
Table 6c present coefficient estimates from the regression of AIS on the negative residuals from Table 7a including the control 
variables for the private debt sample. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated using robust standard errors 
clustered by firm. The variables are winsorized at 2% and 98%.  All the variables are defined in table 2. NARFD is the negative 
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residuals from stage 1 regression AIS is log of weighted average All-in-Drawn. 1A_TW is the log of total number of words in 
Item- 1A. 1A_CRW is log of total number of risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CFRW is the log of total number of financial risk 
words in Item-1A. 1A_CIRW is the log of total number of idiosyncratic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CSRW is the log of total 
number of systematic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CLRW is the log of total number of legal risk words in Item-1A. FACAMT is 
the facility amount in $’m. MAT is the proxy for loan maturity.  SEC is the dummy for secured loans. REV is the proxy for 
revolving loans. RES is the proxy for restructuring loans. FILE_TW is the log of total number of words in annual 10-K report. 
LASSET is the lag of log of total assets. BTM is the lagged book value of equity to market value of equity. ROA is lagged return 
on assets. LOSS is the lag value of dummy for firms with negative earnings. BIGN is the lagged dummy for large auditors. 
oZ_SCORE is lagged bankruptcy score based on Altman (1968). TIE is lagged times interest earned ratio. 
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Table 8a: Stage 1 H2 for Public Debt  
Sign 1A_TW 1A_CRW 1A_CFRW 1A_CIRW 1A_CSRW 1A_CLRW 
SIZE + -0.06** -0.03 -0.15*** -0.03 -0.01 0.00  
 (-2.24) (-1.57) (-4.89) (-1.50) (-0.48) (-0.05) 
FILE_TW + 0.21*** 0.19*** 0.22*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.19***  
 (4.32) (4.37) (4.22) (4.06) (4.40) (4.32) 
LEV + 0.06 0.17 0.63*** -0.01 0.18 0.30*  
 (0.29) (0.96) (2.79) (-0.08) (0.89) (1.81) 
ETR + -0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00* -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***  
 (-3.57) (-4.01) (-1.41) (-3.26) (-3.79) (-4.30) 
LIT + 0.11 0.05 -0.07 0.11 0.04 -0.16  
 (0.96) (0.48) (-0.45) (1.10) (0.37) (-1.64) 
CPIChange + 10.30 9.63 3.57 11.07 10.72 6.54  
 (1.15) (1.24) (0.34) (1.31) (1.28) (0.92) 
SD_EARN + -0.00** -0.00** 0.00 -0.00** -0.00* -0.00** 
  (-2.22) (-2.13) (-1.31) (-2.40) (-1.67) (-2.26) 
Constant  7.35*** 4.58*** 2.63*** 3.95*** 2.96*** 1.91***  
 (11.43) (8.00) (3.93) (6.54) (5.01) (3.32) 
Observations  3,007 3,007 3,007 3,007 3,007 3,007 
R-squared  0.08 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.19 0.16 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1(significant variables at two-tailed test) 
Table 8a present coefficient estimates from the regression of RFDs on the determinants for the public debt sample. t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses and are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by firm. The variables are winsorized at 
2% and 98%.  All the variables are defined in table 2. 1A_TW is the log of total number of words in Item- 1A. 1A_CRW is log 
of total number of risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CFRW is the log of total number of financial risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CIRW is 
the log of total number of idiosyncratic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CSRW is the log of total number of systematic risk words in 
Item-1A. 1A_CLRW is the log of total number of legal risk words in Item-1A. SIZE is the proxy for regulatory risk and 
measured as the market value of equity. FILE_TW is the log of total number of words in annual 10-K report. LEV is firm 
leverage. ETR is the proxy for tax risk. LIT is the proxy for litigation risk. CPIChange is the proxy for economic risk. 
SD_EARN is the proxy for idiosyncratic risk and is measured as the standard deviation of quarterly earnings over 3 years. 
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Table 8b: Stage 2 H2 for Positive Residuals Public Debt 
RATING Sign 1A_TW 1A_CRW 1A_CFRW 1A_CIRW 1A_CSRW 1A_CLRW 
PARFD + 0.01 0.08 -0.06 0.06 0.01 0.12**  
 (0.16) (1.53) (-1.31) (1.23) (0.11) (2.18) 
FILE_TW + 0.09* 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.08** 
  (1.81) (0.81) (0.75) (1.38) (0.37) (1.69) 
LASSET - -0.63*** -0.66*** -0.56*** -0.68*** -0.61*** -0.66***  
 (-22.79) (-24.23) (-21.25) (-25.35) (-22.34) (-25.74) 
BTM - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
 (1.14) (1.25) (0.96) (1.35) (1.3) (1.33) 
ROA - -3.10*** -3.25*** -2.52*** -3.56*** -1.98*** -3.39***  
 (-9.24) (-9.71) (-8.27) (-10.89) (-7.32) (-10.46) 
LOSS + 0.51*** 0.47*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.69*** 0.52***  
 (3.74) (3.52) (4.23) (3.90) (5.52) (4.17) 
BIGN - 0.11 -0.01 0.11 0.08 -0.22 -0.19  
 (0.70) (-0.09) (0.69) (0.55) (-1.37) (-1.15) 
oZ_SCORE - -0.33*** -0.34*** -0.36*** -0.33*** -0.33*** -0.33***  
 (-9.05) (-9.44) (-10.02) (-9.48) (-9.07) (-9.48) 
TIE + -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00***  
 (-3.19) (-3.21) (-3.22) (-2.05) (-3.37) (-2.77) 
Observations  1,284 1,360 1,435 1,447 986 1,565 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2  0.16 0.16 0.13 0.17 0.15 0.16 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1(significant variables at two-tailed test) 
Table 8b present coefficient estimates from the regression of RATING on the positive residuals (PARFD) from Table 8a 
including the control variables for the public debt sample. z-statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated using robust 
standard errors clustered by firm. The variables are winsorized at 2% and 98%. 1A_CRW is log of total number of risk words in 
Item-1A. 1A_CFRW is the log of total number of financial risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CIRW is the log of total number of 
idiosyncratic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CSRW is the log of total number of systematic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CLRW is the 
log of total number of legal risk words in Item-1A. LOSS is the dummy for firms with negative earnings. LASSET is the log of 
total assets. BIGN is the dummy for large auditors. ROA is return on assets. BTM is book value of equity to market value of 
equity. oZ_SCORE is bankruptcy score based on Altman (1968). TIE is times interest earned ratio. FILE_TW is the log of total 
number of words in annual 10-K report. 
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Table 8c: Stage 2 H2 for Negative Residuals Public Debt 
RATING Sign 1A_TW 1A_CRW 1A_CFRW 1A_CIRW 1A_CSRW 1A_CLRW 
NARFD - -0.45*** -0.37*** -0.42*** -0.19*** -0.32*** -0.15*** 
    (9.07) (7.63) (11.36) (4.34) (7.40) (3.75) 
FILE_TW + 0.05 0.08* 0.09* 0.04 0.12** 0.03 
    (0.99) (1.65) (1.77) (0.87) (2.49) (0.61) 
LASSET - -0.63*** -0.60*** -0.70*** -0.57*** -0.63*** -0.59*** 
    (-25.84) (-24.12) (-27.03) (-22.76) (-25.30) (-22.66) 
BTM - 0.00** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00* 0.00* 0.00 
    (2.44) (2.00) (3.72) (1.79) (1.83) (1.36) 
ROA - -2.47*** -2.31*** -2.78*** -2.16*** -4.30*** -2.12*** 
    (-8.65) (-8.09) (-8.95) (-7.43) (-11.63) (-7.24) 
LOSS + 0.91*** 0.95*** 0.93*** 0.90*** 0.79*** 0.96*** 
    (7.24) (7.40) (6.76) (7.10) (5.75) (6.91) 
BIGN - 0.22 0.34** 0.31** 0.26 0.49*** 0.36** 
    (1.42) (2.21) (1.98) (1.61) (3.21) (2.39) 
oZ_SCORE - -0.45*** -0.44*** -0.39*** -0.46*** -0.42*** -0.46*** 
    (-12.55) (-12.11) (-10.58) (-12.16) (-11.65) (-12.10) 
TIE + 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (0.54) (0.46) (0.37) (0.30) (0.66) (0.56) 
Observations   1,723 1,647 1,572 1,560 1,639 1,442 
Year FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2   0.17 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.15 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1(significant variables at two-tailed test) 
Table 8c present coefficient estimates from the regression of RATING on the negative residuals (NARFD) from Table 8a 
including the control variables for the public debt sample. z-statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated using robust 
standard errors clustered by firm. The variables are winsorized at 2% and 98%.  All the variables are defined in table 2. 
RATING is the numerical value of S&P debt issuer rating. 1A_TW is the log of total number of words in Item- 1A. 1A_CRW is 
log of total number of risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CFRW is the log of total number of financial risk words in Item-1A. 
1A_CIRW is the log of total number of idiosyncratic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CSRW is the log of total number of systematic 
risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CLRW is the log of total number of legal risk words in Item-1A. LOSS is the dummy for firms with 
negative earnings. LASSET is the log of total assets. BIGN is the dummy for large auditors. ROA is return on assets. BTM is 
book value of equity to market value of equity. oZ_SCORE is bankruptcy score based on Altman (1968). TIE is times interest 
earned ratio. FILE_TW is the log of total number of words in annual 10-K report. 
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Abstract 
This chapter examines the effect of corporate governance on managerial discretion in reporting 
Risk Factor Disclosures (RFDs) and the subsequent effect on cost of debt in the public debt market. 
Managerial discretion in reporting RFD, which I call Abnormal Risk Factor Disclosure (ARFD), 
is measured as the residual from the regression of RFDs on its determinants. In the previous 
chapter, I find that for public debt, cost of debt is positively associated with Positive Abnormal 
Risk Factor Disclosure (PARFD) and negatively associated with Negative Abnormal Risk Factor 
Disclosure (NARFD). To examine the effect of strong versus weak corporate governance on cost 
of debt, I focus on those firms that pay a price for perceived higher risk, i.e., the PARFD firms. I 
expect the presence of strong corporate governance will mitigate the expected higher cost of debt 
for these firms. Cost of debt is measured using S&P debt issuer rating (RATING) while corporate 
governance (GOV) is measured as the composite score of three corporate governance measures 
(Independent Directors – IND, Expert Directors – EXPERT, and Board Maturity – BMAT). The 
results reveal positive associations between GOV and ARFD which is consistent with the 
expectation that corporate governance will promote more transparent reporting. However, there is 
no cost of debt mitigating effect for riskier firms (PARFD) with strong corporate governance. As 
expected, PARFD firms with weak corporate governance have higher cost of debt. The findings 
are useful to regulators in setting mandatory disclosure requirements and to management in 
implementing corporate governance structures in the organization. 
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4. Introduction 
Corporate governance mechanisms can mitigate agency conflicts and reduce information 
asymmetry between stakeholders and managers (Jensen, 1993). Strong corporate governance can 
serve as a means of managing opportunist and self-seeking behaviour by managers, thereby 
reducing the variability in cash flow and subsequently reducing default risk (Sengupta, 1998).  
Extant literature has established a positive association between some corporate governance 
characteristics and corporate risk disclosure (Beasley, Clune, & Hermason, 2005; Lajili, 2009). 
However, there are currently no studies on the direct or indirect effect of corporate governance on 
the mandatory Item 1A-Risk Factor Disclosure by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). Compared to similar studies that have focused on levels of disclosure, this study explores 
managerial discretion in disclosure by first examining whether corporate governance promotes 
transparency in reporting RFDs and then assessing whether strong corporate governance mitigates 
cost of debt for firms that are considered risky (Positive Abnormal Risk Factor Disclosure – 
PARFD) in the public debt market. In the previous chapter, I find that PARFD is positively 
associated with cost of debt while Negative Abnormal Risk Factor Disclosure (NARFD) is 
negatively associated with cost of debt. This suggests that PARFD firms suffer a penalty for 
perceived higher risk although it appears that NARFD firms are rewarded for less risk. If strong 
corporate governance has a risk mitigation effect, then I expect risky firms (PARFD) with strong 
corporate governance have lower cost of debt. 
In this chapter, I examine whether strong corporate governance mitigates the negative 
effect on the cost of debt when firms are perceived as risky. Addressing these objectives will 
provide insights into the following research questions: 
RQ 1) Does corporate governance affect managerial discretion in risk factor disclosures? 
 
 
142 
 
RQ 2) Does strong corporate governance have a mitigating effect on cost of debt? 
Similar to Chapter 3 of this dissertation, managerial discretion in reporting RFDs, 
Abnormal Risk Factor Disclosure (ARFD), is measured as the residual from the regression of RFD 
on its determinants. These determinants are discussed in the previous chapter and based on the 
literature examining the contents of RFDs (financial risk, idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk, 
macroeconomic risk, tax risk, and legal risk). Corporate governance (GOV) is assessed using the 
composite score of three corporate governance mechanisms: the proportion of independent 
directors (IND); the number of expert directors on the board (EXPERT); and the average age of 
directors, or board maturity (BMAT). Cost of debt is measured as the categorical value of S&P 
issuer debt rating (RATING). 
The results of the first part of the study examining the effect of corporate governance on 
managerial discretion in RFDs indicate that there is a positive association between corporate 
governance (GOV) and discretionary reporting of RFDs (ARFD). This result suggests corporate 
governance improves transparency in reporting RFDs. However, the results of the second part of 
the study assessing the mitigating effect of strong corporate governance on cost of debt for risky 
firms (PARFD) with strong corporate governance did not show a mitigating effect on cost of debt. 
Meanwhile, as expected, PARFD firms with weak corporate governance have a high cost of debt.  
This study makes three main contributions to the existing literature. It is the first study to 
examine the effect of corporate governance on Item 1A-Risk factor disclosure. While previous 
studies have examined the role of corporate governance on corporate risk disclosures, there is no 
known study on corporate governance and RFDs. Compared to corporate risk disclosures, RFDs 
are unique because they are a mandatory requirement to disclose sensitive, negative information.  
This study also contributes to the literature on capital market implications of disclosure and 
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corporate governance by examining the effect of corporate governance on cost of debt when 
managers exercise discretion in reporting risk information. Therefore, this study provides new 
evidence on the importance of RFDs in the debt market and the impact of strong corporate 
governance on the credibility of disclosures. Finally, my research contributes to the literature on 
mandatory disclosure policies, including the implications and usefulness of such disclosures. 
Examining RFDs within the context of corporate governance provides insight into the usefulness 
of RFDs when corporate governance is considered strong or weak. 
The findings from this study are useful to organizations implementing corporate 
governance structures and to regulators setting mandatory disclosure requirements. The remainder 
of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents the background literature relating 
to corporate governance, RFDs, and cost of debt. The following sections present the theories and 
hypotheses, a discussion of the research design, the results, the robustness tests, and a final 
conclusion. 
4.1. Background Literature 
4.1.1 Corporate Governance 
Broadly defined, corporate governance encompasses the rules, practices, and processes by which 
a company is governed and directed, and responsibility for corporate governance in an organization 
rests mainly with the board of directors. Corporate governance is multidimensional and has been 
widely studied within and outside the field of management. It is important in all organizations and 
has been identified as one of the key channels through which accounting information affects 
economic performance (Bushman & Smith, 2003). Mechanisms of corporate governance are both 
external and internal; external mechanisms include the external auditor, the market for control, the 
role of regulators, and the role of the media, while internal mechanisms include board 
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characteristics, such as board size, percentage of independent directors, CEO role duality, and 
board busyness (Brown & Caylor, 2004; McNulty, Florackis,& Ormrod, 2012). Some studies have 
also classified corporate governance based on board structure, which can be further categorized as 
board structural characteristics, director-specific characteristics, and board processes (McNulty et 
al., 2012; McNulty, Florackis & Ormrod, 2013). This study focuses on internal mechanisms related 
to three corporate governance characteristics: board independence (IND), board expertise 
(EXPERT), and board maturity (BMAT). 
Corporate governance studies have relied mostly on agency theory which predicts that 
managers are likely to shirk their duties and divert the firms’ resources to enjoy perquisites (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). This theory suggests that managers are likely to take risks that are not 
beneficial to the stakeholders. To prevent agency conflicts between shareholders and management, 
corporate governance measures are used to align the goals of the shareholders and managers. These 
measures include having more independent directors on the board, avoiding CEO duality, tying 
managerial incentives to future firm performance, and ensuring board diversity in terms of 
ethnicity and gender.  
While the literature on corporate governance and firm attributes or characteristics is vast, 
very little has been done on corporate governance and risk disclosures, especially in North 
America. The next sub-section discusses the current state of research relating to corporate 
governance and risk disclosure. 
4.1.2 Risk Disclosures and Corporate Governance 
Extant literature has established a relationship between corporate governance and risk. Abraham 
and Cox (2007), for example, show that risk information has only partial association with a non-
executive board. Lajili (2009) examined the relationship between corporate governance 
 
 
145 
 
mechanisms and risk disclosure in Canadian firms and found that board size and percentage of 
non-executive directors are positively associated with risk disclosure. Lajili also found that a 
fraction of the controlling vote is negatively associated with risk disclosure, while CEO incentive 
compensation did not present a consistent result. Elzahar and Hussainey (2012) examined the 
relationship between corporate risk disclosure and both firm characteristics and corporate 
governance measures. The corporate governance measures they examined include institutional 
ownership, board size, role duality, board independence, and presence of audit committee. 
Surprisingly, their results did not show any relationship between these characteristics and risk 
disclosure. 
In an international setting, Ntim, Lindop, and Thomas (2013) examined the relationship 
between the quality and extent of corporate risk disclosure for firms in South Africa. The corporate 
governance mechanisms were split into corporate ownership mechanisms (government ownership, 
block ownership, and institutional ownership) and corporate board characteristics (board diversity, 
board size, independent non-executive directors, and dual board leadership). The results showed a 
negative association between the extent of corporate risk disclosure and both block and 
institutional ownership and a positive association for board diversity, board size, and independent 
non-executive directors. Similarly, investigating the impact of corporate governance mechanisms 
on the level of risk disclosure in Kuwait, Al-Shammari (2014) found that corporate risk disclosure 
has a positive association with board size, a negative association with role duality, and no 
association with the proportion of non-executive directors, directors on audit committee, or having 
family members on the board. Contrary to the negative association between risk disclosure and 
non-executive directors reported in Ntim et al. (2013), Beasley et al. (2005) provide evidence of a 
positive association between risk disclosure and both non-executive directors and role duality. The 
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different results in these papers may be because Beasley et al. (2005) focused on the 
implementation of enterprise risk management system while Ntim et al. (2013) studied corporate 
risk disclosure. 
Empirical evidence has also shown that corporate governance has a mitigating effect on 
risk. Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2004) demonstrated that the presence of large diverse boards 
with more independent directors, higher amounts of board busyness, greater numbers of busy and 
experienced directors, and lower directorship ownership results in lower costs of loans and less 
intense covenants. The results from Francis, Hasan, and Koetter (2012) also provide supporting 
evidence that board monitoring mitigates information risk ex ante and controls agency risk ex post. 
The findings are further reinforced by McNulty et al. (2012) who find that financial risk is lower 
in boards that are smaller, with fewer than eight directors, while corporate risk is lower when tenure 
and remuneration of the executive director is greater than that of the non-executive director. 
In summary, there is evidence of a positive association between risk disclosure and board 
size, board duality, and percentage of non-executive directors and a negative association with 
institutional ownership. Yet the relationship between risk disclosure and role duality is unclear. 
There is also evidence that corporate governance mitigates risk; however, whether this effect 
extends to managerial discretion in reporting RFDs is an empirical question.  
4.1.3. Debt Contracting and Corporate Governance 
Greater levels of corporate governance can mitigate agency conflict among managers and other 
stakeholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Studies have shown that strong corporate governance has 
a mitigating effect on cost of debt by reducing information risk which subsequently reduces the 
cost of debt (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, & La Fond, 2006; Sengupta, 1998). Strong corporate 
governance, therefore, provides a platform for adequate supervision of actions and decisions taken 
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by management that can increase the default risk if not controlled. Armstrong, Guay, and Weber 
(2010) reviewed the literature on the role of information and financial reporting in corporate 
governance and debt contracting and also discussed how governance mechanisms are used by 
creditors to reduce agency cost and the associated cost of default. 
In addition to default risk, information risk is another determinant of cost of debt that can 
be influenced by the quality of corporate governance. This influence can be through the quality of 
accounting information provided (Bushman & Smith, 2003) or through the timely disclosure of 
information (Sengupta, 1998). Studies on corporate boards have examined the role of boards in 
bank loan contracts (Francis et al., 2012), the effect of internal control weaknesses (Kim, Song, & 
Zhang, 2011), corporate misreporting (Graham, Li, & Qiu, 2008), Sarbanes Oxley Act (Pae, 2010), 
and board characteristics (Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003). Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) found that 
institutional ownership and greater outside control are associated with a higher bond rating and 
lower spread. Anderson et al. (2004) argued that board independence and audit committee size are 
negatively associated with cost of debt in the public debt market, while Francis et al. (2012) found 
that higher quality boards have lower interest rates, more favourable loan terms, and more lenders 
participating in syndicated loans. Furthermore, the board can influence bank contracting terms 
through the monitoring of management activity and ensuring that proper internal controls are in 
place. Pae (2010) demonstrated evidence of a reduction in private cost of debt following the 
implementation of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX), while Kim et al. (2011) showed that loan spread 
is higher for firms with Internal Control Weaknesses. These results align with the findings of 
Graham et al. (2008) who argued that companies initiating loans after a restatement have higher 
spreads. 
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The above research findings suggest that strong corporate governance can reduce 
information and default risk and that the benefits of strong corporate governance are recognized in 
the debt markets through more favourable loan terms.  
4.2. Theories and Hypotheses 
4.2.1 Abnormal Risk Factor Disclosure and Corporate Governance 
While most studies on corporate governance are based on agency theory, some studies also rely on 
signalling theory to explain the role of strong corporate governance in disclosure quality and 
quantity. While agency theory predicts that providing reliable information about risk decreases 
information asymmetry between investors and debt holders, signalling theory predicts that 
disclosure of adequate information in the financial reports can be a sign of management quality. 
Both theories, however, suggest that providing reliable information is beneficial to investors, 
creditors, and management. 
Another benefit of strong corporate governance is that it enhances the financial reporting 
process by influencing management to make more accurate disclosure. Since a primary duty of 
boards of directors is monitoring the financial reporting process, the board structure is important 
in ensuring that financial statements are credible and relevant, and the credibility of financial 
information is critical in evaluating the default risk of debts. Furthermore, corporate governance 
can minimize opportunistic disclosure as an outcome of the discretion allowed in financial 
reporting. Corporate governance mechanisms that limit opportunistic management behaviour will, 
therefore, benefit all stakeholders. Prior studies have discussed an association between corporate 
governance and risk disclosure. For example, there is evidence of a positive association between 
risk disclosure and dual listing (Abraham & Cox, 2007), board size and percentage of non-
executive directors (Lajili, 2009), and board diversity and board size (Ntim et al., 2013). 
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Furthermore, agency theory suggests that corporate governance mechanisms, such as outside 
directors, play a significant role in aligning the interests of managers and owners (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). This is because firms with strong corporate governance are better able to monitor 
management and prevent managerial self-interest behaviour which reduces information asymmetry 
between management and owners. Therefore, governance mechanisms that mitigate self-interest 
behaviour will improve risk disclosure transparency and subsequently mitigate information 
asymmetry in firms. 
 Based on the above discussion, I expect corporate governance will have a direct impact on 
managerial discretion in reporting RFDs by promoting transparency in disclosures and signalling 
the credibility of disclosures. This argument leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: There is a positive association between discretions in reporting RFDs (ARFD) and 
corporate governance. 
4.2.2 Cost of Debt, Corporate Governance, and Abnormal Risk Factor Disclosure 
Chapter 3 of this dissertation provides empirical evidence that RFDs reflect actual firm risk and 
that managerial discretion in RFDs (ARFD) affects the cost of debt. The results from the previous 
chapter also reveal higher cost of debt for firms that are perceived as riskier (PARFD) in the public 
debt market. The higher cost of debt effect suggests public debt lenders take disclosed RFDs as 
representative of firm risk. Furthermore, the results show that firms with RFDs below the expected 
level (NARFD) attract lower cost of debt possibly as a reward for lower risk. Research findings 
also reveal capital market benefits of strong corporate governance. There is evidence that corporate 
governance can reduce the cost of debt through the effect on default and information risk 
(Sengupta, 1998) and that the quality of corporate governance can influence information risk 
through the quality of accounting information (Bushman &Smith, 2003). Prior research has also 
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established an association between corporate governance and cost of debt (Anderson et al. 2004; 
Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003) and also between corporate governance and risk disclosure (Lajili, 
2009; Ntim et al. 2013). These findings suggest that corporate governance plays a role in the 
relationship between risk disclosure and cost of debt.  
I evaluate the influence of strong corporate governance on discretionary reporting of RFDs 
for firms that that are perceived as risky (PARFD). Focusing only on PARFD firms makes it 
possible to examine the effect of corporate governance in mitigating the higher cost of debt effect 
observed for PARFD firms in Chapter 3. Since strong corporate governance adds credibility to 
disclosures, I expect PARFD firms with strong corporate governance to have a lower cost of debt 
based on the predictions from theory and evidence from the current literature. Similarly, risky firms 
(PARFD) with weak corporate governance should have a higher cost of debt because the weak 
governance structure in these firms further underscores the riskiness of the firms. 
Based on the above discussion, I propose the following hypotheses. 
H2a: The association between cost of debt and positive abnormal risk factor disclosure 
(PARFD) is negative when corporate governance is strong.  
H2b: The association between cost of debt and positive abnormal risk factor disclosure 
(PARFD) is positive when corporate governance is weak. 
4.3. Research Design  
4.3.1 Sample Selection  
The sample consists of public debt firms as outlined in Chapter 3 with complete data for the 
corporate governance variables. The final sample is 2,149 loan-year observations after excluding 
firms with incomplete data and those with RFDs of less than 30 words. The data is summarized in 
Table 1. 
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4.3.2 Method  
The first stage regression to derive the measure of managerial discretion in RFDs (ARFD) is 
presented below. 
𝐴𝑅𝐹𝐷௧ = 𝑅𝐹𝐷௧   − ൤
∝଴+∝ଵ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸௧ +∝ଶ 𝐿𝐸𝑉௧ +∝ଷ 𝐸𝑇𝑅௧ +∝ସ 𝐿𝐼𝑇௧ +∝ହ 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒௧
+∝଺ 𝑆𝐷_𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁௧ +∝଻ 𝐹𝐼𝐿𝐸_𝑇𝑊௧
൨…. (1) 
 
ARFD is derived as the residual from the regression of RFDs on the determinants. As explained in 
Chapter 3, these determinants are based on previous studies that have examined the topics 
disclosed in RFDs (Bao & Datta, 2012; Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, & Steele, 2014; Huang & 
Li, 2011). From these, I identified six major categories of risk, as follows: financial risk, 
idiosyncratic or operational risk, litigation risk, regulatory or legal risk, tax risk, and 
macroeconomic risk. Similar to Chapter 3, LEV is firm leverage measured as the book value of 
debt divided by total assets and is a proxy for financial risk. SD_EARN is the standard deviation of 
quarterly firm earnings over the previous three years and is the proxy for idiosyncratic risk. LIT is 
the proxy for litigation risk and is a dummy that equals one for firms with SIC codes 2833-2836, 
3570-3577, 3600-3676, 5200-5961, 7370-7374, and 8731-8734, or zero otherwise. SIZE is 
measured as log value of market equity value and is the proxy for regulatory risk. ETR is expected 
tax rate measured as total tax expense divided by pre-tax income and is the proxy for tax risk. 
CPIChange is the monthly rate of change in Consumer Price and is the proxy for macroeconomic 
risk. I expect all determinants are positively associated with RFDs. 
The regression to test H1 on the association between managerial discretion in RFDs 
(ARFD) and corporate governance is presented below.  
𝐴𝑅𝐹𝐷௧ =  𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝐺𝑂𝑉௧ + 𝛽ଶ𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇௧ + 𝛽ଷ𝐿𝐸𝑉௧ + 𝛽ସ𝐵𝑇𝑀௧ + 𝛽ହ𝑅𝑂𝐴௧ + 𝛽଺𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆௧ +
𝛽଻𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁௧ + 𝛽଼ 𝑜𝑍_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸௧ +  𝛽ଽ𝑇𝐼𝐸௧ + 𝛽ଵ଴𝐹𝐼𝐿𝐸_𝑇𝑊௧ + 𝛽ଵଵ𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝛽ଵଶ𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝜀଴.. (2) 
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ARFD is measured as the absolute value of the residual from the regression of RFD on its 
determinants, where RFD is measured as the total number of words in Item 1A-RFD and the risk 
word categories from Item 1A-RFD, based on Campbell et al. (2014). GOV is the composite score 
of three corporate governance mechanisms (IND, EXPERT, and BMAT). The coefficient of interest 
is β1 which captures the relationship between corporate governance and discretion in reporting 
RFDs (ARFD). I expect β1 to be positive in support of transparency and credibility effect of 
corporate governance. 
The first stage regression to examine H2 is the same as equation (1). The regression 
equation for the second stage is presented below. As explained earlier, this regression is conducted 
only for PARFD firms to examine the effect of strong corporate governance on the relationship 
between positive managerial discretions in RFDs (PARFD) and cost of debt (RATING). This 
regression is conditioned on a dummy variable of corporate governance (CGOV) which takes the 
value of 1 for firms with strong corporate governance and zero otherwise. This variable is further 
explained in the next subsection. 
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺௧ =  𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝑃𝐴𝑅𝐹𝐷௧+𝛽ଶ𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇௧ + 𝛽ଷ𝐵𝑇𝑀௧ + 𝛽ସ𝐿𝐸𝑉௧ +  𝛽ହ𝑅𝑂𝐴௧ + 𝛽଺𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆௧ +
𝛽଻𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁௧ + 𝛽଼𝑜𝑍_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸௧ + 𝛽ଽ𝑇𝐼𝐸௧ + 𝛽ଵ଴𝐹𝐼𝐿𝐸_𝑇𝑊௧ + 𝛽ଵଵ𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝛽ଵଶ𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 +
𝜀଴ 𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝐺𝑂𝑉 = 1 (0)….…………………………………………………………………… (3) 
The coefficient of interest is β1. I expect β1 to have a negative sign for strong governance firms 
and a positive sign for weak governance firms. This follows from the argument that strong 
corporate governance has a risk mitigating effect on cost of debt. PARFD firms with strong 
corporate governance should be rewarded with lower cost of debt, while PARFD firms with weak 
governance should be penalized with higher cost of debt.  
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4.3.3 Description of variables 
Cost of debt is the categorical score of S&P debt issuer rating (RATING). Corporate governance 
(GOV) is the composite measure of: (1) the proportion of independent directors on the board (IND); 
(2) the log of the number of directors employed in the fields of academia, accounting, law, 
consulting, financial services, investing, and medicine (EXPERT);35 and (3) the log of average age 
of directors (BMAT). The evidence in the literature linking these variables to corporate governance 
are discussed below.  
Armstrong et al. (2010) explains that a board consisting of only internal directors may not 
be effective because of managerial entrenchment. On the other hand, boards consisting of only 
external directors may not be effective because of limited experience. Research, however, supports 
the view that a greater number of non-executive directors should improve the control and strategic 
function of the company and reduce excessive risk-taking by executives (Coles, McWilliams, & 
Sen, 2001). Elhazer and Hussainey (2012) find that the proportion of non-executive directors 
explains most of the variation in corporate risk disclosures. Furthermore, based on agency theory, 
having a larger number of independent directors can mitigate agency problems as independent 
directors can monitor opportunistic behaviour by executives. Independent directors are therefore 
able to monitor, discipline, and influence management. As such, the presence of more independent 
board members (IND) suggests stronger corporate governance.  
Financial literacy is essential in any board (Jensen, 1993). I expect that boards with expert 
directors will make decisions that are beneficial to the firm as they understand the financial 
implications of their actions. Armstrong et al. (2010) also support the view that financial expert 
directors will be better at monitoring and advising on financial reporting and disclosure issues 
                                                 
35 This classification builds on Defond, Hann, and Hu’s (2005) classification of director’s expertise based on 
financial and non-financial education and experience. 
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compared to non-financial expert directors. Therefore, a larger number of EXPERT directors 
implies stronger corporate governance. Board maturity (BMAT) measures the average age of 
directors and is synonymous with more business experience which is a positive attribute. Similar 
to EXPERT, higher values of BMAT indicate stronger corporate governance. 
To derive this composite score, I create a dummy variable for each governance mechanism 
(IND, EXPERT, and BMAT) based on the sample median. Observations with values greater than 
the sample median are assigned a score of 1 or zero otherwise. Thus, the highest value for GOV is 
three for firms with strong governance relating to IND, EXPERT, and MAT while the lowest value 
is zero for weak governance relating to the three measures.  
As explained in the previous section, the determinants of RFDs are SIZE, LEV, ETR, LIT, 
CPIChange, and SD_EARN. I expect all determinants will be positively associated with RFDs.  
The control variables in this study are log of total assets (LASSET), book to market ratio 
(BTM), return on assets (ROA), dummy for negative earnings (LOSS), audit quality (BIGN), 
oZ_SCORE for bankruptcy prediction, times interest earned (TIE), industry and year fixed effects. 
Extant research has shown that these variables are associated with risk disclosure. For example, 
Khlif and Hussainey (2014) showed that risk reporting has a positive association with size, 
leverage, profitability, and risk factor (Beta, probability of bankruptcy). In addition to these control 
variables, I also control for disclosure comprehensiveness, using the variable FILE_TW measured 
as total number of words in the annual 10-K report. Relying on Watts and Zimmerman’s (1986) 
prediction that larger companies disclose more information and are more susceptible to regulatory 
scrutiny, I expect large firms, profit making firms, firms with lower risk of bankruptcy, and firms 
audited by large auditors to have more scrutiny over the reporting process and more transparent 
disclosure. Loss making firms may attempt to hide risk information to avoid further losses and are 
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likely to have less transparent RFDs. Consistent with prior literature I expect all control variables, 
except LOSS, to be negatively associated with discretionary reporting in RFDs. 
 The continuous variables are winsorized at 2% and 98% and the regressions are clustered 
by firms. The details of the variables are presented in Table 2. 
4.4. Results 
4.4.1 Descriptive analysis 
Table 3a presents a general overview of descriptive statistics for the governance measures, RFD 
measures and its determinants, cost of debt, and control variables. The corporate governance 
measures (GOV and CGOV) have mean values of 1.44 and 0.46, respectively, suggesting corporate 
governance for the sample is slightly below average. However, the median value gives more insight 
on the distribution of the data. GOV and CGOV have median values of 1 and zero respectively. 
These values imply that most of the firms in the sample have strong corporate governance. The 
average number of words in the 10-K file (FILE_TW) is 263,769, while the mean total number of 
words in Item 1A (1A_TW) is 16,418. The mean of total number of risk words (1A_CRW) is 813, 
financial risk words (1A_CFRW) is 116, systematic risk words (1A_CSRW) is 285, idiosyncratic 
risk words (1A_CIRW) is 299, and the mean of the number of legal risk words (1A_CLRW) is 85.  
The average RATING is 9 which translates into a BBB debt rating. The borrower 
characteristics indicate average firm size of $19 billion.36 As explained in Chapter 3, most of the 
firms in this study are large firms because Item 1A disclosure is only mandatory for firms with 
more than $75 million in assets. The control for firm leverage (LEV) has a mean of 0.26 implying 
that most of the firms have low solvency risk. The mean of the control for audit quality (BIGN) is 
                                                 
36The value in the descriptive table is the log value. 
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0.99 meaning that most of the firms are audited by large audit firms. In addition, average ROA is 
0.05 indicating the average firm is profitable, and most of the firms have low risk of bankruptcy 
as indicated by the average Z_SCORE of 4.11.   
4.4.2 Univariate analysis 
The correlation matrix is presented in Table 3b. Cost of debt (RATING) is negatively correlated 
with the corporate governance measures (GOV&CGOV) providing initial evidence that firms with 
strong corporate governance may have a lower cost of debt. RATING is positively correlated with 
all RFD measures. These positive correlations support the findings in Chapter 3 that the risk 
profiles of firms are reflected in their cost of debt. The disclosure comprehensiveness proxy 
(FILE_TW) is negatively correlated with RATING, suggesting that more comprehensive 
disclosures may have cost of debt benefits. As expected, RATING is positively associated with 
leverage (LEV), book to market ratio (BTM), and loss firms (LOSS), suggesting firms with high 
leverage, long maturity period, secured loans, growth firms, and firms reporting losses have higher 
cost of debt. Also, RATING is negatively correlated with standard deviation of earnings 
(SD_EARN), firm size (SIZE), and the proxy for large firms (LASSET). RATING is also negatively 
associated with profitable firms (ROA), firms audited by large auditors (BIGN), low bankruptcy 
firms (oZ_SCORE), and low liquidity risk (TIE). These negative correlations suggest that firms 
with low volatility in earnings, large and profitable firms, firms audited by large auditors, and firms 
with low probability of bankruptcy have lower cost of debt. These negative correlations are not 
surprising as large and profitable firms will have better debt ratings.  
As expected, GOV and CGOV are positively correlated. GOV is positively associated with 
systematic (1A_CSRW) and legal (1A_CLRW) risk words. This correlation provides preliminary 
evidence of the influence of corporate governance on disclosure transparency in line with the 
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prediction of H1. Predictably, GOV and CGOV are positively correlated with disclosure 
comprehensiveness (FILE_TW) and firm size (SIZE and LASSET). GOV and CGOV are also 
positively associated with volatility of earnings (SD_EARN) which contradicts the expectation that 
strong corporate governance will reduce earning fluctuations. The corporate governance measures 
(GOV and CGOV) are negatively associated with the proxy for litigation risk (LIT), probability of 
bankruptcy (Z_SCORE), and times interest earned (TIE). This negative correlation suggests that 
firms with strong corporate governance usually have lower litigation risk, lower probability of 
bankruptcy, and lower liquidity risk. 
Furthermore, all the RFD measures are positively correlated with one another, as expected. 
Financial risk words (1A_CFRW) and legal risk (1A_CLRW) words are positively correlated with 
leverage (LEV). All risk words, except idiosyncratic risk (1A_CIRW), are positively associated 
with the control for growth firms (BTM) and negatively associated with firm profitability (ROA). 
These correlations suggest firms with more risk disclosures are less profitable growth firms.  
4.4.3 Multivariate analysis 
The results to test H1 for the association between corporate governance and managerial discretion 
in RFDs are presented in Tables 4a and 4b. Table 4a shows the result of the regression of the six 
RFD measures on the determinants of RFDs. The residual from this regression is the measure of 
managerial discretion in RFDs: ARFD. Table 4a reveals a significant negative association between 
SIZE and RFD for all risk measures except legal risk words (1A_CLRW) suggesting that larger 
firms have less transparent disclosures. This is contrary to expectation since larger firms generally 
experience greater exposure and should be more transparent in their risk disclosures. A possible 
explanation for the negative association is the cost of proprietary information. These firms may be 
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conservative in disclosing information about the firm’s risk to avoid competitors gaining access to 
sensitive information.  
The proxy for disclosure comprehensiveness (FILE_TW) shows significant positive results 
for all the RFD measures, as expected. This is because Item 1A-RFD has been identified as one of 
the disclosures responsible for the increased size of the 10-K report (Dyer, Lang, & Stice-
Lawrence, 2016). Financial risk proxy (LEV) is significant for total number of words in Item 1A 
(1A_TW) and idiosyncratic risk words (1A_CIRW). Unexpectedly, ETR is negatively associated 
with all the RFD measures except financial risk words (1A_CFRW). The proxy for macroeconomic 
risk (CPIChange) and idiosyncratic risk (SD_EARN) are not significantly associated with any of 
the RFDs. A possible explanation for some of the insignificant results is variation in the types of 
risk words included in the categories. For example, the systematic risk words variable (1A_CSRW) 
contains risk words relating to war, currency fluctuations, and natural disasters, etc. The proxy for 
macroeconomic risk (CPIChange), however, is associated with risks relating to inflation and price 
changes.  
Table 4b presents the results for the main test of the association between corporate 
governance and managerial discretion in reporting RFDs. In line with H1, Table 4b reveals a 
positive association between GOV and ARFD for all determinants. This result supports the 
expectation that strong corporate governance will enhance transparency in reporting RFDs. For the 
control variables, LASSET is negatively associated with ARFD for total words in Item 1A (1A_TW), 
as expected, implying larger firms show less deviation in their risk factor reporting. The negative 
association between oZ_SCORE and ARFD for all risk word measures, except financial risk words 
(1A_CFRW) and legal risk words (1A_CLRW), was also predicted. These negative associations 
imply firms with low bankruptcy risk have less deviation in their reporting. Similarly, the proxy 
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for disclosure comprehensiveness (FILE_TW) shows positive association with ARFD for 
systematic risk words (1A_CSRW). This is consistent with the assumption that larger files will have 
more RFDs. On the other hand, leverage (LEV) is positively associated with ARFD. A possible 
reason is that high leverage firms disclose less risk to avoid the potential negative effect of 
disclosing risk information. The controls for loss making firms (LOSS) and audit quality (BIGN) 
are negatively associated with ARFD, as expected. Surprisingly, the controls for growth firms 
(BTM) and liquidity (TIE) are not significant for any of the ARFD measures. The overall results 
support H1 that corporate governance will promote more transparent disclosure.  
The results to test H2a and H2b are presented in Tables 5a and 5b. The first stage regression 
for H2a and H2b is the same for H1 and can be found in Table 4a. Table 5b presents the results for 
the test of H2a of the association between PARFD and the cost of debt for firms with strong 
corporate governance (CGOV=1). Unexpectedly, three measures of ARFD (1A_TW, 1A_CRW, and 
1A_CSRW) have positive associations with cost of debt (RATING). This result suggests that strong 
corporate governance is not recognized by public lenders as a credible signal of lower risk. 
Therefore, the higher cost of debt for these PARFD firms observed in Chapter 3 persists in the 
presence of strong corporate governance. It is possible that public lenders are more concerned 
about risk and are not sophisticated enough to adjust for the effect of strong corporate governance 
in evaluating firm risk. As expected, the control for firm size (LASSET) and profitability (ROA) 
show a negative correlation with cost of debt. Thus, large and profitable firms with strong corporate 
governance have lower cost of debt. The control for growth firms (BTM), however, shows positive 
association with RATING which contradicts the expected negative correlation. A possible 
explanation for the higher cost of debt is that growth firms do not yet have the reputation or 
resources to command more favourable debt ratings. As expected, the control for leverage (LEV) 
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and LOSS firms have positive associations with cost of debt. The control variables for audit quality 
(BIGN), bankruptcy risk (oZ_SCORE), liquidity (TIE), and disclosure comprehensiveness 
(FILE_TW) are not significant for all RFDs measures.  
Table 5b presents the result for H2b examining the association between PARFD and cost 
of debt for firms with weak corporate governance (CGOV=0). It is expected that these firms will 
have higher cost of debt as penalty for greater risk which is further underscored by the weak 
corporate governance structure. The results confirm this expectation as all RFDs, except total 
number of words (1A_TW) and financial risk words (1A_CFRW), are positively associated with 
RATING. Similar to the results for strong corporate governance firms, controls for firm size 
(LASSET) and profitability (ROA) have negative associations with cost of debt, while leverage 
(LEV) and LOSS have positive associations with cost of debt. Consistent with the expectation, the 
control for disclosure comprehensiveness (FILE_TW) shows positive association with RATING. 
The controls for audit quality (BIGN), bankruptcy risk (oZ_SCORE), liquidity risk (TIE), and 
disclosure comprehensiveness (FILE_TW) are not significant. 
 In summary, the results do not support H2a that strong corporate governance can mitigate 
cost of debt for public firms but agrees with H2b that risky firms (PARFD) with weak corporate 
governance will still have a higher cost of debt.  
4.5 Robustness Test 
4.5.1 Individual Corporate Governance Measures 
In order to examine the individual effect of corporate governance measures, I examine the 
hypotheses in this chapter using the three corporate governance variables (IND, EXPERT, and 
MAT). Untabulated results for H1 show positive associations between proportion of independent 
directors (IND) and all RFD measures. The results also show significant positive associations 
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between proportion of expert directors (EXPERT) and two RFD measures (1A_CFRW and 1A-
CSRW). However, the results are not significant for board maturity (BMAT). The overall result is 
similar to that of the composite measure of governance and also supports H1 that corporate 
governance promotes transparency in reporting. The results for H2a show significant positive 
associations between two corporate governance measures (IND and BMAT) and RATING for risky 
firms (PARFD) with strong corporate governance. These results do not support H2a on the role of 
strong corporate governance in mitigating cost of debt. Similar to the results using the composite 
measure of corporate governance, the results for the individual corporate governance measures 
support H2b that risky firms (PARFD) with weak corporate governance still have higher cost of 
debt.  
Overall, the results of this test support the main findings in this chapter for H1 and H2b. 
4.5.2 Alternate Risk Factor Disclosure Measures 
To further examine whether the usefulness of RFDs is only limited to Item1A-RFD, I measure 
RFDs using Campbell et al.’s (2014) risk words from Item 7-Management Discussion and Analysis 
(MD&A). Contrary to the results obtained using Item 1A-RFDs, the results show a negative 
association for legal risk words (1A_CLRW). While the results for H2a did not show any significant 
association for risky firms with strong corporate governance, the results for H2b show positive 
associations between PARFD and RATING in support of H2b. This is similar to the result for H2b 
for using Item 1A-RFD. Overall results using Item 7-MD&A only support H2b.  
4.6. Conclusion 
This study examines the effect of corporate governance on managerial discretion in reporting RFDs 
and the subsequent effect on cost of debt in the public debt market. Agency theory predicts that 
strong corporate governance promotes disclosure transparency. To investigate the effect of 
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corporate governance on risk disclosure, I first examine the association between the composite 
score (GOV) of three corporate governance measures (independent directors (IND), expert 
directors (EXPERT), and board maturity (BMAT)) and managerial discretion in RFDs (ARFD). 
Then, I examine the role of strong and weak corporate governance (CGOV) on the relationship 
between cost of debt and ARFD for higher risk firms (PARFD). I expect riskier firms with strong 
corporate governance will have lower cost of debt in line with the risk mitigating effect of strong 
corporate governance. Similarly, I expect riskier firms (PARFD) with weak corporate governance 
to have higher cost of debt. 
Using the public debt sample from Chapter 3 of this dissertation, I find positive associations 
between GOV and discretionary reporting of RFDs (ARFD) in support of the transparency effect 
of corporate governance. Unexpectedly, however, I find that risky firms with strong corporate 
governance still have a high cost of debt. Similarly, risky firms with weak corporate governance 
have high cost of debt, as predicted. The results suggest public lenders are concerned about firm 
risk and do not evaluate the effect of corporate governance on risk. 
Similar to the findings for the composite corporate governance measure, alternate tests 
using the individual corporate governance measures (IND, EXPERT, and BMAT) show consistent 
results. A second alternate test using risk information in Item 7-MD&A disclosure only 
corroborates the higher cost of debt for risky firms (PARFD) with weak corporate governance. 
A limitation noted in this study is the weak results for some determinants of RFDs. 
However, this is the first study to examine the role of corporate governance on discretionary 
reporting of Item1A-RFD using these determinants. There is opportunity for future studies to 
develop other proxies for similar research. My study contributes to the mandatory disclosure, 
corporate governance, and capital market research, and these findings are useful to organizations 
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implementing corporate governance structures and to regulators recommending mandatory 
disclosures. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Data Summary 
Public debt with corporate governance variables 6,053 
Drop Item 1A <30 words (1,987) 
Incomplete data for all variables  (1,917) 
Final data 2,149 
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Table 2: Description of Variables 
 Variable Description 
1 RATING S&P debt issuer rating. RATING takes values from 1 to 22 from the best to 
the worst: AAA=1, AA+=2, AA=3, AA- =4, A+=5, A=6,  A- =7, BBB+=8, 
BBB=9, BBB- =10,  BB+=11, BB=12, BB- =13, B+=14, B=15, B-=16, 
CCC+=17, CCC=18, CCC-=19, CC=20, D=21, SD=22. 
2 IND Dummy=1 if IND>median (IND). Where, IND is the proportion of 
Independent Directors. These Directors are stated as Independent in the 
data 
3 EXPERT Dummy=1 if EXPERT>median (EXPERT). Where, EXPERT is the log of 
the number of directors employed in academia, accounting, law, consulting, 
financial services, investing, and medicine 
4 BMAT Dummy=1 if MAT<median (MAT). Where, MAT is the log of the average 
age of directors, or board maturity 
5 GOV GOV is the sum of IND+EXPERT+BMAT 
6 CGOV CGOV is dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if GOV>median and 0 
otherwise 
7 1A_TW Log of total number of words that appear in the firm’s 10-K disclosure Item 
IA + 1 
8 1A_CRW Log of total number of risk words that appear in the firm’s 10-K disclosure 
Item IA + 1, based on Campbell et al. 2014 
9 1A_CFRW Log of total number of financial risk words that appear in the firm’s 10-K 
disclosure Item 1A + 1, based on Campbell et al. 2014 
10 1A_CIRW Log of total number of idiosyncratic risk words that appear in the firm’s 10-
K disclosure Item 1A + 1, based on Campbell et al. 2014 
11 1A_CSRW Log of total number of systematic risk words that appear in the firm’s 10-
K disclosure Item 1A + 1, based on Campbell et al. 2014 
12 1A_CLRW Log of total number of legal risk words that appear in the firm’s 10-K 
disclosure Item 1A + 1, based on Campbell et al. 2014 
13 ARFD Equals absolute value of residuals from the regression of risk disclosure on 
its determinants 
14 7_TW Log of total number of words that appear in the firm’s 10-K disclosure Item 
7 + 1 
15 7_CRW Log of total number of risk words that appear in the firm’s 10-K disclosure 
Item 7 + 1, based on Campbell et al. 2014 
16 7_CFRW Log of total number of financial risk words that appear in the firm’s 10-K 
disclosure Item 7 + 1, based on Campbell et al. 2014 
17 7_CIRW Log of total number of idiosyncratic risk words that appear in the firm’s 10-
K disclosure Item 7 + 1, based on Campbell et al. 2014 
18 7_CSRW Log of total number of systematic risk words that appear in the firm’s 10-
K disclosure Item 7 + 1, based on Campbell et al. 2014 
19 7_CLRW Log of total number of legal risk words that appear in the firm’s 10-K 
disclosure Item 7 + 1, based on Campbell et al. 2014 
20 NARFD Equals absolute value of negative residual from the regression of risk 
disclosure on its determinants if residual is less than zero 
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 Variable Description 
21 FILE_TW Log of total number of words in the 10-K report 
22 LEV Book value of debt divided by total assets 
23 LIT Litigation =1 for firms within SIC code 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3676, 
5200-5961, 7370-7374, and 8731-8734 
24 SIZE Market value of equity 
25 ETR Total tax expense divided by pre-tax income 
26 CPIChange Change in CPI (Inflation) from CRSP Treasury and Inflation Index 
27 BTM Book value of equity divided by market value of equity 
28 BIGN Equals 1 for large auditors and zero otherwise. Large auditors are coded 1-
8 in Compustat data AU 
29 LOSS Equals 1 if firm have negative earnings or zero otherwise 
30 oZ_SCORE 
(Altman) 
Orthogonized Z_score = 1.2 * (working capital/ total assets) 
+1.4*(Retained earnings) +3.3*(earnings before interest and tax/total 
assets) +0.6*(market value of equity/total liability) +0.999*(Sales/total 
asset) 
31 SD_EARN Standard deviation of quarterly earnings over the past three years starting 
from the current quarter 
32 LASSET Log of total assets 
33 TIE Times Interest earned is tax expense divided by income before taxes 
34 ROA Return on asset measured as net income divided by total assets 
35 INDUSTRY Fama_French 12-industry classification 
36 YEAR Control for year effects 
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Table 3a: Descriptive Analysis 
(N=2,149) 
  Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Lower 
Quartile 
Upper 
Quartile 
RATING 9.31 9.00 2.92 7.00 11.00 
GOV 1.44 1.00 0.87 1.00 2.00 
CGOV 0.46 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
IA_TW 16,417.61 6,373.00 22,182.72 3,501.00 25,660.00 
IA_CRW 813.83 448.00 963.01 251.00 1,102.00 
IA_CFRW 115.62 46.00 302.46 21.00 165.00 
1A_CSRW 284.87 130.00 403.83 75.00 339.00 
1A_CIRW 299.43 180.00 306.70 90.00 411.00 
1A_CLRW 85.07 61.00 80.92 34.00 108.00 
FILE_TW 263,769.20 212,666.00 240,440.10 71,382.00 401,541.00 
SD_EARN 181.40 47.70 616.22 17.59 122.73 
CPIChange 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ETR 0.48 0.32 9.33 0.23 0.37 
LEV 0.26 0.25 0.14 0.17 0.33 
SIZE 8.76 8.67 1.45 7.73 9.74 
LIT 0.22 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.00 
LASSET 8.89 8.77 1.28 7.97 9.77 
BTM 0.49 0.43 0.40 0.27 0.64 
ROA 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.09 
LOSS 0.04 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 
BIGN 0.99 1.00 0.11 1.00 1.00 
Z_SCORE 4.11 3.74 2.29 2.45 5.08 
TIE 13.10 4.89 77.02 2.43 9.42 
Table 3a reports descriptive statistics for all variables included in the analyses. Statistics presented include the number 
of observations (N), mean, median, standard deviation, lower quartile and upper quartile. All the variables are defined 
in table 2. RATING is the numerical value of S&P issuer debt rating. GOV is the composite score of: IND an indicator 
variable taking the value of 1 for firms with proportion of independent directors greater than the sample median and 
otherwise zero, EXPERT an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms with proportion of expert directors greater 
than the sample median and otherwise zero, and BMAT an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms with log 
of directors’ age greater than the sample median and otherwise zero. 1A_TW is the total number of words in Item- 1A. 
1A_CRW is total number of risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CFRW is total number of financial risk words in Item-1A. 
1A_CIRW is total number of idiosyncratic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CSRW is total number of systematic risk words 
in Item-1A. 1A_CLRW is total number of legal risk words in Item-1A. FILE_TW is total number of words in annual 
10-K report. SD_EARN is standard deviation of quarterly earnings over 3 years. CPIChange is the proxy for economic 
risk. ETR is the proxy for tax risk. LEV is firm leverage. SIZE is log of market value of equity. LIT is the proxy for 
litigation risk. FACAMT is the facility amount in $’m.  MAT is the proxy for loan maturity. SEC is the dummy for 
secured loans. RES is the proxy for restructuring loans. REV is the proxy for revolving loans. LASSET is the log of 
total assets. BTM is book value of equity to market value of equity. ROA is return on assets. LOSS is the dummy for 
firms with negative earnings. BIGN is the dummy for large auditors. Z_SCORE is bankruptcy score based on Altman 
(1968). TIE is times interest earned ratio. 
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Table 3b: Correlation 
  RATING GOV CGOV TW CRW CFRW CIRW CSRW CLRW FILE_TW SD CPI 
RATING 1                       
GOV -0.08 1                     
CGOV -0.08 0.87 1                   
1A_TW 0.09 0.04 0.03 1                 
1A_CRW 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.96 1               
1A_CFRW 0.24 0.02 0.01 0.90 0.90 1             
1A_CIRW 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.92 0.93 0.78 1           
1A_CSRW 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.87 0.94 0.84 0.78 1         
1A_CLRW 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.78 0.83 0.70 0.75 0.74 1       
FILE_TW -0.06 0.17 0.17 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.21 1     
SD_EARN -0.14 0.07 0.09 -0.07 -0.06 -0.08 -0.07 -0.03 -0.05 0.10 1   
CPIChange 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 0.00 -0.07 -0.09 -0.05 -0.01 1 
ETR 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.03 
LEV 0.36 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.07 -0.03 0.00 0.08 0.10 -0.05 -0.14 
SIZE -0.71 0.11 0.12 -0.10 -0.09 -0.22 -0.05 -0.09 -0.03 0.21 0.31 0.03 
LIT -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 0.00 -0.05 -0.09 0.07 -0.14 -0.10 -0.04 0.05 0.22 
LASSET -0.56 0.16 0.16 -0.08 -0.06 -0.14 -0.07 -0.04 0.01 0.25 0.38 -0.04 
BTM 0.27 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.04 -0.06 0.07 -0.07 
ROA -0.37 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.07 -0.14 -0.02 -0.09 -0.07 -0.04 0.00 0.08 
LOSS 0.26 0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.04 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.10 0.00 
BIGN -0.16 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.02 
oZ_SCORE -0.17 -0.13 -0.13 -0.07 -0.13 -0.17 0.00 -0.20 -0.19 -0.15 -0.05 0.19 
TIE -0.10 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.06 
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Table 3b (continued) 
  ETR LEV SIZE LIT LASSET BTM ROA LOSS BIGN oZ_SCORE TIE 
ETR 1                     
LEV 0.01 1                   
SIZE 0.01 -0.24 1                 
LIT 0.00 -0.15 0.17 1               
LASSET 0.03 -0.12 0.88 0.12 1             
BTM 0.01 -0.15 -0.33 -0.06 -0.06 1           
ROA -0.01 -0.27 0.32 0.08 0.09 -0.21 1         
LOSS -0.01 0.09 -0.15 0.02 -0.07 0.15 -0.4 1       
BIGN 0.00 -0.06 0.16 -0.01 0.14 -0.10 0.06 0.00 1     
oZ_SCORE -0.02 -0.42 0.13 0.27 -0.12 -0.21 0.38 -0.16 -0.01 1   
TIE 0.00 -0.18 0.10 0.12 0.03 -0.07 0.15 -0.04 0.02 0.21 1 
Table 3b presents Pearson correlation matrix for the study sample. Variables significant at 5% and below are in bold. All the variables are defined in table 2. 
RATING is the numerical value of S&P issuer debt rating. GOV is the composite score of: IND an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms with 
proportion of independent directors greater than the sample median and otherwise zero, EXPERT an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms with 
proportion of expert directors greater than the sample median and otherwise zero, and BMAT an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms with log of 
directors’ age greater than the sample median and otherwise zero.  1A_TW is the log of total number of words in Item- 1A. 1A_CRW is log of total number of risk 
words in Item-1A. 1A_CFRW is the log of total number of financial risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CIRW is the log of total number of idiosyncratic risk words in 
Item-1A. 1A_CSRW is the log of total number of systematic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CLRW is the log of total number of legal risk words in Item-1A. FILE_TW 
is the log of total number of words in annual 10-K report. SD_EARN is standard deviation of quarterly earnings over 3 years. CPIChange is the proxy for 
economic risk. ETR is the proxy for tax risk. LEV is firm leverage. SIZE is market value of equity. LIT is the proxy for litigation risk. FACAMT is the facility 
amount in $’m.  MAT is the proxy for loan maturity. SEC is the dummy for secured loans. RES is the proxy for restructuring loans. REV is the proxy for revolving 
loans. LASSET is the log of total assets. BTM is book value of equity to market value of equity. ROA is return on assets. LOSS is the dummy for firms with 
negative earnings. BIGN is the dummy for large auditors. Z_SCORE is bankruptcy score based on Altman (1968). TIE is times interest earned ratio. 
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Table 4a: H1 Stage 1 
  Sign 1A_TW 1A_CRW 1A_CFRW 1A_CIRW 1A_CSRW 1A_CLRW 
SIZE + -0.11*** -0.08*** -0.20*** -0.08*** -0.07** -0.03 
    (-3.28) (-3.02) (-5.38) (-2.89) (-2.34) (-1.11) 
FILE_TW + 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.21*** 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 
    (2.98) (3.00) (3.27) (2.70) (3.06) (3.13) 
LEV + -0.52** -0.32 0.05 -0.45* -0.34 0.04 
    (-1.98) (-1.40) -0.16 (-1.89) (-1.35) -0.15 
ETR + -0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
    (-3.02) (-3.42) (-1.04) (-2.70) (-3.28) (-4.54) 
1.Lit + 0.14 0.07 -0.03 0.10 0.11 -0.12 
    (1.05) (0.68) (-0.17) (1.01) (0.92) (-1.19) 
CPIChange + -0.79 1.05 -8.54 0.98 5.37 -3.09 
    (-0.08) (0.12) (-0.68) (0.10) (0.56) (-0.39) 
SD_EARN + 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (-1.11) (-1.07) (-0.64) (-1.29) (-0.69) (-1.36) 
Constant   8.30*** 5.45*** 3.37*** 4.90*** 3.79*** 2.47*** 
    (9.88) (7.33) (3.78) (6.24) (4.99) (3.44) 
                
Observations   2,149 2,149 2,149 2,149 2,149 2,149 
R-squared   0.10 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.20 0.17 
Year FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1(significant variables at two-tailed test) 
Table 4a present coefficient estimates from the regression of RFDs on the determinants for the public debt sample. t-
statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by firm. The variables 
are winsorized at 2% and 98%.  All the variables are defined in table 2.1A_TW is the log of total number of words in 
Item- 1A. 1A_CRW is log of total number of risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CFRW is the log of total number of 
financial risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CIRW is the log of total number of idiosyncratic risk words in Item-1A. 
1A_CSRW is the log of total number of systematic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CLRW is the log of total number of 
legal risk words in Item-1A. SIZE is the proxy for regulatory risk and measured as the market value of equity. 
FILE_TW is the log of total number of words in annual 10-K report. LEV is firm leverage. ETR is the proxy for tax 
risk. LIT is the proxy for litigation risk. CPIChange is the proxy for economic risk. SD_EARN is the proxy for 
idiosyncratic risk and is measured as the standard deviation of quarterly earnings over 3 years. 
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Table 4b: H1 Stage 2 
  Sign 1A_TW 1A_CRW 1A_CFRW 1A_CIRW 1A_CSRW 1A_CLRW 
GOV + 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 
    (3.89) (3.70) (3.73) (3.97) (4.01) (2.97) 
LASSET - -0.03** -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 
    (-2.29) (-0.81) (-0.91) (-0.41) (-0.19) (0.48) 
BTM - -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 0.01 -0.06 -0.04 
    (-0.88) (-0.86) (-1.34) (0.24) (-1.64) (-1.25) 
LEV + -0.62*** -0.50*** -0.41*** -0.46*** -0.52*** -0.39*** 
    (-5.68) (-4.99) (-3.06) (-4.33) (-4.79) (-3.52) 
ROA - 0.25 0.15 0.34 0.14 -0.04 0.16 
    (1.40) (0.95) (1.58) (0.81) (-0.24) (0.90) 
LOSS + -0.09 -0.05 -0.15* -0.07 -0.02 -0.06 
    (-1.20) (-0.80) (-1.68) (-0.94) (-0.31) (-0.84) 
BIGN - -0.08 -0.07 0.05 -0.10 -0.02 -0.36*** 
    (-0.76) (-0.66) (0.37) (-0.93) (-0.22) (-3.22) 
oZ_SCORE - -0.08*** -0.06*** -0.03 -0.06*** -0.04* -0.02 
    (-4.03) (-3.34) (-1.05) (-3.12) (-1.87) (-0.97) 
TIE + 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (1.59) (1.42) (1.46) (1.10) (0.61) (0.22) 
FILE_TW + 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04* -0.03 
    (1.34) (0.89) (0.61) (0.36) (1.74) (-1.39) 
Constant   0.91*** 0.73** 0.76* 0.91*** 0.47 1.54*** 
    (2.80) (2.46) (1.90) (2.84) (1.46) (4.68) 
Observations   2,149 2,149 2,149 2,149 2,149 2,149 
R-squared   0.16 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.08 
Year FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1(significant variables at two-tailed test) 
Table 4b present coefficient estimates from the regression of ARFD obtained in Table 4a on the governance 
including the control variables for the public debt sample. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated 
using robust standard errors clustered by firm. The variables are winsorized at 2% and 98%.  All the variables are 
defined in table 2. GOV is the composite score of: IND an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms with 
proportion of independent directors greater than the sample median and otherwise zero, EXPERT an indicator 
variable taking the value of 1 for firms with proportion of expert directors greater than the sample median and 
otherwise zero, and BMAT an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms with log of directors’ age greater than 
the sample median and otherwise zero. 1A_TW is the log of total number of words in Item- 1A. 1A_CRW is log of 
total number of risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CFRW is the log of total number of financial risk words in Item-1A. 
1A_CIRW is the log of total number of idiosyncratic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CSRW is the log of total number of 
systematic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CLRW is the log of total number of legal risk words in Item-1A.  LASSET is 
log of total assets. BTM is the book value of equity to market value of equity. ROA is return on assets. LOSS is the 
dummy for firms with negative earnings. BIGN is the dummy for large auditors. oZ_SCORE is bankruptcy score 
based on Altman (1968). TIE is times interest earned ratio.  
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Table 5a: H2 Stage 2 Strong Governance 
RATING Sign 1A_TW 1A_CRW 1A_CFRW 1A_CIRW 1A_CSRW 1A_CLRW 
PARFD - 0.15* 0.24*** 0.09 0.06 0.20** 0.09 
    (1.88) (2.69) (1.32) (0.69) (2.26) (0.85) 
LASSET - -0.67*** -0.65*** -0.62*** -0.66*** -0.67*** -0.70*** 
    (-13.03) (-13.49) (-12.61) (-13.71) (-13.43) (-15.02) 
BTM - 0.80*** 0.82*** 0.73*** 0.79*** 0.78*** 0.56*** 
    (5.57) (5.98) (5.04) (5.79) (5.76) (3.82) 
LEV + 4.18*** 4.23*** 4.36*** 3.97*** 4.01*** 3.78*** 
    (8.34) (8.73) (9.03) (8.43) (8.19) (8.14) 
ROA - -0.69 -0.75 -2.29** -0.89* -0.66 -3.88*** 
    (-1.45) (-1.62) (-2.57) (-1.90) (-1.41) (-4.14) 
LOSS + 0.39 0.68** 0.57** 0.51* 0.75*** 0.21 
    (1.28) (2.45) (2.13) (1.75) (2.83) (0.81) 
BIGN - -7.63 -7.66 -7.57 -7.49 -7.50 -7.07 
    (-0.04) (-0.05) (-0.05) (-0.04) (-0.04) (-0.05) 
oZ_SCORE - -0.10 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.11 -0.10 
    (-1.15) (-1.24) (-1.10) (-1.09) (-1.25) (-1.18) 
TIE + 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (-1.23) (-1.23) (-0.68) (-1.36) (-1.36) (0.07) 
FILE_TW + 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.08 
    (0.55) (0.13) (0.37) (0.15) (0.50) (1.01) 
Observations   422 459 467 472 442 525 
Year FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2   0.21 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1(significant variables at two-tailed test) 
Table 5a presents coefficient estimates from the regression of RATING on the positive residuals from Table 4a for 
strong corporate governance. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated using robust standard errors 
clustered by firm. The variables are winsorized at 2% and 98%.  All the variables are defined in table 2. PARFD is 
the positive residuals from stage 1 regression in Table 5a.  RATING is the numerical value of S&P issuer debt rating.  
1A_TW is the log of total number of words in Item- 1A. 1A_CRW is log of total number of risk words in Item-1A. 
1A_CFRW is the log of total number of financial risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CIRW is the log of total number of 
idiosyncratic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CSRW is the log of total number of systematic risk words in Item-1A. 
1A_CLRW is the log of total number of legal risk words in Item-1A. FILE_TW is the log of total number of words in 
annual 10-K report. LASSET is the log of total assets. BTM is the book value of equity to market value of equity. 
ROA is return on assets LOSS is the value of dummy for firms with negative earnings. BIGN is the dummy for large 
auditors. oZ_SCORE is bankruptcy score based on Altman (1968). TIE is times interest earned ratio. 
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Table 5b: H2 Stage 2 Weak Governance 
RATING Sign 1A_TW 1A_CRW 1A_CFRW 1A_CIRW 1A_CSRW 1A_CLRW 
PARFD + 0.10 0.17* 0.06 0.17** 0.31*** 0.19** 
    (1.19) (1.81) (0.92) (1.99) (3.46) (2.06) 
LASSET - -0.78*** -0.77*** -0.71*** -0.80*** -0.79*** -0.79*** 
    (-14.88) (-15.34) (-14.76) (-16.42) (-15.31) (-16.44) 
BTM - 0.94*** 0.95*** 1.10*** 0.85*** 1.07*** 0.88*** 
    (6.22) (6.67) (7.25) (5.99) (6.99) (6.59) 
LEV + 3.62*** 3.58*** 3.65*** 3.34*** 3.47*** 3.33*** 
    (8.31) (8.59) (8.94) (8.30) (8.09) (8.36) 
ROA - -4.76*** -4.50*** -3.33*** -5.66*** -4.22*** -4.86*** 
    (-5.19) (-5.57) (-3.87) (-6.67) (-5.18) (-6.57) 
LOSS + 0.56** 0.48* 0.56** 0.54* 0.56** 0.65*** 
    (1.98) (1.78) (2.04) (1.92) (2.14) (2.59) 
BIGN - 0.30 0.16 0.20 0.22 0.11 0.06 
    (0.81) (0.46) (0.54) (0.66) (0.32) (0.19) 
oZ_SCORE - -0.08 -0.03 -0.09 -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 
    (-1.13) (-0.47) (-1.34) (-0.86) (-1.17) (-1.24) 
TIE + 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (0.37) (0.16) (-0.07) (1.23) (0.26) (1.26) 
FILE_TW + 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.14* 
    (1.15) (1.10) (0.89) (1.01) (0.90) (1.68) 
Observations   488 522 554 559 516 608 
Year FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2   0.21 0.21 0.19 0.22 0.21 0.20 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1(significant variables at two-tailed test) 
Table 5a presents coefficient estimates from the regression of RATING on the positive residuals from Table 4a for 
weak corporate governance. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated using robust standard errors 
clustered by firm. The variables are winsorized at 2% and 98%.  All the variables are defined in table 2 PARFD is 
the positive residuals from stage 1 regression in Table 5a.  RATING is the numerical value of S&P issuer debt rating.  
1A_TW is the log of total number of words in Item- 1A. 1A_CRW is log of total number of risk words in Item-1A. 
1A_CFRW is the log of total number of financial risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CIRW is the log of total number of 
idiosyncratic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CSRW is the log of total number of systematic risk words in Item-1A. 
1A_CLRW is the log of total number of legal risk words in Item-1A. FILE_TW is the log of total number of words in 
annual 10-K report. LASSET is the log of total assets. BTM is the book value of equity to market value of equity. 
ROA is return on assets LOSS is the value of dummy for firms with negative earnings. BIGN is the dummy for large 
auditors. oZ_SCORE is bankruptcy score based on Altman (1968). TIE is times interest earned ratio. 
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Chapter 5: Summary 
In light of recent discussions on the boilerplate nature of RFDs and the SEC’s concern about how 
to improve this disclosure, this dissertation examines the topics and contents of RFDs and 
empirically investigates the usefulness of this disclosure in the private and public debt markets. 
In addition, I examine the effect of strong corporate governance on managerial discretions in 
disclosing risk factors including the impact on cost of debt for risky firms in the public debt 
market. 
In the first essay, I provide directions for future research relating to the content of RFDs, its 
usefulness to investors and for debt and compensation contracts, as well as its usefulness to other 
market participants. The literature review and the proposed research topics from this dissertation 
provide a platform for future research on RFDs. The findings can be used by regulators in setting 
mandatory disclosure requirements, by debt providers in evaluating firm risk, and by management 
in implementing corporate governance structures. Further research on debt and contracting 
usefulness of RFDs can provide insight to the SEC on other stakeholders that are most likely to 
value RFDs. Similarly, future research examining the length of RFDs using different lexical 
quality proxies can provide information to the SEC on investor’s ability to understand lengthy 
RFDs. 
In the second essay, I use content analysis to show that the risk profile of firms is reflected 
in the cost of debt. I also find evidence that in the private debt market firms with RFDs above and 
below expectation have lower cost of debt. However, in the public debt market, my results show 
that disclosing higher risk than that expected is associated with higher cost of debt while disclosing 
lower risk below expectation is associated with a lower cost of debt. Considering current evidence 
on the usefulness of RFDs in the equity market, providing similar evidence on the usefulness of 
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this disclosure in the debt market closes out discussion on whether RFDs are boilerplate or not. 
The SEC can subsequently focus on improving the disclosure by providing mandate on what is 
disclosed and asking companies to provide information on how the disclosed risks will be 
addressed. Furthermore, providing evidence on institutional differences between the private and 
public debt market can provide guidance to the SEC on the targeted audience for future disclosure 
regulations.  
In the third essay, I provide evidence that strong corporate governance promotes greater 
transparency in reporting RFDs in the public debt market. I find that risky firms with weak 
corporate governance have a higher cost of debt. There is however no cost of debt mitigating effect 
for risky firms with strong corporate governance. Strong corporate governance aligns the interest 
of shareholders and managers and also enhances transparency in disclosures. Examining the 
influence of strong corporate governance on RFDs provide more information to the SEC that can 
guide future regulations that promote transparency and accountability.  
Although, RFDs are only mandatory for large firms in the US, the Canadian Securities 
Administrators can also extend this disclosure to Canadian firms. Such disclosure will aid 
investors and other capital market participants in evaluating firm risk and making appropriate 
investing and financing decisions. 
Limitations of this study are the loss of data through the data extraction software due to the 
format of the 10-K files and the weak results for some RFD determinants. It is possible that there 
are some other determinants of RFDs that are not captured in my manual matching of RFD topics.  
